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Abstract 
This thesis explores three cases of British colonial violence which occurred in the 
second half of the nineteenth century: the Perak War (1875-1876); the Hut Tax Revolt 
in Sierra Leone (1898-9) and the Anglo-Egyptian War of Reconquest in the Sudan 
(1896-99). The decision-making processes that led to atrocities being committed are 
explored, including the importance of communication between London and the 
periphery and the significance of individual colonial administrators in outbreaks of 
violence. The ways in which racial prejudices, the advocacy of a British ‘civilising 
mission’ and British racial ‘superiority’ informed colonial administrators’ decisions on 
the ground are considered. The thesis examines methods of extreme violence that were 
routinely utilised throughout the British Empire and include: the use of ‘divide and rule’ 
tactics; looting; a disregard for international standards of warfare; the use of collective 
reprisals on civilians and scorched earth policies; starvation tactics on the enemy as well 
as the wider population. Furthermore, the relevance of British colonial violence within a 
wider context of European warfare and the genocidal violence of the first half of the 
twentieth century is examined. There has been a neglect of British colonial atrocities 
within the historiography of colonial violence and this study demonstrates the ways in 
which a consideration of instances of British colonial violence can tell us much about 
the dynamics of extreme violence. The thesis is divided into five sections; first it 
considers the place of colonial violence within the historiography of the British Empire 
and genocide studies; the three case studies follow and the final chapter provides an 
analysis of the thesis’ findings and discusses its relevance for our understanding of both 
European and colonial violence, thereby placing colonial violence within a wider 
framework of extreme European violence.  
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7 
Introduction 
We can no longer afford to take that which was good in the past and simply 
call it our heritage, to discard the bad and simply think of it as a dead load 
which by itself time will bury in oblivion.1 
This study considers incidents of colonial violence and examines the nature of colonial 
warfare in the British Empire, focusing specifically on the second half of the nineteenth 
century, therefore within the period of ‘new imperialism’. This thesis comprises of three 
case studies: the Perak War in Malaya (1875-6); the Hut Tax War in Sierra Leone 
(1898-9); the Anglo-Egyptian War of Reconquest in the Sudan (1896-99). In each 
instance, the British used a variety of methods to enforce and maintain their power in 
these regions. These methods included: the use of ‘divide and rule’ tactics; looting; a 
disregard for international standards of warfare; the use of collective reprisals on 
civilians and scorched earth policies; starvation tactics on the enemy as well as the 
wider population. Throughout, I will investigate issues that contributed to outbreaks of 
extreme violence, including Britain’s superiority complex, which led to an intricate web 
of contradictory policies and justifications for imperial oppression. There will be an 
exploration of the increasing influence of ‘scientific racism’ and the racial prejudices 
which accompanied the British imperial project and how these developments influenced 
the manner in which the ‘men on the spot’ dealt with indigenous populations. I will 
consider the role of these men in shaping events on the ground and the nature of the 
violence once hostilities broke out.2 This includes a consideration of communications 
between London and the periphery, which, I argue, are of importance in terms of 
understanding the decision-making processes that led to the use of more extreme tactics 
of violence. The part played by Britain’s military men in advocating and participating in 
extreme methods of violence is central to this thesis. I will also address the influence of 
politicians in the imperial metropole related to the use of extreme violence across the 
Empire to suppress indigenous opposition.  
Unfortunately, it has been too often the case that standard research to date on the 
British Empire persists in viewing its ‘positive’ elements without much mention of 
                                                
1 Hannah Arendt, preface to the first edition, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Harcourt Brace & 
Company, 1976 [1951]), ix.  
2 On the role of the ‘man on the spot’ in colonial expansion see: Roger D. Long, The Man on the Spot: 
Essays on British Empire History (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995).  
8 
those who suffered.3 There has been, until recently, a marked reluctance amongst 
imperial historians to engage in discussions regarding the more negative aspects of 
empire, including the role of extreme violence and genocide. There are of course 
exceptions and V. G. Kiernan’s work is significant in this regard.4 The increasing 
willingness of historians to discuss colonial violence in the context of the British 
Empire marks the beginning of a much welcome shift in the historiography, but it 
remains the case that studies of empire and violence based on archival research are 
lacking. The attention that has been paid to British colonial campaigns is generally 
limited to traditional and, at times, ‘parochial’ military history.5 Examples of British 
colonial violence have often been studied in isolation, rather than within a consideration 
of the wider implications of the role of violence in the British Empire and studies tend 
to neglect the wider context and how these may be part of a broader pattern of both 
British and European colonial violence; examples include the suppression of the Indian 
‘Mutiny’;6 the Morant Bay Rebellion;7 the Boer War;8 and the Amritsar Massacre.9 
Scholars of counterinsurgency are examining the violence of the British Empire 
focusing on the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936-9, and the end of empire in Malaya 
                                                
3 Also commented on by Mark Levene, ‘Empires, Native Peoples, and Genocide’, in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), 
Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History (New 
York: Berghahn, 2010 [2008]), 200, n9. 
4 See: V. G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man, and White Man in the Age of 
Empire (London: The Cresset Library, 1988 [1969]); idem, European Empires from Conquest to 
Collapse, 1815-1960 (London: Fontana and Leicester University Press, 1982); idem, Imperialism and Its 
Contradictions, edited by Harvey J. Kaye (London: Routledge, 1995). See also: Anthony Pagden, 
Peoples and Empires: Europeans and the Rest of the World, From Antiquity to the Present (London: 
Phoenix Press, 2002 [2001]); Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making 
of the Third World (London: Verso, 2001). On colonial warfare: Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial 
Conquest in Africa 1830-1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998); J. A. de Moor and H. L. 
Wesseling (eds), Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa (Leiden: Brill, 
1989).  
5 See, Kim A. Wagner, ‘Seeing Like a Soldier: The Amritsar Massacre and the Politics of Military 
History’, in Martin Thomas and Gareth Curless (eds), Decolonization and Conflict: Colonial 
Comparisons and Legacies (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 23-37. 
6 The use of the term ‘mutiny’ is certainly questionable, however, considering its prevalent use in the 
historiography, the term will be used throughout this study. See: Kim A. Wagner, ‘“Treading upon Fires”: 
The “Mutiny”-Motif and Colonial Anxieties in British India’, Past and Present, 218:1 (2013), 159, n2: 
As Wagner notes, the use of the term denotes the British representation of the Indian Uprising of 1857. 
See also: idem, ‘The Marginal Mutiny: The New Historiography of the Indian Uprising of 1857’, History 
Compass, 9:10 (2011), 760-66. One exception is: Jill C. Bender, The 1857 Indian Uprising and the 
British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
7 R. W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
8 See for example: Paula Krebs, Gender, Race and the Writing of Empire: Public Discourse and the Boer 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: 
Abacus, 2010 [1979]). 
9 For a ‘whitewash’ approach see: Nick Lloyd, The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful 
Day (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011) and Kim A. Wagner’s criticisms: Review of Nick Lloyd, The Amritsar 
Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day, (review no. 1224): 
http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1224. Accessed: 30 June 2016. 
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and Kenya.10 Indeed, recent research on the violent processes of decolonisation has 
proved particularly fruitful – based on archival research – and demonstrates that British 
decolonisation did not reflect a ‘graceful exit’, as the prevailing view suggests but that 
extreme violence was continually resorted to as Britain clung to power.11 Scholars are 
increasingly utilising a range of concepts to explore the relationship between European 
colonialism and violence, including: ‘small wars’/colonial wars, ‘total war’, colonial 
genocide, extreme violence and atrocities for example. In recent years, genocide 
scholars have been exploring the relationship between genocide and colonialism and 
incidents of genocidal violence that are under consideration include Rhodesia, Ireland 
and Zululand.12 In particular, a great deal of attention has been paid to the genocidal 
destruction of the Aborigines in Australia and the literature is extensive. 13  It is 
nevertheless the case that historians of the British Empire have failed to incorporate 
these events into ‘British History’ and, even when historians do acknowledge Australia 
in Britain’s past, the question of genocide tends to be ignored.14  
                                                
10 For example, Donald Featherstone, Colonial Small Wars 1837-1901 (Newton Abbot, Devon: David & 
Charles, 1973). The counterinsurgency literature will be discussed in chapter 1.  
11 Important studies on the violent processes of British decolonisation include: David Anderson, Histories 
of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
2005); Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London: Jonathan Cape, 
2005); Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Robert Holland (ed.), Emergencies and Disorder in the 
European Empires After 1945 (London: Routledge, 1994); Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: 
Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-80 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).  
12 On British colonialism in Ireland see: Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume 
II: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 48-51, 53-57; Robbie 
McVeigh, ‘“The Balance of Cruelty”: Ireland, Britain and the Logic of Genocide’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 10:4 (2008), 541-61; Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and 
Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), 169-212. 
On genocidal violence in Zululand see: Michael Lieven, ‘“Butchering the Brutes All Over the Place”: 
Total War and Massacre in Zululand, 1879’, History, 18 (1999), 614-32; for Rhodesia see: Levene, Rise 
of the West, 252-56. 
13 Of course the use of the term ‘Aborigines’ erroneously suggests that the indigenous populations 
perceived themselves to be a single entity: see A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide and Settler Society in 
Australian History’, in Moses (ed.), Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen 
Indigenous Children in Australian History (New York: Berghahn, 2005), 19. On ‘indigenous’ identitites 
see: Philip D. Morgan, ‘Encounters between British and “Indigenous” Peoples, c. 1500-c. 1800’, in 
Martin Daunton and Rick Halpern (eds), Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous 
Peoples, 1600–1850 (London: UCL Press, 1999), 45-49. Key examples that broke the ‘great Australian 
silence’ (W. H. E. Stanner) include: Raymond Evans, Kay Saunders and Kathryn Cronin, Exclusion, 
Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in Colonial Queensland (Sydney: Australia and New 
Zealand Book Company, 1975); Charles Dunford Rowley, The Destruction of Aboriginal Society 
(Sydney: Penguin, 1983); Lyndall Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians (London: University of Queensland 
Press, 1982); Colin Tatz, With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide (London: Verso, 2003); Henry 
Reynolds, An Indelible Stain? The Question of Genocide in Australia’s History (Ringwood: Viking, 
2001). 
14 See Richard Gott, ‘Shoot Them to Be Sure’, in Stephen Howe (ed.), The New Imperial Histories 
Reader (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 108.  
10 
As well as exploring violence within military campaigns, scholars have also 
been highlighting inherent everyday violence within the colonies, emphasising aspects 
of British rule such as the failings and contradictions within the colonial legal systems, 
demonstrating the huge gulf between the principle and practice of British law in 
colonial rule and therefore emphasising the inherent hypocrisy within the running of the 
British Empire.15  Hence, scholars are increasingly addressing the integral role of 
colonial violence in the Empire and its conquests across the globe; this thesis will 
discuss the importance of such violence in enforcing and maintaining Britain’s authority 
amongst the native populations. Alongside this academic interest, the last few years 
have witnessed a resurgence in popular interest regarding the British Empire, which 
tends to adhere to the longstanding view that the Empire was fundamentally ‘a good 
thing’ and was beneficial to both the colonisers and the colonised.16 Hence, attempts 
within Britain to delve into its colonial past have remained largely superficial and the 
aim is furthering British pride, more than any genuine endeavour to encourage open and 
honest discussion to increase our understanding of all sides of empire.17 One must hope 
that new research and interest into Britain’s dark colonial history will be encouraged by 
recent proof that key records were destroyed in the decolonisation process.18 
It is astounding that it has taken so long for scholars to seriously address issues 
of extreme violence and empire as there is already a legacy of critique in this regard, 
which is over half a century old. When Hannah Arendt discussed the idea of 
‘boomerang effects’, she was not alone in suggesting links between European 
colonialism and the advent of fascism and genocide on European soil.19 Prior to World 
                                                
15 See for example: Elizabeth Kolsky, Colonial Justice in British India: White Violence and the Rule of 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Amanda Nettlebeck and Robert Foster, ‘Colonial 
Judiciaries, Aboriginal Protection and South Australia’s Policy of Punishing “with Exemplary Severity”’, 
Australian Historical Studies, 41:3 (2010), 319-36.  
16 See for example: Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 
2002) and the accompanying TV series; Jon Wilson, ‘Niall Ferguson’s Imperial Passion’, History 
Workshop Journal, 56 (2003), 175-83. 
17 For one example of superficial attempts to understand the Empire’s relationship to violence see: 
Andrew Marr, ‘Empire’, Start the Week, BBC Radio 4, 10 October 2011, with Richard Gott and Jeremy 
Paxman inter alia.  
18 See: Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Sins of Colonialists Lay Concealed for Decades in Secret 
Archive’, The Guardian, 18 April 2012.  
19 Arendt, Origins, 206, 223. For further discussion see: A. Dirk Moses, ‘Hannah Arendt, Imperialisms, 
and the Holocaust’, in Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama (eds), German Colonialism: Race, the 
Holocaust, and Postwar Germany (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 72-92; Dan Stone, 
‘Defending the Plural: Hannah Arendt and Genocide Studies’, New Formations, 71 (2011), 46-57; 
Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), ch. 2. With regards to a ‘boomerang effect’ and 
counterinsurgency see: Sibylle Scheipers, ‘Counterinsurgency or Irregular Warfare? Historiography and 
the Study of “Small Wars”’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25:5–6 (2014), 880. Jean-Paul Sartre also 
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War II and the events of the Holocaust, Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir 
Lenin had already presented the idea that the violence of European imperialism would 
have repercussions closer to home. 20  In the post-war period anti-colonial critics 
including Aimé Cesairé, W. E. B. Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, as well as Jean-Paul Sartre 
made it clear that for them the connections between the violent destruction of 
colonialism and Nazi policies were more than obvious.21 However, as Dan Stone states, 
these theorists ‘all made the connection but took it for granted rather than seeing it as 
the problem they needed to investigate’;22 Arendt subsequently began this task, and her 
ideas – which were never fully developed – are now being examined and developed 
further by historians and genocide scholars who are exploring the ways in which the 
violent practices of imperialism ‘came home’. 23  This connection is perhaps not 
surprising considering the fact that Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term ‘genocide’ in 
1944, very much included colonial violence in his concept of genocide, his definition of 
which bears a distinct similarity to British colonial policies throughout the Empire at 
various points.24  
Importantly, genocide scholars are placing colonial violence within a wider 
framework of genocide and mass killing, which also links colonial violence with 
twentieth-century European warfare.25 This body of work provides us with an approach 
that considers examples of colonial violence – including those that did not amount to 
genocide – within a wider framework of extreme violence.26 Rather than taking the term 
‘genocide’ to be a legal definition, historians are able to use a more ‘flexible’ approach, 
                                                                                                                                          
discussed ‘the moment of the boomerang’ in reference to decolonisation: Sartre, preface to Frantz Fanon, 
The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 2001 [1965]), 7. Pascal Grosse, ‘From Colonialism to 
National Socialism to Postcolonialism: Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism’, Postcolonial 
Studies, 9:1 (2006), 35-52.  
20 See A. Dirk Moses, ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide: Keywords and the Philosophy of History’, in Moses 
(ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide, 34.  
21 For example W. E. B. Du Bois, The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa has 
Played in World History (New York: Viking, 1947), 23. Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. 
Joan Pinkham (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000 [1955]); W. E. B. Du Bois, ‘The Negro and 
the Warsaw Ghetto’, Jewish Life (1952), 14-15. 
22 Stone, ‘Defending the Plural’, 52. 
23 See, Richard H. King and Dan Stone (eds), Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, 
Nation, Race, and Genocide (New York: Berghahn, 2008). 
24 Moses also discusses the similarities: ‘Empire, Colony, Genocide’, 14. See, Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule 
in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79. 
25 See: Cathie Carmichael, Genocide Before the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); 
Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth (eds), Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
26 See Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan, ‘The Study of Mass Murder and Genocide’, in Gellately and 
Kiernan (eds), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 10.  
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viewing extreme violence as part of a historical process, which may or may not become 
genocidal.27 The aim of this thesis is not to prove that genocide occurred in each 
instance, as this was clearly not the case. However, it is clear that there are links 
between incidents of colonial violence and genocide, and whilst the events under 
examination here did not result in outright genocide they can be seen as part of a wider 
framework of extreme violence. The present study examines the differences and 
similarities in the utilisation of violence in each case and explores the dynamics of 
British colonial violence in order to determine the levels of violence that occurred and 
examine the factors in a colonial context that affected the potential use of extreme 
violence. Imperial historians are reluctant to discuss the work of genocide scholars, 
however, their work clearly presents just one approach to the ways in which we can 
explain colonial violence. This thesis considers a range of key concepts and, by 
focusing on specific cases of colonial violence, it will seek to identify key factors that 
enable us to understand why extreme violence was utilised and which factors on the 
ground made excessive colonial violence more likely. A range of scholars, including 
Dirk Moses, are examining such racial violence ‘as part of the same flow of events that 
led to the eruption of violence in Europe in 1914 and again a quarter of a century 
later’.28 This study argues that British colonial violence was part of an important legacy 
of European violence which ‘came home’ in the twentieth century and hence it will 
illuminate issues which are also important for furthering our understanding of the 
extreme and, at times, genocidal violence which later took place in twentieth-century 
Europe.  
Much debate regarding the relationship between genocide and colonial violence 
is a result of a consideration of Imperial Germany’s actions of extreme violence in the 
colonies and possible connections to the Holocaust.29 Clearly, it was logical that 
                                                
27 See, Dan Stone, Histories of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 215-7; Donald 
Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman 
Armenians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 [2005]), 95. For the United Nation’s definition see, 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/357?OpenDocument. Accessed 5 July 2017. For discussion of the troubled 
meaning of ‘genocide’ see for example: Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume I: 
The Meaning of Genocide (London: I. B. Tauris, 2008 [2005]); Ann Curthoys and John Docker, 
‘Defining Genocide’, in Dan Stone (ed.), The Historiography of Genocide (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010 [2008]), 9-41; Gellately and Kiernan, ‘The Study of Mass Murder’, 19.  
28 A. Dirk Moses, ‘Conceptual Blockages and Definitional Dilemmas in the “Racial Century”: Genocides 
of Indigenous Peoples and the Holocaust’, in Moses and Dan Stone (eds), Colonialism and Genocide 
(London: Routledge, 2007), 178.  
29 Notably, Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘The Birth of the Ostland out of the Spirit of Colonialism: A Postcolonial 
Perspective on the Nazi Policy of Conquest and Extermination’, Patterns of Prejudice, 39:2 (2005), 197-
219; Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘Kolonialer Genozid? Vom Nutzen und Nachteil einer historischen Kategorie für 
13 
scholars initially focused their attention on German colonialism as a tool for 
understanding the genocidal violence that ensued across Europe, focusing on Nazi 
destruction and the Holocaust in particular; it is however a natural and necessary 
progression that European colonialism be considered in order to help us understand the 
European traditions of violence which provide the background to the genocidal violence 
of the twentieth century.30 As Stone has stated: ‘Nazi genocidal policies were, at least at 
first, a continuation of policies undertaken by the European imperial powers.’ 31 
However, historians are demonstrating the ways in which German colonial violence was 
consistent with the brutalities of other European empires. 32  A key figure in the 
‘continuity thesis’ debate is Jürgen Zimmerer who has highlighted the connections 
between German colonial policies in Africa – particularly those targeting the Herero 
and Nama – with Nazi policies in ‘the East’. This approach has received criticism, 
notably from Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, who argue that neither ‘the 
scope, nature, [nor] objectives of the violence unleashed in German Southwest Africa 
constituted genuinely “new” or exceptional levels of violence previously unknown to 
European colonialism’.33 Whilst this statement is correct, they also argue that: ‘National 
Socialism and the German war of annihilation constituted a break with European 
traditions of colonialism rather than a continuation’.34 However, it will be argued that 
European colonial violence was much more extreme than Gerwarth and Malinowski 
seem to think, and twentieth-century European violence therefore represents a 
continuation of traditions of colonial violence. Their criticisms fundamentally highlight 
the need for more empirically based, synchronic comparisons of colonial violence;35 the 
present research can be seen as part of this endeavour.  
It is clear that British and German colonial violence did not always result in 
genocide, but that extreme violence was routinely utilised. Further comparisons are 
needed in order to understand these events within the traditions of European colonial 
                                                                                                                                          
eine Globalgeschichte’, in Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beiträge zum Verhältnis zwischen 
Kolonialismus und Holocaust (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2009), 196-221. 
30 See: Ido de Haan, ‘Imperialism, Colonialism and Genocide: The Dutch Case for an International 
History of the Holocaust’, BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review, 125:2–3 (2010), 301-27.  
31 Dan Stone, ‘Britannia Waives the Rules: British Imperialism and Holocaust Memory’, in Stone, 
History, Memory and Mass Atrocity: Essays on the Holocaust and Genocide (London: Valentine 
Mitchell, 2006), 174. 
32  For a comparative approach see, Thoralf Klein und Frank Schumacher (eds), Kolonialkriege: 
Militärische Gewalt im Zeichen des Imperialismus (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2006).   
33 Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable 
Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz’, Central European History, 42 (2009), 284. 
34 Ibid., 285: emphasis in original. 
35 Stone, Histories, 235. 
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violence. This research has further significance for work that appears to take the 
approach of a new colonial Sonderweg36 and arguments regarding the extent to which 
German colonial violence can be understood as ‘exceptional’.37 Chapter 5 explores 
these debates and addresses the role of British military doctrine in the use of extreme 
violence in colonial warfare and challenges the idea that Britain is somehow more 
disposed to ‘peaceableness’.38 By addressing such issues of ‘exceptionalism’ we are 
faced with additional implications regarding our understanding of twentieth-century 
European history and are presented with the question: ‘Why are the countries with the 
longer and (over the course of centuries) most violent colonial traditions not identical 
with those countries that unleashed the greatest degree of racist destruction within 
Europe after 1918?’39 It is clear that Britain was concerned with issues similar to those 
preoccupying its continental counterparts regarding the health of the nation, perceived 
decline and ‘degeneration’, as well as an increased militarism at the fin de siècle.40 As 
Stone points out, for Victorians, British ‘superiority’ had been self-evident regarding 
the successes of industrialisation and the strength of the British Empire, however, for 
Edwardians fears of decline were emerging, as I discuss below.41 Population policies 
and social reform were increasingly viewed as issues of national security and national 
efficiency was equated with military efficiency.42 The relative stability of British 
politics and parliamentary democracy throughout this period served to ultimately keep 
extremist elements at bay; however, it is all too easy to disregard these elements of 
British society during this time and view the events – and Britain’s apparent stability – 
as somehow ‘inevitable’.43 Pascal Grosse argues that the effects of colonialism within 
Europe can be viewed ‘in a way that defies applying immediate lines of continuity’;44 
the effects of Britain’s violent colonialism can be identified in the escalation of intra-
                                                
36 Ibid., 237.  
37 See for example: Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in 
Imperial Germany (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005).  
38 See ibid. Jon Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in 
Post–First World War Britain’, The Journal of Modern History, 75 (2003), 557-89. 
39 Donald Bloxham et al., ‘Europe in the World: Systems and Cultures of Violence’, in Bloxham and 
Gerwarth (eds), Political Violence, 21-22; see also: Gerwarth and Malinowski, ‘Hannah Arendt’s 
Ghosts’, 289.  
40 On the transmission of this militarism and justifications for empire see: Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: 
Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000 (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 51-52. 
41 See: Dan Stone, Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002), 116.  
42 See: Anne Summers, ‘Militarism in Britain before the Great War’, History Workshop Journal, 2:1 
(1976), 112.  
43 See Stone, Breeding Superman, 2-4.  
44 Grosse, ‘From Colonialism to National Socialism’, 46. 
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European violence and the military campaigns of World War I. Chapter 5 addresses 
these issues in more detail.  
Considerations of colonial warfare in a British context demonstrate the 
imbalance in relations between the ‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’ in the Empire 
because of Britain’s vastly larger number of troops and supplies, in the face of which 
the native populations could not hold out long and certainly not without suffering 
innocent casualties. This imbalance was underpinned by the imperial ideology which 
presented the indigenous population as ‘barbaric’ and thus not subject to the ‘standards’ 
of European warfare.45 However, examples of colonial violence demonstrate both the 
use of such dichotomies to justify colonial policies and how meaningless such 
categories are. Scholars have documented the development of racial thought both in the 
metropole and on the periphery, demonstrating the centrality of racial stereotypes and 
the view of the ‘natives’ as ‘savage’, ‘primitive’ and ‘backward’, as opposed to the 
‘civilised’ and ‘advanced’ Europeans. The alleged inherent ‘superiority’ of Europeans 
was provided as justification for the imperial project and the fulfilment of a ‘moral 
duty’ within which the native populations were seen as irresponsible and incapable of 
looking after themselves.46  
An approach that dichotomises behaviour as ‘civilised’ or ‘barbaric’ is still in 
evidence in the continuing Eurocentrism that tends to ignore European colonialism and 
the violent legacy of western ‘civilisation’ in the non-European world.47 As Stone 
highlights in relation to the Holocaust, ‘popular narratives’ of the genocide also rely on 
this dichotomy as ‘a belief in the separation between civilisation and barbarism’.48 As I 
have highlighted, this dichotomy was utilised by Europeans to justify the colonial 
violence and suppression of non-Europeans.49 The idea that ‘civilisation’ could not be 
simultaneously barbaric was advocated within a colonial context in order to justify 
colonial rule maintained by force and to differentiate the ‘civilised’ colonisers from the 
‘savages’ they sought to colonise.50 The use of such binary opposites is a common 
                                                
45 See: Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Mass Killing and the Politics of Legitimacy: Empire and the Ideology of 
Selective Extermination’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, 58:2 (2012), 159-80.  
46 See Gustav Jahoda, Images of Savages: Ancient Roots of Modern Prejudice in Western Culture 
(London: Routledge, 1999),  
47  Eurocentrism is a criticism levied at Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 2002 [1944]): A. Dirk Moses, ‘Genocide 
and Modernity’, in Stone (ed.), The Historiography of Genocide, 165.  
48 Dan Stone, ‘Modernity and Violence: Theoretical Reflections on the Einsatzgruppen’ in Stone, History, 
Memory and Mass Atrocity, 2.  
49 Moses, ‘Genocide and Modernity’, 179.  
50 See Kiernan, Imperialism and Its Contradictions, 159.  
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feature in the justification of violent and genocidal policies and the processes of 
dehumanisation that accompanied them and will be relevant throughout the present 
work, particularly in relation to the ways in which this line of thinking informed the 
actions of the men on the spot and British troops.51  
Racial categorisation was part of a wider trend of European racism which 
marked the second half of the nineteenth century. Race thinking was deeply affected by 
the developments in ‘scientific’ racism and anthropology in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, which were given credence through practices such as 
anthropometry. Important influences include the ‘extinction discourse’, 52  which 
questioned the extent to which native populations were capable of being ‘civilised’ and 
advocated that the ‘extinction of primitive races’53 was an inevitability that European 
colonialism only served to speed up.54 Charles Darwin is an important figure regarding 
‘extinction discourse’ and he claimed that: ‘[w]hen civilised nations come into contact 
with barbarism the struggle is short’.55 Clearly this line of thinking was convenient for 
advocates of European imperialism and as Patrick Brantlinger has highlighted, the 
‘fantasy of auto-genocide or racial suicide is an extreme version of blaming the victim, 
which throughout the last three centuries has helped to rationalise or occlude the 
genocidal aspects of European conquest and colonisation.’56 
Regarding ‘racial’ concerns within Europe, ‘degeneration’ theory was key, 
although as Daniel Pick has shown there was ‘no one stable referent to which [it] 
applied’, but it was  
                                                
51 See Alex Hinton, ‘Savages, Subjects, and Sovereigns: Conjunctions of Modernity, Genocide, and 
Colonialism’, in Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide, 440-60. 
52 See: Patrick Brantlinger, Dark Vanishings: Discourse on the Extinction of Primitive Races, 1800-1930 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). On British anthropology see: Henrika Kuklick, The Savage 
Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991); Talal Asad (ed.), Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter (New York: Ithaca Press, 1973); 
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and British Society (London: Hansib, 1994).  
53 Brantlinger, Dark Vanishings.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Cited in ibid., 1. See also, Tony Barta, ‘Mr. Darwin’s Shooters: On Natural Selection and the 
Naturalising of Genocide’, Patterns of Prejudice, 39:2 (2005), 116-37. 
56 Brantlinger, Dark Vanishings, 2. For a discussion of liberalism, violence and evil, as well as examples 
of nineteenth-century engagement with the concepts of ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’, see: Tom Crook, 
Rebecca Gill and Bertrand Taithe (eds), Evil, Barbarism and Empire: Britain and Abroad, c.1830-2000 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). On liberalism and empire see also: Richard Seymour, The 
Liberal Defence of Murder (London: Verso, 2012 [2008]). On ‘The New Liberal Imperialism’ see, 
Richard Drayton, ‘Where Does the World Historian Write From? Moral Objectivity, Moral Conscience 
and the Past and Present of Imperialism’, Journal of Contemporary History, 46:3 (2011), 671-85.  
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instead a fantastic kaleidoscope of concerns and objects ... from cretinism to 
alcoholism to syphilis, from peasantry to urban working class, bourgeoisie 
to aristocracy, madness to theft, individual to crowd, anarchism to 
feminism, population decline to population increase.57   
Moreover, social Darwinism and other related theories at this time were essential in 
justifying imperialism, although ‘the spectre of internal degradation continually haunted 
it’.58 Along with a belief in progress, as Mike Hawkins highlights, there was ‘a 
widespread fear of moral and physical degeneration, and a sense of decadence and the 
imminent demise of Western civilisation’. 59  Hence, Western European powers 
simultaneously espoused their superiority over ‘savages’ devoid of ‘civilisation’ in the 
colonies and voiced concerns regarding the ‘degeneracy’ and potential demise of its 
own population. European concerns of ‘degeneration’ did not just affect considerations 
regarding the metropole, but were also highly relevant for European colonialism. These 
concerns highlighted the ‘civilised’ versus barbaric’ dichotomy and challenged 
Europe’s perception of itself. In particular, there was a fear that European civilisers 
would themselves become “native” – either that or they would perish altogether’.60 
Hence, racial theories were also linked to fears regarding the health of the imperial 
metropole. British eugenics also supported stereotypes of indigenous populations 
including an alleged propensity for war and apparent desensitisation for example, as 
well as encouraging ‘the English gentleman’s sense of his racial superiority’;61 this way 
of thinking proved integral to justifications for colonial expansion and the extreme 
violence that accompanied it. Significantly, there was an increased fear that Britain’s 
ability to defend her Empire was under threat. Increasing concerns regarding the 
emerging naval power of Germany, Britain’s new ‘prime national enemy’, also led to 
panic and Britain remained the only European country without a standing army.62 Fears 
regarding a national decline came to a head with the costly and controversial Boer 
                                                
57 Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848-c. 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 15. 
58 Ibid., 39.  
59 Mike Hawkins, Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945: Nature as Model 
and Nature as Threat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5.   
60 Pagden, Peoples and Empires, 151.  
61 H. N. Hutchinson, J. W. Gregory and R. Hydeken, The Living Races of Mankind cited in Paul B. Rich, 
Race and Empire in British Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 18. 
62 Jörn Leonhard, ‘Nations in Arms and Imperial Defence – Continental Models, the British Empire and 
its Military before 1914’, Journal of Modern European History, 5 (2007), 296; James Sheehan, ‘What it 
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War.63 Concerns and prejudices present within Europe regarding ‘inferior Europeans’ 
also provided ‘ready-made categories’ of stereotypes for the indigenous populations of 
the colonies to fit into.64 These fears were heightened by the great unease caused in 
response to the rise of nationalism, anti-feminism, socialism and mass politics. Within 
England, the developments and debates regarding these theories, when taken to the 
extreme, can be identified as part of the ‘extremes of Englishness’, which contributed to 
an ‘indigenous proto-fascism’ in the country.65 ‘Scientific’ racism was used to create a 
system of racial hierarchies and it was used to further explain the respective civility and 
primitivity of European males and the ‘savages’ and explore their ‘civilising’ potential. 
Science was central to the colonial project and was used to legitimise its inherent 
racism, the ‘language of progress’ as well as fin de siècle fears of racial 
‘degeneration’.66  
Developments in European racism came at a time of much change and continual 
pressure for British imperialism in which sporadic resistance to British rule appeared 
time and again. These pressures were further exacerbated by the ‘Scramble for Africa’, 
the related period of ‘new imperialism’ and challenges to Britain’s hegemony across the 
globe. As Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler highlight, the ‘new’ imperialism was 
no less coercive or brutal than the old form; rather, Europeans emphasised that their 
brutality would now be based on:  
…attempts to build structures capable of reproducing and extending 
themselves; stable government replacing the violent, conflictual tyrannies 
of indigenous polities, orderly commerce and wage labour replacing the 
chaos of slaving and raiding….67 
With these renewed pressures, the British had little tolerance for indigenous opposition 
and greatly feared any indication of weakness. The present research aims to ascertain 
the extent to which these incidents of colonial violence were ‘part and parcel of a much 
wider landscape of fin de siècle extreme violence perpetrated by European imperialists 
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as they met increasingly tenacious native resistance’.68 This study will be conducted 
within the context of these debates and a consideration of racial prejudices will be 
essential. 
This thesis explores the case studies in the context of what they can tell us about 
the wider history of the British Empire and its relationship with violence. However, it is 
important to emphasise that these events will also be considered in their own right. It is 
essential that individual examples of British colonial violence be addressed and 
acknowledged by historians; given the ubiquity of violence across the Empire, smaller 
instances of violence or British campaigns in ‘small wars’ are often forgotten or 
ignored.69 Colonial warfare devastated indigenous communities as a result of the tactics 
utilised on both sides. This thesis explores the form that colonial warfare took and the 
role of conditions on the ground; Charles Callwell’s work on ‘small wars’ will be 
essential to these considerations. This study takes a comparative approach, which 
enables an exploration of the similarities between each case, thus allowing us to 
establish important factors that were inherent within colonial contexts and which made 
extreme violence more probable; the extent to which we can identify a pattern of 
violence within the British Empire will also be explored. This thesis sets out to examine 
the role of both colonial administrators and politicians in the metropole in extreme 
colonial violence and addresses the part that politicians in London played in seeking to 
either encourage or discourage such methods. I argue that Britain’s military men 
ultimately had a wide range of violent methods at their disposal and will explore the 
factors on the ground that determined the extent of the violence that was used. These 
campaigns were critiqued and represented in a variety of ways at home and on the 
periphery through newspaper reports and parliamentary debates. Whether such debates 
affected the use of extreme violence will be considered. The relationship between the 
violent actions of the British troops and racial prejudice is central to this thesis. The 
case studies will also be assessed as part of a wider context of a catalogue of British 
suppression; I argue that the violent demise of the Empire was consistent with earlier 
practices of suppression and the flouting of European standards of warfare in a colonial 
context. Chapter 5 argues that rather than viewing the British Empire as ‘exceptional’, 
this colonial violence fits within a framework of European colonial violence. 
                                                
68 Levene, Rise of the West, 3. 
69 Charles Edward Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3rd edn (London: General Staff, 
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A comparative approach will prove useful despite the apparent differences 
between the three cases: all three countries were at different stages in the British 
colonisation process; the campaign for the reconquest of the Sudan was a more 
‘traditional’ war in the sense that the Mahdists represented clearly-defined enemies, as 
opposed to the guerrilla warfare undertaken in the Hut Tax Revolt in Sierra Leone, for 
example. However, it is the similarities in the British military campaigns and the 
behaviour patterns regarding the administration prior to, during, and after the outbreaks 
of violence which prove telling and enable us to explore British patterns of reaction to 
perceived challenges to its authority. Furthermore, a comparative study highlights the 
extent to which the brutal and excessive violence, which was carried out during British 
colonial campaigns, was an accepted part of colonial warfare, even if official 
declarations endeavoured to suggest otherwise; through practices such as scorched earth 
and collective punishment we see the blurring of lines between civilians and combatants 
as targets in colonial warfare.  
On the surface, the three case studies appear to be quite different in scope and 
scale. Nevertheless, British troops utilised extreme violence in all three campaigns and 
this thesis examines the extent of this extreme violence in each case. Moreover, this 
study addresses the factors that led to outbreaks of violence in the first place. I argue 
that the fundamental imbalance in relations between the coloniser and the colonised 
created inherently violent situations. As the men on the spot sought to increase British 
influence on a local level, issues that caused tensions between the colonial 
administrations and indigenous leaders include the abolition of slavery and the 
implementation of tax systems. British approaches to these issues demonstrate a failure 
to understand (or even consider) local customs and traditions and the disastrous effects 
that the implementation of these policies could have. Furthermore, Britain used the 
issue of slavery to ‘prove’ preconceived notions of the ‘natives’ and their alleged 
‘propensity’ towards ‘barbarism’. The approach and attitudes of colonial administrators 
on the ground were informed by the advocacy of the imperial project as a ‘civilising 
mission’ and the belief that colonialism was a ‘moral duty’. Indeed, more than a moral 
duty, the imperial project of the British Empire was viewed as God-given. Thus 
Christianity was also utilised as a justification for the suppression of ‘inferior’ 
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peoples. 70  British imperialism proved a fatal combination for the indigenous 
populations who fell under its rule and the history of the British Empire remains one of 
exploitation, disease, starvation, forced resettlement, political suppression, racism and 
land-hunger.  
The sheer size and complexity of the British Empire makes identifying the 
relationship between violence on the periphery and actions in the imperial metropole 
fairly problematic. In fact, it is difficult to speak of the ‘British Empire’ as one whole 
entity at all.71 The colonial system in itself and the degrees of governance that Britain 
exercised were confusing and often overlapped. Policies in London and in the colonies 
could differ enormously and were often highly contradictory; official policy was often 
at odds with the real conditions on the periphery. By conducting case studies, this 
research tackles these issues and will therefore bring meaning to what is a large and 
complex subject area; by focusing on specific cases of colonial violence in detail, key 
factors can be identified that help us to understand why such violence occurred and 
place it within a broader framework of British colonial violence and warfare.  
The three case studies have been chosen in consideration of their timing, 
occurring as they did in the second half of the nineteenth century; by this point the 
willingness to use extreme force within the British Empire had been repeatedly 
demonstrated in the context of both settler and ‘administrative colonialism’72 – rather 
than explore the ‘usual suspect’ of settler violence this study considers the extreme 
violence of British military campaigns in establishing and maintaining colonial 
administrations.73 Examples of extreme British violence include the destruction of the 
indigenous population of Tasmania; suppression of the Indian ‘Mutiny’; and violence in 
Ireland.74 The context of the Indian Mutiny in 1857 is particularly significant and has 
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been described as an ‘ideological turning-point’ in Britain’s approach to the Empire.75 
By focusing on colonial violence in this period we may challenge the viewpoint of 
‘prevalent myths regarding the long peace from 1815 to 1914’ in Europe and as Eric 
Weitz argues, ‘war has been shown to be endemic to the nineteenth century, especially 
when one moves out of a Eurocentric stance’.76 Indeed, as Sheldon Anderson rightly 
states, ‘From the perspective of a Pole, a disenfranchised European, or an Indian, the 
century was not a “long peace” but a “long war”’.77 This misconception is baffling in 
the face of evidence regarding the scale and severity of colonial warfare throughout the 
nineteenth century and highlights the need for more attention on these colonial 
conflicts.78  
While the historiographies of the three cases studies differ in volume and 
approach, it remains the case that there has been little attempt to place these examples 
of colonial violence within a wider framework of violence in the British Empire. 
Considerations of other colonial violence will also be essential to this work, thus 
providing the context within which these events occurred. Brutal tactics were routinely 
utilised across the British Empire and scholars are exploring transnational learning 
across European empires, as well as the use of ‘knowledge’ regarding mentalities and 
tactics of violence within empires;79 the British Empire was central to this system of 
emulation. The case studies focus on just three of many British colonial conflicts that 
occurred throughout the nineteenth century and which have, at times, been overlooked 
by historians. Further examination is required within the context of colonial violence 
and the British Empire, which I argue, provided one of the ‘training grounds’ for 
European violence in the twentieth century.80 
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The objectives of my research, as stated above, are to be achieved through the 
investigation of British parliamentary papers and government policies, parliamentary 
debates, local colonial rule (and how it could contradict official government policies), 
newspaper propaganda and justifications for imperialism, as well as the advocacy of 
race theories and prejudices. Owing to the lack of research in this subject area, primary 
sources will be essential to this study. Within my research, sources from regimental 
archives are vitally important, but need to be considered with care. This study certainly 
does not take a ‘regimental approach’, which seeks to preserve and defend the memory 
of individual regiments, ‘ignoring ignoble episodes’.81 Rather, this thesis focuses on 
what British colonial officers and troops (as well as indigenous troops working with 
them) ‘did’ on the ground in these wars – based on primary sources.82 
Contemporary accounts of the conflicts are highly telling with respect to racial 
prejudice and colonial military practices. Official ‘colonial’ sources such as 
parliamentary papers provide clear examples of the colonial mindset and the ways in 
which the colonists’ actions and decisions were informed by their prejudices regarding 
the indigenous population and how they perceived their own ‘civilising’ mission. Key 
to this research are the communications between the metropole and the periphery and 
the nature of this communication is particularly relevant; the delays that were inherent 
within the system as a result of the technology of the time meant that the men on the 
ground often acted on their own initiative in the face of potential unrest, or exploited 
this time delay, as the case may be, to enforce their own objectives in the region. 
Official documents are typically shrouded in vague ‘colonial’ language and often tell us 
little about the nature and outcomes of violence in the British Empire.83 As Cooper and 
Stoler remind us, ‘colonial archives … are cultural artifacts, built on institutional 
structures that erased certain kinds of knowledge, secreted some, and valorised others’ 
and one cannot simply ‘do colonial history’.84 Hence, archives are not simply ‘sites of 
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knowledge retrieval’85 and the primary evidence used throughout this study will be 
considered with care. 
An alternative ‘colonial’ source, which is integral to this study and which is 
more revealing regarding the realities of colonial violence and its effects is the private 
correspondence of participating British colonial troops; their accounts are central to 
providing the details of the conflicts, which have been obscured behind the shrouded 
language of official documents. While subjective documents, private papers are 
nevertheless revealing in relation to the extreme violence that was carried out against 
the indigenous populations and the ways in which the British participants of this 
violence perceived their own actions, as well as those of their comrades and superiors. 
Furthermore, soldiers’ accounts reveal how they framed their understanding of these 
brutal events within the racial language of empire and used this language and way of 
thinking as a means to justify their own participation in the violence. As these sources 
demonstrate, the viewpoint of the ‘natives’ as ‘inferior’ is key, as is their perception of 
their own role as ‘superior’, and also as ‘liberators’ of the indigenous peoples; these 
viewpoints were central to British troops’ willingness to undertake extreme methods of 
violence against the ‘enemy’, which often included the wider population. The private 
papers of individual soldiers are also highly revealing in relation to the conditions and 
realities of colonial campaigns in the nineteenth century and the difficult circumstances 
in which colonial troops often found themselves; this study explores the extent to which 
these difficulties also played a role in the escalation of violence. The private papers that 
are used here include those that have been utilised by a range of historians to others that 
have been hitherto absent from the historical record. Those sources which have been 
utilised elsewhere – particularly the soldiers’ accounts of the Battle of Omdurman in the 
Sudan reconquest campaign – will be ‘reread’ in reference to the extreme violence 
utilised by the British in their colonial endeavours and within a consideration of the 
wider context of patterns of violence.  
The majority of the primary sources utilised in this study are therefore ‘colonial’ 
in nature and fundamentally adhered to the principles of the British imperial project; 
this includes newspaper articles, which will also be essential to this study, although in 
some cases these sources also offered criticism of Britain’s colonial policies and 
methods of violence. Importantly, these criticisms were still framed within the 
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‘civilised’ versus ‘barbaric’ dichotomy, as were philanthropic considerations regarding 
the suffering of the ‘colonised’, often viewing indigenous populations as helpless and 
childlike. 86  While this study primarily focuses on the actions, motivations and 
mentalities of British colonialism and its protagonists, it also considers the perspectives 
of the indigenous populations whenever the available sources allow. As a result of a 
lack of sources from the perspective of the ‘colonised’, an in-depth discussion of the 
experiences of the indigenous populations cannot be provided, nevertheless the agency 
of the indigenous peoples is present as colonial officials in London and on the 
periphery, as well as the military, reacted to the actions of those they sought to conquer; 
while the sources used may, for the most part, be ‘colonial’, we can detect the sound of 
‘indigenous voices’ throughout.87 Furthermore, while the primary sources concern 
themselves little with the suffering of the indigenous populations as a result of the 
actions of British colonial troops – whether through scorched earth, blockades or 
bombardment – the consequences are implicit throughout, and the present study seeks to 
draw on this information, wherever possible. Each case study addresses the challenges 
regarding the available sources and provides an assessment of the historiographies of 
the conflicts. Clearly, as Stoler describes, ‘archives are not simply accounts of actions 
or records of what people thought happened’;88 issues that will be discussed include the 
partisan nature of colonial sources and the ways in which they often obscure more than 
they reveal.  
Secondary sources will also be highly important to this study and the historical 
context is essential; in this regard this investigation relies on the findings of a variety of 
subject areas, most notably: the histories of the individual regions; imperial history; 
studies of violence and genocide. Studies of other British colonial violence will prove 
instructive throughout the present work, providing the historical context in which 
extreme colonial violence became an accepted part of colonial military campaigns, as 
well as providing direct links through the presence of significant individuals in different 
colonial conflicts.89 Furthermore, a note on nomenclature: I tend to use the names of 
places and names as used most frequently within the colonial documents. This may not 
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be ideal from the point of view of representing the indigenous peoples, but serves to 
provide greater consistency when citing direct from the sources.  
The structure of this thesis is as follows: chapter 1 addresses the place of 
colonial violence within the historiography of the British Empire, further exploring 
some of the historiographical issues indicated above, including the emphasis in Britain 
on the extreme violence of others at the expense of investigating the country’s own 
violent past. This chapter also expands on issues raised heretofore regarding the use of 
categories including ‘small wars’ and ‘total war’, as well as discussing the importance 
of genocide studies to understandings of colonial violence. The three case studies follow 
and an analysis of my findings is provided in chapter 5, discussing how my research 
further enhances our understanding of European violence, the nature of colonial warfare 
throughout the British Empire, and Britain’s relationship with extreme violence. Issues 
of particular importance include the context of the case studies and what they tell us 
about the nature of the British Empire more broadly and how this extreme violence 
‘fits’ in terms of perceptions of British ‘benevolence’ and the alleged ‘exceptional’ 
violence of other empires, most notably, that of Wilhelminian Germany. Such 
endeavours to explain colonial violence within a wider framework of extreme European 
violence remain important and their significance is not limited to furthering our 
historical understanding, but also remain essential today, as others have concluded: ‘the 
colonial mentalities of discrimination and violence’ have not disappeared and ‘Empire 
is therefore not over, but remains a territory of the mind and a source of violence in 
contemporary Europe’.90 
  
                                                
90 Bloxham et al., ‘Europe in the World’, 22-23.  
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Chapter 1 
The Place of British Colonial Violence within the History of the British Empire 
This chapter considers the ways in which historians of empire and genocide scholars 
have explored the role of violence in the British Empire, suggesting the relevance of the 
present study for the historiography of imperial history and studies of violence and 
genocide, as well as British history more broadly. I will address key debates related to 
Britain’s history of colonial violence including those attached to discussions regarding a 
‘British way in counterinsurgency’, the violent processes of decolonisation and relevant 
developments in genocide studies. The key concepts and definitions for this study will 
be introduced, notably ‘colonial warfare’ and ‘extreme violence’. Imperial historians 
have highlighted a resurgence of interest in the history of empire and Tony Ballantyne 
asserts that the interdisciplinary approach that has developed in the last few years stands 
in marked contrast to ‘a once moribund field that seemed near obsolescence in the late 
1970s and early 1980s’, and which, he continues ‘has re-emerged as an important and 
rejuvenated academic field and even a topic of public concern.’1  Stephen Howe 
highlights that previously there had been an implication that to study empires ‘meant 
being in favour or nostalgic for them.’2 There have been a number of stages in the 
development of British imperial history, one of which is the proclamation of a ‘new 
imperial history’.3 New approaches to the British Empire include: literary, gender, 
cultural and postcolonial studies, as well as anthropology, questions of imperial 
‘networks’ and ‘knowledge’ to name a few.4 Previously neglected aspects of the British 
Empire are therefore being explored and the importance of race, gender, sexuality and 
class to our understandings of empire emphasised.  
Antoinette Burton comments that this ‘imperial turn’ ‘is not a turn toward 
empire so much as a critical return to the connections between metropole and colony, 
                                                
1 Tony Ballantyne, ‘Introduction: Debating Empire’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 3:1 
(2002): https://muse.jhu.edu. Accessed 8 June 2016. Sarah Stockwell (ed.), preface, The British Empire: 
Themes and Perspectives (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), xi.  
2 Stephen Howe, ‘Introduction: New Imperial Histories’, in Howe (ed.), The New Imperial Histories 
Reader (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 1. 
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4 See for example: Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002); Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 
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race and nation’.5 Rather controversially, however, David Cannadine chose to underplay 
the role of race and its importance to the imperial project and his work has been 
criticised for his blatant disregard of the vast amount of research which has already 
proven the importance of race in the British Empire.6 Studies of race and racism and its 
links with the British Empire have contributed greatly to our understanding of how 
racism was inherent within the colonial system and its relevance for the metropole, as 
well as the periphery. Examples include Bill Schwarz’s consideration of the ‘re-
racialisation’ of the metropole in the period 1956-68; Schwarz argues that the 
decolonisation process led to colonial fantasies of a lost ‘racial utopia’7  and he 
concludes that not only was race integral to the empire, but that ‘if the colonies worked 
through race then, by extension, so did the metropole’.8 Hence, scholars are exploring 
the ways in which the metropole and the periphery were intimately connected.9  
The resurgence in attention to the British Empire has also been reflected in more 
popular interest, as demonstrated by the number of books and television programmes on 
the subject.10 This popular interest in the British Empire tends to adhere to the 
longstanding view that the Empire was fundamentally ‘a good thing’ and was beneficial 
to both the colonisers and the colonised.11 Advocates of empire, such as Niall Ferguson, 
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Cambridge University Press, 2012), 3.  
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Lane/Penguin, 2001) see: Dan Stone, ‘Britannia Waives the Rules: British Imperialism and Holocaust 
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seek to strengthen justifications for Britain’s continued role on the world stage, as well 
as support for other ‘imperial’ nations. Indeed, as Dan Stone highlights, the culmination 
of recent research resulted ‘in one academic’s call for the US directly to colonise areas 
of the world that need to be brought under control, in the same way that Britain once 
did.’12 Clearly attempts within Britain to address its colonial past are often superficial 
and the aim is furthering British pride, and highlighting the ‘positive’ role of the 
Empire. Significantly, Richard Drayton advocates a ‘post-patriotic approach’ to the 
study of the British Empire. Drayton argues that historians need to take responsibility 
for popular perceptions of the Empire and place violence at the centre of study.13  
Focusing on the more ‘positive’ aspects of Empire means that, until recently, 
there has been a marked reluctance amongst imperial historians to engage in discussion 
of the more negative aspects of empire and in particular, the genocidal policies 
implemented within it. A key example is the Oxford History of the British Empire; 
whilst this is an impressive collection, there is no genuine attempt to address the role of 
extreme violence and genocide within the British Empire; these issues are only briefly 
acknowledged, if at all.14 There are of course exceptions as noted above, including V. 
G. Kiernan.15 More recently, Mike Davis has explored the disastrous effects of Britain’s 
laissez-faire economic policies in the ‘Third World’, which led to ‘Victorian 
Holocausts’.16 Popular anecdotes to Ferguson’s approach of ‘empire rehabilitation’ 
include John Newsinger’s ‘people’s history of the British Empire’ which provides an 
overview of the most well-known incidents of colonial violence which were carried out 
upon Britain’s colonial subjects.17 Richard Gott’s study of British violence discusses 
examples previously covered by Newsinger, as well as other episodes of extreme 
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violence and atrocity. Both studies highlight the need for historians to undertake further 
archival research to examine violence and empire in more depth.18 These studies 
challenge the perceived ‘exceptionalism’ of the British Empire and highlight the 
violence that ensued as British imperial ambitions spread across the globe, making clear 
the integral role that violence played in maintaining the Empire, as well as the general 
ignorance of such events in British society today.  
The ongoing reluctance of some imperial historians to engage with the issues at 
hand regarding the relationship between the British Empire and violence has been 
illuminated by a recent roundtable on John Darwin’s The Empire Project.19 It remains 
the case that standard histories of the Empire often neglect to deal with this issue in a 
meaningful way. The extent of the violence that was inherent across the British Empire 
is often underplayed and its history sanitised, as Duncan Bell shows.20 Bell challenges 
Darwin’s approach, arguing that he neglects the ‘brutal violence and insidious racism at 
the core of the Victorian empire’; in particular, Darwin fails to bring to light the ‘broken 
and abused bodies–almost invariably black or brown–on which the empire was 
erected’.21 Bell makes the fundamental point that the ‘world-system’ that Darwin 
explores was impossible without violence.22 Furthermore, Bell laments Darwin’s failure 
to engage more with the issues of race and social Darwinism.23 These issues are clearly 
essential to understanding colonial violence and are central to the present study. In his 
response, Darwin acknowledges the role that violence played, but he deems this 
violence to be self-evident and unworthy of further exploration, stating that emphasising 
the centrality of violence to the Empire ‘is not to add much to the sum of knowledge’.24 
However, contrary to Darwin’s claims, British colonial violence is not negated by the 
fact that other European countries committed violence or that they have reached a 
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higher death toll.25 The aim is certainly not to claim that the British ‘invented’ empire 
and its corresponding violence, but to locate, as Darwin himself states, ‘the scale, 
operation, and meaning of British imperial violence’.26 The present study looks beyond 
the ‘few striking examples’ and assesses the role of extreme violence, not as the result 
of individual ‘excesses’, but as part of the ‘logic’ of the British Empire.27  
There are scholars who are placing colonial violence at the centre of historical 
enquiries, most notably regarding the processes of decolonisation and associated 
debates regarding counterinsurgency and ‘minimum force’ and it is to these debates that 
we will now turn. In recent years, studies of decolonisation in particular have 
highlighted the willingness of politicians in London and Britain’s military men to 
condone and conduct campaigns of extreme violence in the name of the Empire. While 
Arendt stated in 1951, ‘That the British liquidated rule voluntarily is still one of the 
most momentous events of twentieth-century history’,28 new studies – based on archival 
research – show that this was not the case; independence was not always simply handed 
over willingly and peacefully and the lengths that were gone to in order to keep areas of 
empire under British influence have been highlighted.29 A key example is the British 
suppression of the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s in which Kenya became a police 
state and tens of thousands of Kenyans were put into detention camps, mainly without 
trial and mostly without any evidence.30 While revisionist histories on the topic of 
decolonisation were appearing particularly from the 1990s, the works of two historians 
published in 2005 are notable within this trend.31 David Anderson’s study recognised 
the legal contradictions in the colonies, highlighting that 1090 Kikuyu people went to 
the gallows in state executions, at the same time that British politicians were 
consideration the abolition of hanging.32 Such contradictions are part of a long British 
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colonial legacy of legal anomalies and hypocrisy: colonial ‘exceptionalism’ regarding 
the law, particularly in reference to martial law, was utilised to enforce colonial 
domination in Ireland, India and Jamaica for example.33 Anderson observes, regarding 
the brutal suppression of the Mau Mau, that the realities were not in keeping with the 
myth: ‘the British tend to think they made a better job of it than anyone else’.34  
Caroline Elkins’ study focuses on the brutalities of the infamous ‘Pipeline’ of 
detention/‘screening’ camps and the policy of ‘villagisation’, which she describes as 
‘Britain’s gulag’.35 Elkins’ study also highlights the ways in which British actions -– 
including the use of forced labour in these camps – were in direct contravention of 
international law. Huw Bennett has also contributed to this body of work and shows that 
the Mau Mau were viewed as ‘illegitimate opponents’ and not subject to international 
law; hence fitting with Britain’s more general approach to law and order against 
‘uncivilised’ opposition across the Empire.36 Interestingly, Elkins frames her argument 
within a consideration of both Stalinist violence and Nazi genocidal violence, although 
she was not the first to argue the similarities between Britain’s camps and the gulags of 
the Soviet Union. Marshall Clough previously described the camps as ‘Kenyan gulags’ 
in his study of Mau Mau Memoirs and makes a similar connection with Nazi 
concentration camps.37 However, Elkins goes furthest in framing her argument within 
the context of genocide studies,38 although the connections she makes between the 
events in Kenya and other genocides are not thoroughly explored.39 Nonetheless, 
Elkins’ work makes clear the ‘potential’ for genocide during the Kenya Emergency, 
suggesting a wider relationship between colonial violence and genocide in the British 
Empire.40 In reviewing Anderson’s and Elkins’ work, Bernard Porter has argued that 
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‘Kenya was Britain’s Algeria’ and clearly studies of decolonisation are challenging 
long-standing perceptions of Britain’s alleged ‘exceptionalism’.41  
Violence was endemic rather than sporadic across the system of empire and it 
may be argued that the brutalities of the Kenya Emergency were the logical outcome of 
colonial policies and the violence that had preceded it, both in Kenya and across the 
Empire. This case also highlighted the fallacy of the British imperial project as a 
‘civilising mission’. Much of the history of brutality in the decolonisation process has 
long remained hidden; in part, this is a consequence of the false perception of a 
benevolent British Empire. However, further studies are necessary to explore the ways 
in which the brutalities of decolonisation were consistent with Britain’s wider approach 
throughout the Empire. Historian Bethwell Ogot has argued that the British approach in 
Kenya (1952-60) was in keeping with the colonial tactics used hitherto in the country. 
For example, Ogot argued that the camps of decolonisation were not the first of 
Britain’s ‘gulags’ in Kenya.42 The wars of ‘pacification’ across the Empire in the 
second half of the nineteenth century anticipated the violence of decolonisation; hence 
the violence of the latter was the logical conclusion to British colonial rule, rather than a 
‘radicalisation’ of this violence.43 The present study likewise highlights the ways in 
which extreme violence was integral to the British Empire and argues that the brutalities 
of decolonisation were consistent with its wider approach.  
Revisionist histories of British decolonisation are relevant to a reassessment of 
the actions of the British Army in their role of ‘imperial policing’, assumptions 
regarding a British propensity for ‘minimum force’ and an alleged British ‘tradition’ of 
successful counterinsurgency. It has been assumed that a ‘British way in 
counterinsurgency’ includes ‘hearts and minds’, civil-military cooperation and 
restraint.44 The traditionalist view is being challenged by studies that are highlighting 
that Britain has not consistently acted with minimum force throughout the Empire, 
particularly during the interwar period as Britain suffered a ‘crisis of empire’ and 
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repeatedly faced indigenous opposition.45 The concept of minimum force is highly 
problematic: a consideration of the levels of force that constitute the ‘necessary’ 
minimum is clearly subjective and perceptions have changed over time and place.46 The 
concept was initially a result of British authorities’ approach to nineteenth-century 
internal unrest in which the application of the minimum amount of force necessary was 
advocated. There is much debate regarding the applicability of this concept to a colonial 
context and Matthew Hughes, amongst others, insists that minimum force was never 
employed in imperial policing or counterinsurgency.47 It may be said that there has been 
the perpetuation of a ‘myth’ of minimum force, or as Simeon Shoul argued, at the very 
least its ‘sporadic negation’.48 In any case, it is clear that more force was considered 
‘necessary’ and accepted as part of Britain’s approach to warfare in the colonies. Bruno 
Reis argues that not only was minimum force all but absent in military practice on the 
ground, it was also absent in principle.49 In marked contrast, Rod Thornton, a key 
proponent of the British tradition of minimum force, argues that the idea is ‘deeply 
rooted in the British military psyche’.50 Indeed, Thornton has argued that the British 
Army’s propensity for minimum force was the result of ‘Victorian values’ that were 
embedded in the army’s role of imperial police force. Emphasising the British 
‘gentlemanly’ ideal, Thornton argues that ‘restraint’ and ‘chivalry’ were inculcated 
through a variety of ways including the British public school system. Viewing the 
British Army’s relationship with violence in this way leads Thornton to claim that the 
British evacuated the empire ‘reasonably painlessly’. 51  Thornton argues that the 
Amritsar Massacre in 1919 was met with shock because the concept of minimum force 
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had already been standard ‘for several decades prior’ to the massacre.52 In contrast, 
Thomas Mockaitis clearly states that from 1870 until 1900 the principle was not in 
operation.53 Thornton’s account is notable for its absence of first-hand accounts and it is 
beyond question that British perceptions of a ‘minimum’ were subject to the context of 
whether force was to be enacted at home or across the Empire;54 indeed, it is hard to 
argue that ‘the principles of English Common Law’ were adhered to in the colonies.55  
Thornton has been involved in a dispute with Huw Bennett particularly in 
relation to minimum force in the Kenya Emergency.56 Bennett emphasises that the term 
is ‘deliberately ambiguous’ and a ‘malleable’ concept and his work shows the important 
ways in which the brutalities of Britain’s fight against the Mau Mau were officially 
sanctioned and certainly do not fit with the narrative of minimum force.57 Thornton’s 
critique of Bennett’s work focuses on differentiating between the various security forces 
on the ground and the issue of responsibility for exemplary violence, criticising Bennett 
for denigrating the reputation of the British forces for example.58  Mockaitis has 
weighed in on the dispute by arguing that these debates demonstrate the manner in 
which ‘contemporary moral attitudes’ inform historical scholarship, suggesting that 
concepts of ‘minimum force’ have changed over time, as demonstrated, he argues, by 
the case of the Amritsar Massacre and the fact that the ‘previous generation of soldiers 
and administrators probably would have accepted Dyer’s argument and deemed his 
actions appropriate.’59 Bennett’s work, as well as other revisionist histories of the 
emergency, demonstrates that the British campaign against the Mau Mau went above 
and beyond what was ‘necessary’ to defeat the opposition.  
Mockaitis, whose work has also been central within minimum force debates, has 
emphasised the issue of British success within counterinsurgency. 60  Specifically, 
Mockaitis questions whether brutality was a contributing factor to Britain’s success 
including in the case of the Arab Revolt in Palestine in 1936-9, which was relentlessly 
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suppressed by the British.61 Mockaitis concludes that ‘Brutality may thus have been 
coincidental with successful counter-insurgency rather than contributing to it.’ 
However, the fact that such conflicts were not solely based on brute force is beside the 
point.62 Extreme violence was central to these campaigns. That the use of extreme 
violence is not a measure of ‘success’ or ‘failure’ has been discussed by David Jones 
and M. L. R. Smith, who conclude that the fact that British counterinsurgency was often 
extremely violent ‘does not, ipso facto, mean that they failed’.63 The issue is surely not 
whether extreme violence contributed to the ‘success’ of British counterinsurgency, but 
rather the very fact that it was utilised, as well as how and why.64 Karl Hack’s work has 
been important in challenging the perception of the British campaign in Malayan 
Emergency (1948-60) as the archetypal success of a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy, 
arguing the need for a more nuanced approach.65 In his quarrel with Bennett, Thornton 
concludes that British adherence to minimum force and a concern for ‘hearts and minds’ 
is an approach that ‘made sense to Colonel Robert Sandeman back in 1866 in the 
Punjab when he first coined the term ‘hearts and minds’ and it makes sense today in 
Afghanistan’,66 as though minimum force was a clear approach throughout this period. 
Clearly this position cannot be sustained; as this study will demonstrate, British colonial 
campaigns do not represent a history of restraint. Of course, one of the central reasons 
for ongoing interest in this topic is its relation to Britain’s most recent ‘small wars’ in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, 67  a fact that further emphasises the importance of a true 
understanding of Britain’s history of violence and the ways in which perceptions of that 
violence inform British campaigns today.68  
While it is clear that minimum force was not considered a doctrine for colonial 
warfare in the period in which the case studies occurred, it was nevertheless the case 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century that belief was high in the British 
‘civilising mission’ and its ‘benevolent’ endeavours; restraint was assumed to be central 
to Britain’s imperial approach. Charles W. Gwynn’s Imperial Policing espoused the 
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first formulation of the concept of minimum force.69 Gwynn made his position clear and 
he perceived ‘small wars’ as an entirely separate category from ‘imperial policing’ and 
hence in the former, ‘No limitations are placed on the amount of force which can 
legitimately be exercised, and the Army is free to employ all the weapons the nature of 
the terrain permits’.70 For the present study, the work of Charles Callwell, a theorist on 
‘small wars’ is a more helpful contemporary guide and scholars have recently been 
revisiting his work. His book, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice was first 
published in 189671 and is the most extensive outline of the British approach to colonial 
warfare (although Callwell also used a variety of examples and included an 
international focus72) and is particularly pertinent regarding the case studies under 
discussion here. There were other examples of literature upon which one could draw 
and interest in the subject had increased from the 1870s onwards.73 Callwell made use 
of Garnet Wolseley’s The Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field Service, which was first 
published in 1869, but it was Callwell’s work that was most comprehensive on the 
topic.74 Several scholars have noted that, while important, Callwell’s work reflected 
military practice as much as it influenced it. 75 Furthermore, Ian Beckett emphasises the 
limited influence of Callwell based on the fact that Small Wars ‘was published at a 
moment when the army was increasingly turning its face to Europe.’76 Nevertheless, 
Callwell’s and Wolseley’s works gained ‘semi-official status’ and were influential both 
at home and abroad.77 As Kim Wagner importantly emphasises, the book’s significance 
lies in its ‘unique record of the manner in which the British at the turn of the century 
themselves interpreted their military campaigns throughout the Empire’.78 Furthermore, 
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as Wagner argues, rather astoundingly, the book is still being read today as a guide to 
successful tactics of counterinsurgency.79 Callwell considered there to be three main 
categories of small wars: conquest or annexation; the suppression of insurrections or 
lawlessness or to settle a recently conquered territory; to avenge a wrong or overthrow a 
dangerous enemy.80 For Callwell, ‘small wars’ were  
all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of 
regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-
civilised races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken 
to suppress rebellious and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where 
organised armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them 
in the open field….81  
Callwell accepted that there was a clear distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ 
warfare and that small war tactics may mean ‘committing havoc which the laws of 
regular warfare do not sanction’.82 Callwell did not espouse restraint and accepted that 
small war tactics ‘may shock the humanitarian’, particularly if the enemy could not be 
drawn into the open or if there was no capital to destroy. Callwell cited Wolseley’s oft-
quoted statement that, ‘your first object should be the capture of whatever they prize 
most, and the destruction or deprivation of which will probably bring the war most 
rapidly to a conclusion’.83 Central to this premise was the emphasis on ‘moral effect’, 
although Callwell also acknowledged that destroying the enemy’s property ‘may 
sometimes do more harm than good’. 84  However, it is important to emphasise 
Callwell’s acceptance of the need to not only defeat the ‘savage’ enemy, but to destroy 
them.85 While Callwell does not address the Perak War, this campaign was a small war 
and Callwell’s work remains relevant; the cases of Sierra Leone and the Sudan were 
considered in the third edition of Small Wars – as such Callwell’s work provides a 
contemporary example of the manner in which military men endeavoured to ‘learn 
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lessons’ from a variety of small wars and his work will be referred to throughout the 
present study.86  
 In light of Callwell’s work we may make some observations regarding a 
definition of ‘colonial warfare’87 and the challenges it presented for European troops: 
European military actions were often frustrated by the refusal of the indigenous ‘enemy’ 
to engage in open battle, often undertaking guerrilla-style tactics. Indigenous forces had 
the upper hand with regards to knowledge of the local terrain and access to resources, 
this reliance on the local population meant that such wars could include the targeting of 
whole ‘hostile’ populations. As such, colonial wars were often fought against an unclear 
and ill-defined enemy and European troops often resorted to destroying homes and food 
supplies. Conditions could be extreme for colonial troops and disease accounted for 
most European casualties.88 Callwell emphasised colonial warfare as ‘against nature’ 
and issues of supply were key.89 Hence, to defeat (or destroy) indigenous opposition, 
European troops utilised a range of extreme methods against their ‘uncivilised’ foes, 
including collective punishment, the destruction of villages and crops, punitive 
expeditions. The challenges that colonial warfare posed will be in evidence throughout 
this study, which examines how colonial warfare radicalised towards ever-more extreme 
violence on the part of the colonists. Callwell emphasised the need to act swiftly and 
decisively once violence broke out – but ‘striking a heavy blow’ could clearly lead to 
extreme violence, as this thesis will discuss.90 Hence, ‘exemplary violence’ was key to 
colonial conflicts, as highlighted by Callwell. Elsewhere it has been argued that such 
violence was necessary as a universal ‘language’; Elizabeth Kolsky has emphasised this 
point thus: ‘As a tactic, it paved the way for colonial pacification and control. As a 
language, British administrators argued that violence was the only sign system the “rude 
and savage” people on the frontier understood.’91  
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 While Callwell served as a guide, it is clear that there was no one type of 
colonial war; the scale and scope of colonial campaigns and their objectives differed, as 
will be borne out by the case studies below. Contemporary treatises and understandings 
of colonial warfare will be key to the present study; however, the case studies will also 
be considered in light of the role of ‘extreme violence’ in British colonial conflicts. 
Susanne Kuss’ definition of ‘extreme violence’ in a colonial context is highly useful 
with regards to considering the nature of the violence that was wrought across the 
Empire. Kuss defines extreme violence as that which ‘represents a level of violence 
uncoupled from military objectives’ and hence, in excess of what would be deemed a 
necessary minimum – though one could use a range of terms including ‘atrocity’, 
‘barbarity’ or ‘excessive force’ for example. According to Kuss, this violence occurs 
after the military aims have already been achieved and as such is ‘strategically 
superfluous’. Importantly Kuss emphasises that the number of civilians and military 
casualties does not determined incidents of extreme violence; she also recognises the 
importance of local destruction and the implications of these actions for the indigenous 
inhabitants.92 The present study will utilise the concept of extreme violence throughout, 
as it provides a fitting definition, although clearly ‘colonial warfare’ as a concept will 
also be key.  
 Scholars have been considering issues of colonial violence in a variety of ways 
and in examining the nature of colonial warfare more specifically the imbalance of 
resources – including advances in technology and weaponry93 – and power within 
colonial conflicts has been highlighted, as well as the ways in which colonial warfare 
deviated from European warfare, for example in a disregard for international standards 
of warfare.94 However, the advantages gained through superior weaponry should not be 
overemphasised, as these could be offset by indigenous fighters’ local knowledge and 
mobility.95 Regardless of the initial aim in conducting colonial violence against an 
indigenous enemy, the end result of European colonial wars was to defeat and almost 
always annex the territory and subject the population; hence, the aims of colonial 
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warfare were ‘absolute’.96 As a result, it is logical to consider the extent to which ‘total 
war’ is a useful concept regarding colonial warfare. Henk Wesseling emphasises that 
the means within colonial war were limited and certainly European powers did not need 
to deploy ‘total’ forces against indigenous opposition.97 One issue with such debates is 
the fact the there remains no clear definition or consensus on the term’s meaning.98 This 
is problematic with regards to the use of the concept as a tool for understanding colonial 
warfare more specifically; as Beckett observes, ‘It has become fashionable to suggest 
that colonial warfare was a precursor of “total warfare” in the twentieth century, the 
context being the degree of violence rather than the extent of economic, social and 
political mobilisation’.99 Both the levels of destructiveness and societal mobilisation 
involved may be identified as two key elements of total war, but Eric Markusen argues 
that either factor or both may be present. Markusen asserts that the high stakes and 
‘absolute’ nature of colonial warfare demonstrate the relevance of a total war approach 
to colonial warfare.100 Focusing on the forms of European colonial violence has allowed 
scholars to explore the role of total tactics in the destruction of colonial opposition and 
it has been highlighted that the threshold between total war and genocide is ‘very low 
and easily crossed’ in a colonial context.101 Dierk Walter observes in his discussion of 
the ‘totalisation of the conduct of war’ (Totalisierung der Kriegführung), that it was 
only a small step from the destruction of the enemy’s subsistence basis to the use of 
direct violence on civilians.102 However, while colonial wars may have been total they 
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were also asymmetric.103 This thesis argues that the one-sided nature of colonial warfare 
has implications for the ‘potentiality’ of genocide, as will be discussed below. In terms 
of a ‘totalising’ affect on colonial warfare, aspects of particular relevance include the 
blurring of the distinction between combatant and noncombatant, the dehumanisation of 
the enemy and the separation of ‘us’ from ‘them’.104  
Considering the fact that colonial wars could quickly become wars against an 
entire group of people, particularly in the context of guerrilla-style opposition, historian 
Dirk Moses has highlighted that, ‘Colonial war could mean total war on a local 
scale’.105 Scholars have been examining colonial violence within a framework of 
genocide, as discussed above in relation to Elkins. In recent years genocide scholars 
have produced some of the most thought-provoking and challenging studies that 
highlight the violence of European imperialism. It is without dispute that atrocities were 
carried out in the name of the British Empire, and new studies in this area are now 
spanning decades, if not centuries, of British colonial rule.106 Historians of empire are 
exploring the everyday violence that was inherent within the structures of the colonial 
systems and debates amongst genocide scholars could prove instructive regarding ‘the 
vexed question of intention’ and the ‘unintended’ consequences of colonial policy.107 A 
central challenge to genocide scholars’ studies of colonial genocide is the representation 
of the Holocaust as the ‘prototypical genocide’;108 such an approach has hindered 
understandings of other genocides as a result of the oft-made assumption that genocide 
must resemble the prevailing view of the Holocaust as a highly centralised, 
bureaucratically-led, industrial mass extermination.109 Discussions of the extent to 
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which colonial policies can, in certain circumstances, be understood as active policies of 
genocide are important here; as opposed to the ‘accidental’ effects of a complex and 
overlapping system of structures and policy-making. Establishing cases of genocide in a 
colonial context is further complicated by the actions and aims of colonial settlers, the 
objectives of colonial administrators on the ground, and politicians back in London. 
Scholars have shown how the British could be indirectly involved in genocidal practices 
by backing ‘settler massacres by supporting the patrol/commando systems with their 
notorious modus operandi of indiscriminate firing, and protected commando members 
by concealing irregularities and suppressing/revising indigenous evidence.’110 Despite 
much evidence to the contrary, it has often been argued that indigenous populations 
were reduced in spite of the ‘good intentions’ of the British government and colonial 
administrators.111 Martin Shaw discusses the relationship between Britain and genocidal 
policies in particular and highlights that evidence suggests ‘that genocide was a 
repeated problem of British – as of most other – imperial and colonial expansions, in 
which the imperial centre was often, if usually indirectly, implicated.’112 There is often 
a lack of engagement between imperial and genocide scholars and for some imperial 
historians, discussions of colonial genocide are addressing an ‘anachronistic 
question’.113 However, the aim of such discussions is not to ‘fit’ colonial violence into 
contemporary definitions of genocide, as Jordanna Bailkin claims. Rather, historians are 
viewing genocidal violence as part as a wider historical process. Stone, for example, has 
argued the need to ‘take a more historical view, which can explain why certain 
situations evolve into genocide policies and, importantly, why some violent ones do 
not’.114 As Moses argues, ‘colonialism needs to be viewed as a dynamic process’ within 
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an international context,115 and both he and Mark Levene discuss the importance of 
genocidal ‘moments’ of potentiality116 within colonialism that need to be investigated, 
thus helping us to identify key instances in which genocide can become a policy option, 
even if this is not realised.117 Rather than holding genocide up as the ‘ultimate yardstick 
of depravity’, it is important to acknowledge that extreme violence is part of a wider 
framework of destruction that includes a range of dynamics of violence, which in 
certain circumstances may become genocidal.118 Importantly, genocide scholars are 
using a more flexible understanding of genocidal violence to understand the ‘potential’ 
for genocide in an imperial setting and are also interested in examples of extreme 
violence, which may not constitute genocide.119 The context of these debates is essential 
to the arguments of this thesis and I argue that the findings of genocide scholars should 
be incorporated into those of historians of empire. It is the case, however, that the 
research findings of the area of colonialism and genocide are still relatively recent and 
may need time to filter down into the broader historiography of the British Empire.  
 An area of study that has important ramifications for an understanding of the 
relationship between Britain and genocide is that of settler violence in Australia.120 It is 
this historiography in particular that has ignited debate about the nature of settler 
colonialism and its relationship with genocide. Despite extensive research on the 
colonisation of Australia, there has been a marked failure by historians of the British 
Empire to incorporate genocidal violence against the indigenous population into ‘British 
History’.121 One recent exception is Tom Lawson’s study of the destruction of the 
Tasmanian people, which he considers to be a ‘British Genocide’.122 Lawson argues that 
this violence took place ‘almost exclusively under direct British rule, and was 
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committed by British colonists and settlers who either worked for the British Crown or 
for British companies, and who moved between Britain and the Antipodes’.123 Hence, 
Lawson’s study demonstrates that ‘genocide is part of British history’ and not one 
which offers ‘alternatives to genocide’.124 While there is a range of concepts that one 
may use to understand colonial violence, I argue that just as a framework of genocide 
aids an explanation of the nature of colonial violence, so a consideration of genocide 
‘potentiality’ in a colonial context encourages an awareness of just how violent the 
British Empire truly was. Chapter 5 further explores the relevance of genocide studies 
for understandings of colonial violence.  
 As stated above, historians of empire are also assessing the ways in which 
everyday violence was inherent within the colonial relationship.125 As Jill Bender 
emphasises, we need to understand both the ‘micromoments’ of everyday violence as 
well as the ‘macromoments’ such as the Indian Mutiny, which, as Bender and others 
have argued, ‘dramatically shaped the accepted use of force in the colonies’.126 
Regarding such violence the role of law and order in the colonies is significant and this 
issue has implications for our understanding of both everyday violence and the 
processes of more extreme violence. Studies of everyday violence undertaken by the 
colonial state show, as Taylor Sherman’s work does regarding state violence and 
punishment in India, that once colonial rule was established, quotidian violence 
remained in a variety of forms: ‘from firing on crowds and bombing from the air, to 
dismissal from one’s place of work or study, to collective fines, imprisonment and 
corporal punishment’.127 Hence, the relationship between war and peace in the colonies 
was blurred as a result of inherent violence throughout the colonial system.128 Elizabeth 
Kolsky’s exploration of white violence in India shows how violence was endemic, not 
ephemeral in the colonial relationship.129 Scholars are demonstrating the failings and 
contradictions of the colonial legal systems and systems of punishment, which were 
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hierarchised according to race, class and gender. In colonial rule, violence was inherent 
and a gulf was present between the principle and practice of law, despite contemporary 
claims to the contrary and upon which justifications of the ‘civilising mission’ were 
based.130  
 The true extent of the violence used to uphold the Empire and British interests as 
a whole has failed to seep into the British consciousness more generally. Typically, the 
viewpoint is presented that Britain’s Empire was ‘not as bad’ as its European 
counterparts and the idea is conveyed that the ‘“natives” were lucky’ to have been 
colonised by Britain rather than France for example.131 Scholars are emphasising the 
relevance of debates regarding the memorialisation and representation of the Holocaust 
and the failure of Britain to deal with its violent past.132 One example is the debates 
surrounding the introduction of Holocaust Memorial Day (HMD), which has further 
highlighted this lack of awareness and at times, apparent hypocrisy.133 Britain’s direct 
relationship with extreme – and at times genocidal – violence needs to be 
acknowledged. However, as Shaw has noted, the typical approach has been that ‘our 
country stands as a “vigilant”, and if necessary armed, protector of the innocent’ and as 
such there is a lack of self-criticism and a failure to conduct even an ‘academic debate 
about our country’s relationship to the history of genocide, which has preoccupied 
intellectuals and scholars in these countries’. 134  While commemorations of the 
Holocaust are clearly to be welcomed, we must also explore the fact that, as Donald 
Bloxham points out, ‘the British linkage with mass atrocity and death is much more 
direct in the record of interference, settlement and exploitation in north America, Africa, 
Australasia and the Indian subcontinent’ than with the Holocaust.135 Unfortunately, the 
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opportunity that HMD represented for the British to engage in debates about its own 
genocidal record has not been taken; but then, as Stone has stated, this was never the 
day’s intention.136 As these examples show, debates among scholars of the Holocaust 
and genocide studies have highlighted Britain’s complicated relationship with violence, 
and in particular the context of the British Empire as a ‘site of genocide’.137  
 The recent surge of interest regarding the British Empire and its integral role in 
British identity has witnessed public figures, including British politicians, proclaiming 
that it is time for Britain to ‘stop apologising’ for the Empire (Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown for example138) and celebrate ‘Britishness’; this approach comes in marked 
contrast to the current ‘culture of apology’ in some countries, and demonstrates the need 
for more research and a wider understanding of the true nature of the British Empire and 
its effects.139 Clearly studies of everyday violence across the Empire are integral to our 
understanding of the experiences of the millions of people who found themselves under 
British rule, whether directly or indirectly. However, this violence was usually 
‘bookended’ by more extreme acts of violence, initially to bring an area under British 
control or ‘influence’ and as the colonisers sought to maintain their power, fighting 
against the tide of decolonisation – and often with outbursts of violence in between. It 
seems that a dual process is underway within Britain; on the one hand, reflections of the 
darker side of empire are underplayed and on the other, the ‘positive’ aspects of empire 
are emphasised to create a positive British identity based on pride. Stone has argued that 
the emphasis on the Holocaust in Britain has produced a ‘screen memory’ effect, which 
‘conceptually prohibits inquiry into Britain’s own historical record’.140 However, he 
then goes on to conclude that ‘it is precisely this focus on the Holocaust that has 
encouraged a reconsideration of the question of genocide in imperial history’.141 Hence, 
much of our understanding regarding the dynamics of violence against indigenous 
peoples in the colonies has been hitherto gained through genocide studies, or those 
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interested specifically in studies of violence. Andrew Thompson has warned that ‘By 
becoming too steeped in their imperial history, the British may avoid squaring up to the 
problems of the present’, such as immigration and race relations.142 Alternatively, one 
could argue that attempts to glorify the Empire, rather than genuine considerations of 
the Empire’s true nature and empirical research into its violence and atrocities, are what 
give rise to such ‘screen memories’. 
Conclusion 
Historians are using a wide range of concepts and categories to explore issues of 
violence and colonialism, all of which are relevant to this study, which defends the 
merits of bringing together the fields of imperial history and studies of mass violence. 
While this thesis is particularly interested in the extreme colonial violence that the 
British military utilised in ‘macromoments’ of violence, areas for further research 
regarding ‘micromoments’ of everyday violence will also be alluded to;143 issues of 
particular relevance include the utilisation of slavery as a justification for violence, the 
role of non-military violence and the hypocritical approach to British colonial rule, 
including law and order. With regards to popular perceptions of the British Empire and 
its ‘benevolent’ agenda, this study demonstrates that colonial administrators, politicians 
in London and British military men accepted the need for exemplary violence and the 
utilisation of extreme tactics when these were deemed to be necessary – violence was 
endemic across the British Empire. I argue that there needs to be a reassessment 
regarding both Britain’s relationship with violence and the supposed ‘nature’ of the 
British Empire. This study is part of an endeavour to determine the significance of 
colonial violence within a wider framework of European mass violence in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and to place Britain’s role within this framework. 
Representations and the memorialisation of mass violence are highly important, but 
they need to occur within an open and honest conversation about extreme violence in 
British history. The violence in Britain’s past needs to be explored and assessments of 
others’ misdeeds should not come at the expense of self-reflection. Bloxham has 
highlighted a more typical approach: ‘“Our” imperial record simply does not enter into 
the British collective memory as objectionable, and “our” history of discriminations is 
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seen as nowhere near as relevant as those visited by someone else.’144 Clearly this 
approach needs to change and this thesis can be seen as part of this endeavour. 
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Chapter 2 
A ‘Little War’ in Perak: British Intervention, 1875-61 
The contact between the civilisation of the European races and effete semi-
barbarous States has occurred all over the world. Its immediate results 
have differed widely. Some races have succeeded, others have signally 
failed. This contact has, in some cases, been marked by mutual savagery, in 
others by mutual deterioration. I do not pretend that in our dealings with 
the native States of the Malay Peninsula, we have been actuated by a spirit 
of pure disinterestedness. I do claim that our action will bear a close 
scrutiny, and that it has resulted in almost unmixed good to the States 
themselves, while a new and rich field has been opened out to the 
commerce of all nations.2 
Surely we do not yet require to learn that nothing like direct European 
fighting is to be expected from the half-savage inhabitants of the Malayan 
Peninsula.3 
The East India Company initially established British connections with Malaya in 1786 
as it acquired the island of Penang, which along with Malacca and Singapore would 
form the Straits Settlements from 1826 onwards. In the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny 
in 1857 and amidst a more general review of the Indian government – as well as 
protests by European merchants in Singapore against the Company 4  – the 
administration of the Straits was transferred to the British Colonial Office in April 1867 
as a Crown Colony.5 Contrary to the hopes of local traders and merchants, the British 
initially continued the Company’s policy of ‘liberal non-intervention’ on the Malay 
Peninsula.6 However, as the future Governor of the Straits Settlements, Andrew Clarke, 
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later stated, Britain hereby came ‘into contact with native states in various stages of 
anarchy, whose perpetual quarrels became more and more intolerable’.7 As a result of 
this perceived ‘anarchy’, Britain’s strategy of non-intervention was abandoned in 1873 
and several of the Malay States came under British control amidst concerns regarding 
local disputes and their effect on trade, as well as the potential threat of other European 
powers in the region.8 The British thus sought to take a more active role in the States 
surrounding the Straits and Clarke initiated a British Residents system, which was 
established via the Pangkor Engagement of 1874. However, local discontent to growing 
British influence culminated in the murder of the first British Resident in the State of 
Perak, James Birch on 2 November 1875. The era of British non-intervention in the area 
was officially at an end and the Governor of the Straits Settlements quickly sent in 
troops to promptly and brutally suppress any resistance to British authority.  
This chapter examines the background to the Perak War and explores the 
circumstances in which the British Resident system was set up in Malaya, thus paving 
the way for greater British influence on the peninsula. The aggressive British policies 
that were implemented here will be explored, as well as the ways in which these 
policies contradicted the intentions of the Colonial Office. These events are important in 
terms of understanding the manner in which British colonisers dealt with those they 
sought to bring under direct British influence and how their actions made outbreaks of 
violence highly probable. This chapter demonstrates the significance of individual men 
on the spot in shaping events on the periphery, including the nature of the violence 
when indigenous opposition broke out. Directly after Birch’s murder, troops moved 
swiftly into the country, razing villages and brutally suppressing the opposition. Issues 
that will be addressed include the ways in which the resistance was suppressed, 
considering for example the severe punishments meted out to those allegedly involved 
in the Resident’s murder. By examining the role of the British administration in the 
colony and its communication with the Colonial Office we will be able to ascertain the 
development of the violence directed against the indigenous population of Perak, 
considering whether the violence accorded with British policy or whether it was the 
result of ad hoc decisions taken by individuals on the ground. 
As historian C. D. Cowan has highlighted, in the early period of British 
involvement in Malaya, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 had ‘left the British 
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settlements as the only outside power in the Peninsula’.9 The treaty, which marked a 
desire in London to ‘end colonial disputes’ between Britain and the Netherlands,10 
ensured Dutch supremacy in Sumatra,11 and British control of the Malacca Straits.12 
Hence, it is clear that European relations dictated British policies in the region. In the 
Malay States Britain initially undertook a colonial policy of committed non-intervention 
in which ‘Earlier requests for intervention brought invariably prompt and emphatic 
refusal from Whitehall’ 13  under the Liberal government. As V. G. Kiernan has 
emphasised, ‘As late as 1874 no maps or handbooks of the peninsula existed’.14 
However, a series of local disputes and dynastic quarrels, failure by local officials to 
create a situation of stability, as well as the increasing fear of foreign intervention led 
the Colonial Office to consider an increased role in the area.15 In the early 1870s, the 
areas of Perak, a state on the northwest of the Malay Peninsula and Selangor, on the 
west coast, were said to be ‘in a state of anarchy’ as a result of continual disturbances 
and piracy.16 Internal conflicts were having a detrimental effect on the trade of British 
and Chinese merchants, the latter of whom wrote a petition to the British government 
requesting action.17 The Chinese community argued that as a result of the Government’s 
policy of non-intervention, the States were ‘rapidly returning to their original state of 
lawlessness and barbarism’.18 Mining disputes between Chinese tin-miners were a key 
source of conflict and the severity of the disturbances ‘compelled the Straits 
Government to act’.19 It has also been highlighted that there was a ‘deteriorating 
situation’ in other areas of the British Empire and pressure from these disturbances led 
Lord Kimberley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to express a ‘desire to contain 
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the spreading troubles in Malaya and his willingness to reconsider British-sponsored 
pacification of the troubled Malay states’.20 On Kimberley’s orders, the new Governor 
of the Straits Settlements Andrew Clarke was sent to Malaya on 20 September 1873 to 
investigate the situation on the peninsula and report back with suggestions for further 
action:  
to promote the restoration of peace and order ... I should wish you 
especially to consider whether it would be advisable to appoint a British 
officer to reside in any of the States. Such an appointment could, of course, 
only be made with the full consent of the Native Government, and the 
expenses connected with it would have to be defrayed by the Government 
of the Straits Settlements.21 
While these instructions marked a ‘new phase in the history of Malaya and of the 
British empire’, 22  these directives were not strictly adhered to. Upon arrival in 
Singapore on 4 November 1873, Clarke had already decided that he would go beyond 
his mandate, later justifying his actions thus: ‘Reporting alone scarcely seemed to meet 
the grave urgency of the situation. It was necessary to act in the first place, and to report 
afterwards’.23 Clarke argued further that ‘the War Office is at this moment crammed 
with such documents, the majority of which have never been even studied. Still less 
acted upon’.24  At this time there was also a succession dispute and further justification 
for British intervention in the region was provided by Raja Abdullah, who was vying 
for recognition as the new Sultan, in an ongoing succession dispute.25 In an attempt to 
gain British favour, Abdullah wrote to Clarke requesting that a British officer come to 
Perak to advise him in reference to the local hostilities, thus providing Clarke with his 
chance to intervene, or as Emily Sadka has stated, he offered Clarke a ‘key to the 
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door’.26 Although this ‘key’ was actually provided by W. H. M. Read, a Straits 
merchant, who wrote up the letter, which was then translated into Malay and signed by 
Abdullah, requesting that Clarke intervene in the local disturbances as an ‘umpire’ and 
that after peace was restored ‘it would be the desire of the Sultan and chiefs to place the 
country under the protection of the British flag, and for that purpose to enter upon a new 
treaty of a friendly and liberal nature’.27 In order to increase British influence in the 
region, Clarke set about establishing a Residents system in the states of Negri Sembilan, 
Selangor, and Perak in which a British officer would advise the Malay chiefs. Clarke 
sought to settle the disputed succession of the Sultan, bring peace to the mining areas, 
as well as gain new British territory. Clarke’s policies were brought together in the 
Pangkor Engagement, which was agreed upon on 20 January 1874 on Pangkor Island, 
just off the coast of Perak.28 The heads of the warring Chinese factions were present and 
a peace settlement was agreed which included disarmament, the destruction of 
stockades and compensation.29  
 A key aspect of Pangkor was the question of succession, which had been 
disputed since the death of Sultan Ali in 1871; there were three potential successors to 
consider: Rajas Abdullah, Ismail and Yusuf. The latter was the son of the late Sultan, 
but he had been previously passed over because of unpopularity for his role as a 
‘ruthless commander’ in a local dispute; Ismail was elected in 1871, as a result of 
Abdullah’s unpopularity as ‘an opium-smoker and a coward’.30 At Pangkor, Abdullah 
became the new Sultan – although this decision continued to be disputed – Ismail 
officially became the ex-Sultan and Yusuf was again overlooked. Neither Ismail nor 
Yusuf attended the event at Pangkor for reasons that are unclear.31 In any case, Clarke 
‘had taken the law into his own hands’ by reversing the election of 1871;32 this decision 
created a highly ambiguous situation, as ‘the settlement recognised one of the three 
                                                
26 Burns, ‘Introduction’, xxi; Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States 1874-1895 (Kuala Lumpur: 
University of Malaya Press, 1970 [1968]), 47; see W. David McIntyre, The Imperial Frontier in the 
Tropics, 1865-75: A Study of British Colonial Policy in West Africa, Malaya and the South Pacific in the 
Age of Gladstone and Disraeli (London: Macmillan, 1967), 292-93.  
27 [W. H. M. Read], Play and Politics, Recollections of Malaya By an Old Resident (London: Wells 
Gardner, Darton, 1901), 26; McIntyre, Imperial Frontier, 292. For further information on Read see: P. L. 
Burns (ed.), The Journals of J. W. W. Birch: First British Resident to Perak: 1874-1875 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), 17, n3.  
28 See: McIntyre, Imperial Frontier, 295. 
29 Ibid., 293.  
30 See: Parkinson, British Intervention, 73. As Mary Turnbull explains, Perak had an intricate power 
structure: the sultan was at the apex, followed by the raja muda and then a hierarchy of chiefs, Turnbull, 
A Short History of Malaysia, 130-31.  
31 Turnbull, A Short History of Malaysia, 133. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya, 185, n29.   
32 McIntyre, Imperial Frontier, 295.  
 56 
claimants without securing his acceptance by the other two. Birch, the new resident, 
found himself accredited to a Sultan whose right was denied by half his subjects, and 
who could not guarantee the support of the Perak chiefs for the Resident’.33 The new 
Governor William Jervois, later admitted to Lord Carnarvon, Kimberley’s successor as 
Secretary of State, that ‘from the day when we deposed the late Sultan Ismail and set up 
Abdullah upon the throne, it was merely a question of time, and that of no long 
duration, when opposition to our intervention would become apparent’.34 As a result of 
Pangkor, both the new Sultan Abdullah and the Mantri, ruler of Larut (a district in 
Perak) were now subject to British advice which ‘must be asked and acted upon on all 
questions other than those touching Malay Religion and Custom’; adjustments to the 
territorial boundaries were also made in favour of the Straits Settlements.35 It has been 
claimed that the British version of the treaty was much more assertive than its Malay 
translation36 and the agreement demonstrated a misunderstanding (whether intentional 
or otherwise) of the role of religion and custom in Perak,37 thereby creating a precarious 
situation regarding the distribution of power between the chiefs and residents. Events at 
Pangkor were conducted by Clarke at great speed and with much secrecy and as 
Colonel Anson, Lieutenant-Governor of Penang observed: ‘There can be little doubt 
that these chiefs did not fully realise what they were asked to agree to; or if they did, 
had no intention of acting up to it’;38 in contrast, Anthony Webster has argued that the 
‘Malay rulers saw the new arrangements for what they were, an unwelcome intrusion of 
British imperial power’.39  
 Previously, British control in the region had been increased through local treaties 
and, as Sadka has highlighted, it was ‘common practice throughout the period to secure 
documents legitimising British actions by presenting drafts for signature under 
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pressure’; a long established colonial practice.40 While A. J. Stockwell is correct in 
stating that in Southeast Asia, ‘British imperialism advanced by the pen as well as by 
the sword and its history is peppered with treaties—albeit unequal ones’, it was 
nevertheless the case that the threat of British force was never far behind.41 One 
correspondent recognised the reality for indigenous communities that made treaties with 
European imperial powers; he wrote that because the chiefs had signed the Pangkor 
Treaty they have ‘forfeited their rights’.42 The Resident system was to prove highly 
problematic as a result of their ambiguous role and the extent to which the chiefs were 
obliged to act on British ‘advice’. Stockwell has argued that British intervention was 
motivated by concerns regarding the increased threat of Germany and the area was of 
particular strategic importance for the empire as of 1869 owing to the opening of the 
Suez Canal.43 E. Chew also argued that British interests in the area were focused on 
keeping out other potential foreign influence and highlights that the war came at a 
period of ‘renewed imperial sentiment in England and the appearance of the German 
colossus on the continent’.44  
 Perak’s first Resident was James Birch, whose actions within his new role 
contradicted Clarke’s instructions and antagonised Perak’s various chiefs and the new 
Sultan.45 There had been a nine-month delay in Birch taking up his residency, which 
‘allowed Abdullah’s enemies to harden their resistance to the Pangkor decisions’, or at 
the very least, led the chiefs to believe ‘that the Pangkor Treaty could be ignored’.46 
Changes made by Birch included a new civil code, a police force and a superior judge 
who was answerable only to the Resident and Sultan.47 The chiefs were further 
provoked by Birch’s criticism of the long-established system of debt-slavery and his 
attempts to hinder the practice, and his insistence on providing refuge to escaped slaves 
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particularly antagonised the chiefs,48 as well as his creation of a new system of revenue, 
which was to diminish the income of the chiefs.49 Financial incentives were offered to 
the chiefs if they complied with British demands and Sadka has highlighted that 
financial issues represented a central problem within the relationship: 
Money was doled out to buy support or as a reward for obedience; it was 
withheld when rajas or chiefs were recalcitrant, with the explanation that 
there would be no money for allowances till the revenues were properly 
collected. The chiefs were unwilling to exchange their rights for irregular 
and arbitrary payments, and Birch was not in a position to make fixed 
allowances until he had revenue.50 
In April 1875, Clarke had reminded Abdullah that he was bound to the Pangkor 
Engagement which stipulated that the British Resident was to receive all revenue and 
taxes. 51  As C. Northcote Parkinson stated, by ‘striking at the chiefs’ means of 
livelihood, Birch managed to create a common resistance among men who agreed, 
perhaps, in nothing else’. 52  Frustrated by Abdullah’s refusal to cooperate, Birch 
threatened to have him removed from the throne.53 Jervois also realised too late that 
Abdullah was not up to the job and that he did not enjoy local support. 54  
 Lord Henry Stanley of Alderley from the India Office provided staunch 
opposition to British policy in the area and highlighted Birch’s incompetence, stating 
that ‘on several occasions he had to resort to strong measures, such as burning the 
houses of refractory headmen, by way of example’. Stanley concluded that ‘while the 
Colonial Office fancied that the Resident was acting by advice, he was advising by 
burning’.55 Birch was informed that the Raja Ngah in the town of Bidor was illegally 
raising taxes on tin exports and as punishment Birch decided to burn down Ngah’s 
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house.56 However, Birch came to regret his actions, stating in his journal: ‘Yusuf and 
Ismail complain of the burning of Ngah’s house and Ismail has now got to calling it his 
house … I am not satisfied by any means that it was a wise thing to do, and I may have 
made a mistake in doing it’. He continues: ‘At all events I shall not burn any more 
houses, but this was a place in the jungle….’57  
 However, Birch’s actions were not solely to blame for the precarious situation, 
as Sadka has highlighted, the Pangkor Engagement was inherently problematic, 
particularly with regards to the Resident’s role in which ‘control’ was called ‘advice’.58 
While Jervois would later criticise Clarke’s approach, on his arrival in Perak, Jervois 
continued to implement Clarke’s policy of intervention in the area during his time as 
Governor (1875-77).59 Jervois arrived in Perak in May 1875 to investigate the growing 
tensions and realised that some form of action was needed; the Resident system 
appeared untenable.60 As Jervois stated: ‘The Resident’s advice is disregarded, and he 
must either passively look on while acts are committed which he disapproves, but 
cannot control, or he must assume to himself a power which is inconsistent with his 
position as adviser’.61  
 It was in the midst of the tensions between Birch and the Malay chiefs that 
Jervois travelled to Perak to implement a new agreement. After an unsuccessful 
consultation with Abdullah, Jervois independently decided to introduce a new system in 
which two British officers would be appointed as Queen’s Commissioners to carry out 
the administration of the country in the name of the Sultan with the assistance of a 
Malay Council; these changes were to be conveyed to the chiefs via the issuing of a 
Proclamation. 62  Whilst negotiations were being conducted with Abdullah for his 
consent to the new system, a plot to rid Perak of Birch was allegedly underway, 
however, in the lead up to the outbreak of violence Jervois had failed to recognise the 
true extent of the tensions and the gravity of the situation. Jervois claimed, regarding the 
likelihood of resistance, that ‘there is not the least probability of such an event’.63 
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Furthermore, Jervois stated, ‘I believe the desire is general amongst the great body of 
the population that the British should take into their hands the government of the 
country, for they know that then they would then be protected, be paid for their labour, 
and receive justice, which they neither get nor expect under the Sultan’s rule’.64 Frank 
Swettenham (who was appointed Assistant Resident in Selangor) later claimed to have 
been aware of the worsening tensions on his visits to Perak and knew that ‘trouble was 
brewing’.65 Jervois had failed to understand the extent of the animosity towards Birch 
and how it had united the otherwise divided chiefs and he believed that the majority of 
the people wanted to be under British rule66 and on his September trip to Perak he went 
on to make matters even worse; as Parkinson states: ‘His visit was the Malays’ last 
opportunity for redress of their grievances, and its main result was a decision to make 
Birch’s powers more absolute’.67 Both Birch and Swettenham were to distribute the 
new Proclamation throughout Perak which stated that: ‘Her Britannic Majesty’s 
Government have determined to administer the government of Perak in the name of the 
Sultan’.68 Birch had previously received death threats and had been warned that the 
posting of the Proclamation would not be allowed in Pasir Salak, but still he did nothing 
to protect himself and it was whilst his men attempted to carry out this assignment that 
Birch was stabbed to death at the bath-house on 2 November 1875.69 It seems that the 
violence was sparked by the attempts of Birch’s interpreter Arshad to post the 
Proclamation, which was immediately torn down; ‘Arshad struck with a stick one of the 
Malays who had been concerned in the proceeding’.70 In the following moments Arshad 
was stabbed, shortly followed by Birch.71  
In the immediate aftermath of Birch’s murder, Colonel Anson, Lieutenant-
Governor of Penang, swiftly sent out a garrison to carry out a surprise assault on Pasir 
Salak and bring the area under control; this attack was unsuccessful however and 
marked a military reversal for the British in which 17 officers and men were killed, 
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including Captain Innes the Commissioner in charge.72 This reversal was the result of 
the hasty manner in which Anson had organised the expedition into the village, with a 
lack of command and outdated weaponry – including rockets ‘of an obsolete fashion’ – 
which the participants could not operate.73 Confusion amongst the Sepoys led to them 
shooting on the British troops and as Jervois reported, ‘Want of knowledge of their 
language was also a serious difficulty in dealing with the [Sikhs], and Mr. Plunket had 
to give orders through an interpreter’.74 As Abbott stated, ‘The Sepoys and police were 
huddled together behind a large tree close to the river, and proved utterly useless, and 
rather dangerous from their wild firing, which wounded some of the troops’. 75 
Furthermore, as Swettenham later observed, ‘We had no surgeon and no stretchers, and 
the journey back was far from pleasant’.76 With reference to the aftermath of Innes’ 
death and the failed attack on Pasir Salak, Peter Benson Maxwell, the former Chief 
Justice of the Straits Settlements, stated that  
now people fairly lost their heads. With the news of this reverse a season of 
panic set in. Rumours of a great Mahometan ‘revival’, and of a general 
rising of all the Malay Peninsula arose in the Colony, and spread like 
wildfire to this country, where we were told that the ferocious and fanatical 
Malays were about to kindle a religious war against hated foreigners traders 
and Christians [sic].77  
Anson’s swift attempt to rid Pasir Salak of any opposition was representative of a wider 
approach across the British Empire and adhered to broader practices of colonial warfare, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. In this instance, Anson’s decisive response was 
counter-productive and led to an initial British defeat, which in turn led to a sense of 
panic; it was warned in the British press that ‘if we are to maintain the tradition of our 
invincibility among these semi-civilised races, we cannot afford to adopt a slovenly 
manner either of making war or of keeping the peace in our relations with them’.78 
William Napier, Chairman of the Straits Settlements Association, acknowledged the 
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importance of the failed assault, stating that with these events ‘the affair assumed a new 
aspect; and an expedition which, in its origin, could have been properly considered as 
limited to merely punitive objects, and specially directed against the murderers of the 
Resident, acquired a different character’.79  
 Jervois had not consulted with the Colonial Office prior to the Proclamation 
initiative and his actions had received no official sanctioning; hence his sudden calls for 
military assistance in the wake of Birch’s murder ‘provoked suspicion and dismay in 
the Colonial Office’.80 Carnarvon expressed his hope that the violence was an ‘isolated 
outrage’ and stated his desire to avoid any military intervention: ‘I hope this may admit 
of being treated as an individual outrage, and not lead to military operations, which 
would endanger British policy in native States’.81 Carnarvon also reiterated Kimberley’s 
concerns regarding the need to contain the conflict, emphasising that his ‘hands are 
extraordinarily full of very heavy work now’.82 Kimberley gave Clarke his instructions 
during the same period in which he instructed Wolseley with regards to the Ashanti 
expedition in West Africa (1873-4).83 In his reluctance to act in Perak, Carnarvon also 
cited a range of disputes throughout the Empire and it is likely that his concerns were 
influenced by recent events in India regarding the ‘Kooka outbreak’, which occurred in 
1872. This incident involved the summary execution of sixty-eight Kuka Sikh prisoners 
in the wake of a small-scale rebellion in Malerkotla, a principality in Punjab, and caused 
a stir in the imperial metropole; the threat of the rebellion had been limited and the 
killings were undertaken after peace had been restored. 84 Brutal events throughout the 
Empire left an ‘indelible memory’ on the colonists, notably the Indian Mutiny in 1857 
and the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865 in Jamaica, both of which will be discussed 
further in chapter 5.85 Colonel Anson later reflected that the events in Jamaica were at 
the forefront of his thoughts as he made his way to the Malay Peninsula.86 Hence, the 
wider context of episodes of violence was important to the approach in Perak and 
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concerns were further fuelled by the Dutch conflict in Sumatra, which was also seen as 
relevant. As expressed in The Times, the events in Sumatra were perceived in the 
imperial metropole as a sign of a ‘flame of the Musselman revival’ and that ‘encouraged 
by the sight of the Dutch reverses in [Aceh], the Malays of the Peninsula may cherish 
the hope of driving the English out of Malacca. If such be the character of the outbreak 
at Perak, it may give us not a little trouble’.87 However, Jervois believed that Ismail 
would not demonstrate open resistance against the Government once he saw that the 
British would ‘bring a force into the field.’88 Jervois’ call for troop reinforcements was 
received with concern from Carnarvon who feared that Jervois would use the murder as 
an excuse for the conquest and annexation of Perak.89 However, 2,000 troops were sent 
out from Hong Kong and India, despite Carnarvon’s reservations, and a bitter series of 
correspondence ensued between the two, 90  which was worsened by delays in 
communication that led to Carnarvon receiving requests for troop reinforcements 
without having received a full explanation from Jervois of the events on the ground;91 
hence, Jervois ‘demanded large reinforcements from a Government which was in the 
dark as to their purpose’.92 Carnarvon noted in his journal on 13 November: ‘I am 
utterly disenchanted with Jervois. I believe he is getting up a little war of annexation but 
I am nearly powerless to stop it. At this distance I cannot take the responsibility of 
refusing the troops if he persists in calling for them’.93 This situation demonstrates the 
extent to which British politicians in London were reliant on the men on the ground for 
accurate assessments of colonial conflicts and they were often subject to the colonial 
objectives of these men. It also shows the difficulties regarding the technology of 
communication at this time, resulting in delays, which meant that the colonial 
administrators had to use their initiative and acted without having their actions 
sanctioned by London.  
It is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Jervois utilised Birch’s murder to 
carry out a military campaign in the country with the aim of annexation; it is clear, 
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however, that future British policy in the area was at the forefront of his mind 
throughout 1875: Jervois wrote to Carnarvon expressing his advocacy of a policy of 
annexation, which he argued, ‘would certainly pay well, whilst it would be an 
incalculable advantage to the State itself, and a great benefit to the cause of humanity 
and freedom’.94 Jervois also believed that annexation was achievable ‘without costing a 
penny or firing a shot’.95 As reports in The Spectator make clear, Jervois’ actions were 
certainly viewed as amounting to annexation and the role of the Residents was 
fundamentally ‘to govern the country’.96 Carnarvon’s position on this issue was clear 
however, and Jervois was under strict instructions that annexation was not an option at 
this time, although Carnarvon did not rule it out for the future, but stated that the time 
‘has not yet come’.97 After his tour of the state, Jervois concluded that a complete 
takeover should be resisted for the moment; one reason he gave for this view was that 
‘it would be very inconvenient if the inhabitants of Perak all at once became entitled to 
the rights and privileges of British subjects’.98  
 In any case, Jervois now planned for a military campaign to find and punish 
those culpable for Birch’s murder and suppress any resistance; as he communicated to 
the Colonial Office, ‘it is most advisable to make a display of power, and that 
difficulties present and future will cease by the adoption of such a course’.99 As 
Swettenham later stated, this task was to entail ‘perpetual work day and night’.100 The 
Navy was ordered to blockade the Perak coastline, although this was deliberately not 
announced publicly.101 A prohibition of the sale of arms was also enforced throughout 
the area. It has been argued that Commander Stirling and his naval soldiers were 
particularly ‘spoiling for a fight’ and had ‘a reputation to retrieve and casualties to 
avenge’102 after the first failed attempt to take Pasir Salak. Theirs was an attitude fit for 
the assignment intended to show an ‘imposing display of force’.103 The troops were 
further spurred on as they passed Birch’s abandoned boat en route to Pasir Salak for the 
second attack on 16 November; it has also been claimed that the troops were further 
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encouraged by ‘rivalry between the army and the navy’.104 This time the operation was 
equipped with reinforcements, as well as the ‘needed artillery support and the needed 
unity of command’ and the operation was carried out without British losses.105 As the 
forces made their way towards the village, Stirling described how he ‘directed rockets 
and shell to be thrown into the jungle at intervals to clear the way for the troops (who 
burnt the houses on their way as they advanced) … the enemy again made a stand, and 
opened fire on us with their rifles, but with no effect and they were soon dislodged’.106 
As the troops entered the deserted village it was soon destroyed and as one participant 
described, ‘the village was fired, and the banks for a mile and a half were ablaze’107 – 
this was just one of many ‘acts of vengeance’ to be executed throughout Perak.108  
 Lt. H. B. Rich of the Royal Engineers described how Major-General Francis 
Colborne and his troops then proceeded north from Pasir Salak; having spent a few days 
marching with no signs of opposition, Colborne arrived in the village of Bota where 
they tried to ‘obtain news of the whereabouts of Maharajah Lela and ex-Sultan Ismail’. 
However, he ‘could gain no information until he tied some of the chief men to a tree, 
preparatory to lashing them, when they told him Lela was about one day’s march in 
front of our force’.109 Furthermore, on the following day the troops advanced to Blanja 
‘intending to attack’, but then, ‘contrary to expectation, they entered the place without 
opposition’.110 Essential to these operations was the desire to find Lela who resided in 
the village and was a key suspect in Birch’s murder; it was reported that in the 
aftermath of the murder, Lela shouted from the steps of his house, ‘This is not the will 
of the Raja, or his order; it is our will, because we cannot stand it any longer. Others’ 
houses have been burned, and where are we to go to, if our houses are burned too! It is 
better that we should die at once’.111 As Jervois wrote: ‘the suspicions that point to Lela 
as the instigator of the crime are so strong that the occupation of his village, to be 
followed by the uncompromising demand for his surrender, is the first object to be 
aimed at’, however, he did not expect his surrender ‘until an imposing display of force 
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has been exhibited’.112 Captain Dunlop reported that he had received information that 
Lela had ‘about 300 men with him and food for only one day’.113 In his next letter, 
Dunlop expressed his belief that the scarcity of food would aid their attempts to capture 
the alleged culprits and stated: ‘One thing is very certain, rice is becoming scarce, and 
this in my opinion will do more towards weakening our enemies than anything else’.114 
Dunlop also described how the British ‘determined to burn’ the village of Gaja, 
opposite Pasir Salak, because of the alleged complicity of one inhabitant in Birch’s 
murder.115 Dunlop concluded in his report that ‘the lesson they received yesterday, 
though a severe one, will not be sufficient to restore order or safety to Europeans in 
Perak’. 116 Pasir Salak was destroyed and its reoccupation prevented; Swettenham 
acknowledged that ‘These measures were then very necessary if they sound severe 
now’, but he then states that when ‘considering the circumstances they cannot really be 
considered harsh’.117 The incident at Pasir Salak was not the only example of a village 
being held to ransom; after shots had been fired upon British provision boats from the 
village of Bhota, it was proposed to ‘inflict chastisement’ on the village and the British 
began to destroy it. However, seeing the destruction that they intended to cause, the 
headmen of the village soon handed over the alleged perpetrators.118  
 After the successful occupation of Pasir Salak the troops subsequently proceeded 
to the village of Kinta, believing Ismail to have fled there although interestingly, Jervois 
informed Carnarvon in a despatch from 18 December that Brigadier General Ross was 
making his way from Blanja to Kinta but that this movement ‘has not been made in 
accordance with instructions from me.’ 119  Furthermore, Jervois expressed his 
misapprehension at the plans to enter Kinta ‘where I expect considerable opposition will 
be made’.120 However, Private Michael Weir’s account details how Kinta was taken 
with little difficulty on arrival, despite the village being defended by a small Malayan 
force: ‘the natives under Sultan Ishmad and Rajah Sela [sic] were completely 
demoralised and when they heard loud cheers of our little Brigade charging their Capital 
the [sic] broke in wild confusion and fled firing off their brafs guns just before the final 
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rush’. As was often the case throughout this campaign the expected strength of 
opposition of the enemy did not materialise and Weir concludes that ‘Kinta was ours 
with 5 guns and much spoil. We burned part of the town and occupied the remainder 
ever since’.121 Rich confirms this destruction, stating that on capturing Kinta, ‘The 
General then gave orders for all the houses on the right bank of the river to be burnt’.122 
It was also acknowledged in the press that ‘The Malays are reported to be everywhere 
dispirited and retreating. Driven from place to place, frightened by our “unfair” fighting 
with the “devilish rockets” as they say, they see that they are playing a losing game, and 
it is the general opinion that active resistance is at an end’.123 Clearly, the campaign 
went well beyond Jervois’ mandate of ‘the punishment of those connected to Mr. Birch 
and the protection of the lives of British subjects wherever they may be in danger’;124 
Jervois argued that, ‘A timid and vacillating policy might furnish a real ground for 
alarm, as likely to lead to a combination against us which might entail lengthened 
hostilities and a heavy outlay’.125  
 On capturing Kinta, Jervois’ instructions to Major J. F. A. McNair, the Senior 
Commissioner, were decidedly vague: 
Further steps should be taken in order (if possible) to fulfil the objects of 
the expedition, viz., the capture of those implicated in the recent outrages, 
and the pacification of the country. I am unwilling to hamper you with 
minute instructions which you may find it impossible to carry out, but I 
desire you in all eventualities to keep these ends in view.126 
These instructions left McNair to decide for himself the best means to achieve the 
‘pacification’ of Perak. Another village, Kota Lama, was also targeted for destruction; 
an initial attack took place on 4 January 1876. According to the regimental records of 
the 3rd Regiment (‘the Buffs’), as Ismail had fled from Kinta, McNair was ‘forced’ to 
‘turn his attention to Kota Lama and the Lok Raja, who treated all his communications 
with silent contempt’.127 The records state that ‘Towards the close of December the 
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Malays of Kota Lama began to show signs of hostility … and the Commissioner 
determined to punish them, but as they made no open attack on our force it was resolved 
to disarm the inhabitants of Kota Lama and those proving refractory were to have their 
habitations burned’. Rather than being met with opposition, the British saw that ‘armed 
Malays were seen running away’ and furthermore, ‘the inhabitants had abandoned their 
houses and shut them up’. Nevertheless, the dwellings were to be ‘searched and 
burned’. It is clear that shots were only fired at the British after Ross approached a 
house through the jungle in which there were women and children who, ‘at the approach 
of white faces commenced screaming’.128  As Commander Garforth of the Naval 
Brigade reported, the enemy used their spears ‘with great effect’.129  
 The evidence suggests that the inhabitants of Kota Lama had had no intention of 
attacking the British. The village was destroyed completely by Ross’ men during a 
further punitive expedition on 20 January 1876 under Jervois’ instructions ‘to make an 
example of this village’, which included the burning of rice stores.130 In a letter home, 
Private James George Johns described the attack from his post on sentry duty thus:  
It was a pretty sight to see the Rockets flying over the river into the village. 
… The Malays were frightened to death very near for they all ran out of the 
village and there was about 50 of our men waiting for them and as soon as 
they saw them running they fired into them, and killed a good number of 
them, but they could not catch the lot as the jungle was too thick.131 
Garforth stated that the blue jackets were ‘trying to outvie [each] other in individual acts 
of gallantry’.132 Johns stated that, ‘They then went into the village and burnt it to the 
ground, they had built it up again since the 4th of January when it was burnt down 
before’.133 Johns described the action on 20 January thus:  
there was another Expedition sent against Kota Lama as it was believed 
they were as thick as ever and so they was [sic], for when the party about 
100 altogether went up to it the Malays opened fire on them, but it was very 
harmless, and our men returned it pretty warm, they killed another lot of 
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Malays and burnt the village to the ground again for they had built it up 
again and came home after about 6 hours knocking about.134 
That these actions were partly conceived as punishment is made clear by historian Alan 
Harfield’s statement that ‘The Kota Lama Malays were pursued for a while and then the 
British force withdrew having suitably avenged the death of Major Hawkins and the 
others who had been killed on 4 January’.135 Furthermore, ‘Fire was immediately 
applied to the houses on this side of the river, every one of which was burnt’. Johns 
goes on to describe a further operation in the village of the same nature on 4 February, 
which was then followed by the march into a larger village of 200 houses that was also 
‘burnt to the ground’.136 Kota Lama was relentlessly targeted as a result of its alleged 
reputation ‘of being the resort of the worst of characters’ and as part of the mission to 
capture Ismail.137  
 The general population suffered greatly, not only as a result of the destruction of 
these villages, but also due to the blockading of the coastline, which soon resulted in a 
scarcity of rice amongst the inhabitants. Correspondence with Ismail reveals that he 
explained to the authorities that he was unable to meet with them due to the scarcity of 
rice, as ‘his boatmen [were] refusing to leave their families without rice’.138 Jervois’ 
response made his position clear: 
We are sorry for the people, but the responsibility of all the suffering of the 
country must rest with those who have caused and excited the disturbances. 
If no opposition is shown to our troops, and there is a pacific settlement of 
the affairs of the country, food will be allowed to come in as usual.139 
Regarding Ismail’s message, Jervois stated that ‘he did not consider the excuse a good 
one’ and described him as being ‘blinded with obstinacy’.140 Nevertheless Ismail was 
ordered to provide accommodation for British troops.141 However, that Ismail’s people 
were indeed in a desperate situation became clear after his surrender; John Hewick, 
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Assistant Superintendent of the Police, stated that Ismail’s people were destitute and he 
had lost a number of them in the jungle.142 McNair also later confirmed this situation: 
It seems that the sufferings of Ismail and his followers must have been very 
severe; for when he surrendered he was in a destitute condition, his people 
emaciated, many of them ill while many more had been left behind in the 
jungle and had died off.143  
One correspondent, however, disputed the view that food shortages were occurring as a 
result of the war and argued that Kota Lama was ‘fully provisioned’.144 In any case, the 
colonial authorities acknowledged the importance of the blockades in preventing the 
spread of further outbreaks of resistance and the blockade clearly weakened not only the 
‘enemy’ but also the population at large. This importance was also acknowledged by a 
correspondent from The Times: ‘The circumstance that the harvest had not set in, and 
that last year’s supplies had been well-nigh finished, added to the fact that the blockade 
of the coast prevented supplies from being thrown into Perak, has contributed greatly to 
the success which has attended the British advance and the comparatively little 
opposition which has been experienced’.145  
McNair’s above statement also highlights a further problem of villagers fleeing 
‘in great terror’ into the jungle ahead of the arrival of British troops;146 for example, as 
the British headed towards the villages of Sri Mananti and Datu Moar, it was discovered 
that the ‘whole of the population upon either route had abandoned their homes and 
taken to the jungle’; these abandoned villages were subsequently destroyed.147 It is clear 
that the authorities perceived people fleeing their homes in fear as a sign of guilt. These 
British military tactics were utilised across the region at the first sign of any 
disturbance; however, despite the devastation that these tactics caused, British officers 
failed to understand the effects of these actions on the native population in the region. 
This fact is apparent from an account of a punitive expedition in Sungei Ujong (in Negri 
Sembilan); Anson describes an encounter with women from a deserted village: ‘The 
inhabitants having deserted their houses, and fled into the jungle, I sent messengers out 
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to try and induce them to return; but only the women, to the number of about two 
hundred came in’. Anson continues:  
I asked them why they ran away. They said they were very frightened. I 
said, ‘Do we look such dreadful people that you should be afraid of us?’ 
Again they said they had been very much frightened. I then told them, that 
English people did not fight against women and children, nor against any 
people who were peacefully disposed.148  
Punitive expeditions took place in Sungei Ujong in both 1874 and 1875;149 the latter of 
which occurred at the same time as the campaign in Perak, although, as Napier pointed 
out the two outbreaks had little to do with each other, despite attempts in the British 
press to connect them.150 There is little information available on these events, as Stanley 
highlighted in the House of Lords at the time.151 The Parliamentary Papers suggest that 
the methods undertaken in Sungei Ujong were similar to those in Perak and Rich stated 
that based on accounts of the 1875 campaign ‘The plan of operations seems to have 
been, to march right into the heart of the enemy’s country, burning and pilaging [sic] on 
the way’.152 The accounts of these punitive expeditions also describe the burning down 
of villages and looting. 153  Sungei Ujong’s first British Resident, P. W. Murray, 
concluded at the end of the 1875 expedition that ‘The lesson has been a severe one, and 
the cost heavy, but the moral effect, will, I trust, repay us’.154 In 1874, Dunlop, who was 
at this time the Commissioner in Sungei Ujong was instructed to ‘take steps to restore 
tranquillity to [Sungei] Ujong’ in the aftermath of a ‘disturbance’, and advocated that 
‘the proper punishment for rebels was death and confiscation of property, and all who 
aided and assisted rebellion deserved the same fate’. Furthermore, Dunlop ‘detained’ 
the chief headmen to aid him with his search for potential collaborators in the 
disturbance and stated clearly to him that ‘unless I got every assistance, I should, in the 
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Klana’s name, inflict severe and summary punishment’.155 This conflict was another 
example of a system imposed by the British and maintained by the threat of force.156  
Jervois’ proclamations regarding the campaign in Perak were highly 
contradictory as he called for the military ‘to avoid, as far as possible, the punishment of 
the innocent along with those engaged in armed resistance to the Government of Perak’, 
although he goes on to state that ‘under the present circumstances it is difficult to 
discriminate’.157 Whilst Jervois instructed: ‘I desire that all places shall be treated as 
friendly until there is evidence to the contrary, and that punishment shall as far as 
possible be confined to places where resistance is made’, this order was clearly not 
adhered to.158 General orders as conveyed by Colborne on 7 December 1875 stated that: 
‘The setting fire to or destruction of property, except under orders from competent 
authority, is strictly forbidden’.159 He further stated that, ‘It is important that all natives 
of the country and others (with the exception of those in arms and opposing the advance 
of troops) are to be held as friendly, and to be treated with consideration, and 
encouraged to bring in supplies for the use of the troops’. 160  However, official 
correspondence makes it quite clear that the operation’s purpose was the punishment of 
the entire area and its goal was to demonstrate the power of the British Empire in order 
to prevent any further spread of unrest, with little thought for the suffering of the 
population, including women and children. The brutal nature of the campaign was 
motivated by the desire to show that the Resident system would be enforced and that 
‘each British officer would be supported, in the last resort, by the whole strength of the 
British Empire’.161 Jervois argued his policy thus: ‘Had I acted upon the assumption that 
the country was hostile, and proceeded indiscriminately on the burning and slaying 
principle, I should have turned friends into foes and have bred in Perak a hatred of the 
British name’.162 Whilst contradicting his actual policy, he also shows that attempts to 
keep the British campaign under control were a result of considerations of future policy, 
not as a result of any moral objection. It is not possible to determine the number of 
casualties of the native population as no investigation has been conducted regarding the 
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adverse effects of the British campaign on the wider population; with respect to the 
number of casualties as a result of open warfare, no estimates have been made, although 
Harfield has highlighted that there were discrepancies regarding the number of enemy 
casualties reported.163 In truth, often little attempt was made in colonial warfare to count 
the number of enemy casualties.164 McNair stated that ‘As the Malays always, when 
they have time, carry off their dead and wounded, it was impossible to ascertain exactly 
the full extent of their losses; but, from the traces left, it was evident that they must have 
suffered severely’. 165  Such evidence is made clear by an account given by a 
correspondent from The Times in Perak:  
While at Banda Baru I heard that a civil officer had discovered in the 
jungle, about a week after the attack on [Pasir Salak], a wretched Malay 
who had lain wounded, unable to assist himself for days. The ants had 
already commenced eating about his wounds, and he was senseless and 
dying from thirst. It is to be feared that many more have died a lingering 
death, wounded, in the recesses of the dense thickets, with no human aid 
near. A more horrible death could hardly be devised. Some Malays were 
sent to this man’s assistance, but I did not hear whether he survived.166  
The brutality of the British campaign came in stark contrast to the scale of the 
Perak resistance. As Maxwell made clear: ‘Everything seemed complete; and yet there 
was a want - an uncommon want. Where was the enemy?’ As Maxwell states, ‘Not 
more than thirty or forty armed Malays were ever seen at any one time; the whole 
number in arms in Perak throughout the so-called campaign, did not probably exceed 
three hundred men’.167 British reinforcements highlight the one-sided nature of the 
campaign as ‘a force numbered about 1600 bayonets, with a battery and a half of Royal 
Artillery, and a company of Bengal sappers’ were sent from Hong Kong and India.168 
Firsthand accounts also confirm that more often than not British troops were met with 
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deserted villages rather than heavy resistance.169 Nevertheless, the British used methods 
of burning and blockading against the population to achieve an end to the conflict and 
the disproportionate nature of the violence was intended to deter future unrest.  
As stated above, Birch’s controversial actions resulted in uniting the chiefs on 
the issue of British interference in the region; however, it is clear that no systematic 
attack on the colonists was planned.170 Swettenham later reflected that the chiefs 
‘determined to kill [Birch] believing that would be an end to the matter’.171 Sadka 
argues that the manner of Birch’s death suggests ‘a sudden act of passion under 
considerable provocation’,172 however, the official enquiry in to the ‘Perak outrages’ 
concluded that the murder was ‘no chance affray’ and that the murders were 
‘premeditated’.173 In any case, the chiefs failed to understand the nature of British 
colonial rule, which would not tolerate challenges to its authority; they also 
underestimated the force which underpinned the British Empire and the willingness of 
the colonists to employ this force. The ‘absolute’ nature of colonial warfare as discussed 
in chapter 1 was clear in this case, as Robert Heussler states, ‘…‘the British were 
irresistible. They meant to stay and transform the country’.174 Jervois expressed his 
opinion that the hostilities were a result of the actions of the chiefs, ‘whose power 
would be affected by civilised rule’, rather than a reflection of the views of the people 
themselves.175 Hence, on the one hand the authorities argued that strong measures were 
needed to combat wider resistance to British power and on the other, argued that the 
people wanted British rule. It is clear that the British campaign was motivated by a 
desire to deter further potential unrest both in Perak and the surrounding area; further 
isolated incidents of violence were treated in a similar manner, as described above in the 
case of Sungei Ujong, an approach which was typical across the Empire.176 Jervois’ 
overestimation of the rebellion – whether genuine or deliberate – played a key role in 
the escalation of the campaign. As Maxwell claimed, ‘The plain truth is, that before the 
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troops sent for had arrived, the fighting, such as it was, was over’.177 Hence, Jervois 
now needed to create justification for having called in reinforcements in the first place 
and ‘Accordingly, the campaign continued for a few more months’.178 Indeed, Jervois 
wrote to Carnarvon on 12 November 1875 that ‘Disaffection most likely restricted to 
small portion of the country; wise, nevertheless, to act as if not so’.179 Swettenham 
argued that ‘The reverse had been atoned for; but it was decided by high authorities that 
there must be a punitive expedition and never was there more need for one.’180 Rich 
also supported the argument that by 17 December 1875, British troops had effectively 
brought the situation under control.181 Carnarvon had previously chastised Jervois’ 
actions in the lead up to the outbreak of violence and stated clearly that despite Jervois’ 
suggestions otherwise, ‘the retention of Her Majesty’s forces in a country continuing to 
possess an independent jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing measures which the 
natives do not cheerfully accept, could clearly not be permitted.’ Carnarvon further 
stipulated that regarding the Residents the ‘leading principle must obviously be one that 
it should not need to be upheld by force against the feelings and wishes of the people, or 
of any persons, by whatever right, to exercise a great and undoubted authority’.182 
However, after the victory at Kinta, Jervois was still not ready to withdraw the troops 
and in response to Carnarvon’s concerns of a prolonged conflict he claimed that they 
had a moral obligation to retain the troops:  
Supposing Perak abandoned by us, the Chiefs and others implicated in 
murder and outrages will come back, without the object of our expedition 
being attained; there will be a return of anarchy; the natives who have 
adhered to us, and all who have refused to join malcontents, will be left to 
their fate; civil war will be the consequence, to be soon followed by the war 
of extermination between Malays and Chinese.183 
In consideration of the discrepancy between British military overzealousness 
and the weak resistance that it faced, the extent of the British campaign can perhaps be 
explained by the frustrations of a group of soldiers who were desperate for military 
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action; that Pasir Salak had been taken in a ‘bloodless victory’184 is perhaps one reason 
for the potential frustrations of both officers and men and helps to explain the 
devastation that was wrought in the areas through which the British traversed. It has 
been argued that the officers present in Perak had seen little armed conflict and that: 
‘Fortunate were they who could boast of their deeds during the Indian Mutiny’.185 
Parkinson also emphasises the importance of ‘the whole Victorian attitude to war’, and 
states that ‘At the least hint of a campaign the less fortunate would rush to the scene 
from all points of the compass, sword in hand and eager for decorations’. 186 
Furthermore, the poor conditions for the troops during the campaign may have been a 
factor; this included the prevalence of illnesses such as dysentery.187 Participants in the 
campaign described the difficult conditions, which were typical in colonial warfare, as 
discussed in chapter 1 in relation to Callwell’s Small Wars.188 Weir for example detailed 
the trying circumstances of the campaign thus: ‘we encamped in the mud and were so 
worried by Mosquitoes that sleep was out of the question and during the time we 
remained there about a fortnight it rained all the time still making the swamp more 
uncomfortable making us all the colour of mud’, he continues to complain that ‘to 
complete our wretchedness we were continually on duty going a days [sic] march into 
the jungle burning the villages and returning to camp at night’.189  
The brutality of the British campaign was heightened further by the punishments 
meted out to those found guilty of involvement in Birch’s death. By mid-1876 all of the 
fugitives had been captured and Lela and his three followers were subsequently 
hanged.190 Others accused of complicity including Ismail, the Mantri and Abdullah were 
deported to either the Seychelles or Johore. It has been pointed out that the events 
‘cleared Perak of both Sultans and nearly every chief of the first and second rank’.191 
Yusuf, as ‘practically the only important chief not implicated’ was to become the new 
Sultan. Swettenham would later insist that Yusuf had ‘the best hereditary claim’.192 The 
circumstances in which the trials of the alleged collaborators were carried out are highly 
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questionable. The documentation regarding the trials that took place is not complete due 
to the absence of cross-examinations in the proceedings, as well as the fact that most of 
the accused were not even formally charged or questioned; their guilt had been 
predetermined.193 Yet R. O. Winstedt and R. J. Wilkinson claimed that ‘The finding of 
the Executive Council was fair’, as it was stated that  
It must be admitted that provocation was given to the Sultan and his chiefs. 
The late Mr. Birch was a most zealous and conscientious officer. He was, 
however, much thwarted from the outset, and there is reason to believe that 
his manner may at times have been overbearing. It must also be admitted in 
some instances he showed a want of respect for Malay custom. It was also 
injudicious to interfere with local taxes before the general scale of 
allowances had been fixed in lieu of them.194 
This statement was a rare admission from the colonial authorities that the chiefs in 
Perak had indeed been provoked by British interference in the region. In consideration 
of these dubious trials it is interesting that British administrators frequently depicted the 
country, the chiefs and their rule as ‘lawless’.195 Clarke had warned Abdullah against 
giving an ‘order of death of any man of the country, including Malays, without the 
order for his death being made after full and impartial trial, and with the signature and 
approval of the Resident’.196 The trials and treatment of the accused by the British were 
criticised by the Aborigines’ Protection Society, arguing that ‘whatever might be the 
deserts of the men, we think it of paramount importance that the character of this 
country for justice and fair play should be preserved above reproach or question’.197 
Clearly, this was not the case. It was also acknowledged that Lela had been executed 
‘after no proper trial, and in violation of all justice’.198 The case of Perak once again 
highlights the contradictory nature of the British approach to law and order, which was 
inherent within the ideology of the British Empire and its justifications for colonial rule. 
Nevertheless, Parkinson has argued that we need not ‘question that the British motives 
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were as genuinely philanthropic as human motives ever are’ regarding their interference 
in the country.199   
 There was limited criticism in Britain of the Perak campaign; Stanley had 
forewarned the House of Lords that Clarke’s policies in Perak would ‘inevitably lead to 
the invasion and conquest of the whole of the Malay Peninsula’ and he had voiced his 
concerns regarding an article in The Times, which expressed apprehension that 
interference in the Malay States might ‘drag us into another [Ashanti] business’, which 
the newspaper described as another ‘display of British power’. 200  In official 
correspondence, he went on to condemn Jervois’ policies. One of Stanley’s criticisms 
was related to Jervois having ordered the building of a new road between Larut and 
Perak; curiously, Stanley criticised Jervois for not having allowed a ‘native ruler’ to 
make the Proclamation to ‘have cleared the Resident from all responsibility as to those 
arbitrary measures which are sure to be resorted to in making the road, such as 
compulsory labour and cheating labourers of their hire, and the appropriation of land 
necessary for the roadway’. Jervois responded by stating that ‘No arbitrary measures 
have been resorted to’ and further claimed that, ‘No land has been “appropriated”’, 
particularly because there is ‘scarcely any part of the road that does not run through the 
jungle, which is Crown property’.201 Central to British movements was the laying down 
of new roads in the area; it was reported that the conditions were harsh for those 
employed in this work, as the engineer in Banda Baru had told a reporter: ‘he was for 
some days up to his waist in water and he nearly lost all his men by starvation’.202 It is 
interesting that Stanley’s concerns were based on the assumption that the exploitation of 
the local labour force and appropriation of land were a given in Britain’s approach. 
Maxwell was also critical of British actions in the region and condemned the treatment 
of the ex-chiefs as ‘an outrage on justice’ in his work Our Malay Conquests, a work that 
Kiernan described as deserving ‘a place in the record of dissent from the barbarism of 
civilisation’.203 Maxwell’s work further criticises the lack of public interest in the case 
of Perak ‘because it is not horrible and sensational enough’ and posed the question: 
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‘Will injustice not move them unless it steeps its hands in blood?’204 The Perak War 
was just one of many ‘small wars’ that warranted little attention in the metropole. 
Maxwell acknowledged the typical British approach that ‘If a town is shelled in some 
distant land … or some hecatombs of natives are slaughtered, up we throw our hats and 
rend the air with cheers for the gallantry of our troops or tars. … But nobody asks about 
the rights and wrongs of the matter’.205 Whilst some opposition was voiced regarding 
the extent of the violence that took place, it is clear that this criticism had little effect 
and Britain’s presence continued to be supported by force. Furthermore, Carnarvon 
appears to have taken no action to limit Jervois’ approach, and wrote to him in mid-
1876 stating, ‘you will see from the enclosed correspondence that provision is made for 
the prompt execution by the military officer in command of the troops at the Straits of 
whatever urgent measures may be necessary for the maintenance of order’.206  
 Importantly, Parkinson has highlighted the occurrence of a war crime – 
‘probably the only one committed’ – which was carried out during the conflict and 
involved the hanging of a Malay named Pajang Meroo at the village of Tumung near 
Kuala Kangsar on 3 January 1876.207 This incident has received little attention from 
historians; Parkinson only mentions it as an explanation for Ross’ failure to be awarded 
for his participation in the campaign (although he escaped court martial). 208  As 
Parkinson explains: ‘This summary execution was carried out by seamen under Captain 
Garforth’s command but acting on Ross’s orders. McNair and Maxwell [deputy 
commissioner] disclaimed responsibility, but Jervois blamed them for not preventing 
it’.209 Significantly, McNair omitted the occurrence from his account of the war.210 The 
incident occurred after Ross’ order to Garforth, who was to send out troops to identify 
and capture ‘three notorious outlaws’; following identification from W. E. Maxwell, 
‘the officer in command will at once hang them opposite or near their house and set fire 
to the buildings. The men are to be left hanging. The officer in command assuring 
himself of their death before leaving’.211 Confidential correspondence, however, reveals 
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that those in charge were asked to account for their role in the summary execution. 
Maxwell initially justified his own actions thus: ‘My duties ended with the 
identification of the man, and I was not present, nor were my party of Malays, at the 
execution’.212 In a later report he sought to further excuse his failure to act against Ross’ 
intentions, stating ‘It never occurred to me to question the right of Brigadier General 
Ross to give the orders he did’.213 Although he goes on to admit that ‘there had been no 
resistance to the advance of the troops in Kuala Kangsa, and there was no force of 
Malays openly in arms against us in the district’, but that the men had however ‘caused 
Brigadier-General Ross’s force considerable inconvenience and pecuniary loss’.214 
Maxwell puts his failure to object to Ross’ actions down to his subordinate position and 
states that his failure to object should seem ‘natural’ in the circumstances.215 Maxwell’s 
superior, McNair, took a similar approach: ‘Deeming it a question to be dealt with by 
the military, Brigadier Ross said that he would take the matter out of the hands of the 
Commissioners’.216 Indeed, Carnarvon also expressed his unwillingness to interfere in 
the matter, although in a summary of his views it was acknowledged that ‘he would not 
be fulfilling his duty if he did not request that Mr. Hardy’s [Secretary of State for War] 
most serious attention may be directed in this case, in which he fails to see that there 
was adequate justification for the orders given or the course adopted’.217 Furthermore, 
whilst it may be noted that authorities were unsettled by these events and explanations 
were requested, no actions of consequence were taken; in the admission of Ross’ guilt it 
was stated that ‘His Royal Highness feels compelled to express his deep regret at the 
course that was adopted in peremptorily ordering the summary execution of this Malay 
without any sort of trial’.218 It is also fair to assume that a trial would have remained 
unfair and that the outcome was a forgone conclusion.  
 Overall there is a lack of studies on the nature of the British campaign in Perak 
and the wider practices of burning whole villages and cutting off supply chains to the 
wider population; these aspects of the British campaign are all but absent from the 
historiography. Historians have tended to focus on the events surrounding the war only 
insofar as they influenced decisions which led to Britain’s changed role within the 
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region. The Perak War has received relatively little attention from historians and key 
studies were undertaken in the 1960s, hence the present study must to some extent rely 
on an outdated body of work. It is therefore essential to revisit the archives and also 
seek new primary sources from the campaign. The neglect of the war has been 
accounted for as a result of ‘the relatively short campaign; the small number of troops 
involved … and relatively few casualties sustained; the campaign’s low cost; the 
distance from Great Britain; and arguable marginal popularity of imperial wars’.219 A. 
C. Milner has discussed problems within the historiography and highlights the bias that 
has resulted from a ‘colonial records’ approach’.220 Writing in 1987, Milner stated that 
the historiography was ‘dated’ and histories on the subject ‘appear “colonial” in their 
preoccupations and perspectives’; unfortunately no new studies have emerged since this 
time to alter this approach,221 although, as J. M. Gullick acknowledged, ‘The key point 
is that one has to do what one can with the source material available for the purpose (or 
give up altogether)’. 222 Patrick Sullivan has also highlighted this issue regarding 
sources, stating ‘Any attempt at reinterpreting colonial history must come to terms with 
partisan sources’.223 Kiernan is exceptional in his inclusion of the Perak War within 
wider studies of European colonial violence.224 Cowan for example sums up the war by 
briefly mentioning the areas that the British occupied, merely adding that the troops 
then ‘subdued the surrounding villages’,225 thus, failing to explore the large devastation 
that resulted throughout the area and the issues that surround this disproportionate 
military campaign.  
 While Parliamentary Papers are essential to this study, it is necessary to look 
beyond the ambiguous language of contemporaries such as Jervois who spoke often of 
‘making an example’ of a person or place.226 The Papers do, however, illuminate the 
prejudices and contradictions that underpinned the British imperial project and also 
highlight the disproportionate and destructive actions of the British throughout the 
territory. The extent of the violence in the British campaign is difficult to comprehend, 
particularly considering the level of resistance that the troops faced, and the conduct of 
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the soldiers needs to be considered within a wider pattern of British colonial violence. 
Rationalisations for intervention in the area were shrouded in the language of 
imperialism, which sought to justify intervention as a result of the perceived need to 
‘civilise’ the population; as Kiernan has argued, ‘belief in the “civilising mission” 
always had its dangers’.227 The rhetoric of the ‘civilising mission’ was also very much 
in evidence in the case of Perak: British colonists advocated the belief that the 
peninsula’s progress could only be achieved by opening up trade in the area and thus 
increasing the number of non-natives.228 Contemporary accounts very much emphasised 
the need for British intervention to put a stop to alleged anarchy and piracy,229 and as 
Kiernan argued, much of the peninsula ‘was in a chronic state of disorderliness, easily 
depicted by critics as “anarchy” which it would be a service to civilisation to step in and 
suppress’.230 Accusations of ‘anarchy’ were typical of the British colonial authorities 
and this viewpoint and the perceived need to ‘civilise’ the inhabitants had previously 
informed the brutal suppression of ‘piracy’ on the Malacca Straits.231  
 Swettenham portrayed British intervention in the area as a ‘duty forced upon 
England, as the dominant Power’ and argued that this ‘duty’ originated from ‘motives 
of humanity alone but would also be highly beneficial to British interests and trade’.232 
He argued further that the Malays needed ‘saving from themselves’ and that the British 
could give them the ‘blessings of peace and justice’.233 Swettenham also refused to 
admit the importance of Perak’s resources to Britain’s involvement in the area, 
maintaining ‘that the Malayan policy embarked on in 1874 was not inspired by 
mercantile greed but was a genuine “new departure” aimed at the well-being of the 
native people’.234 However, British interests in the area were focused on exploiting the 
economic situation in Malaya for the benefit of British trade; in 1848 rich tin deposits 
were discovered in Perak and Walter Knaggs, a tea planter from Province Wellesley 
was sent to Perak in 1874 to assess the area’s potential for tea plantations and concluded 
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that ‘opening the country up’ would be beneficial. 235  Clarke later discussed the 
economic benefits of British intervention in the area, arguing that these had, ‘with the 
single exception of the little expedition of 1875-6’, ‘been won without the expenditure 
of blood or money’. 236  Colonial administrators typically chose to emphasise 
‘humanitarian’ motivations over economic ones. As Kiernan highlights, the Malays’ 
‘homeland was depicted as being in a frightful condition of misrule or chaos, the mass 
of its cultivators in a state of slavery’; however, whilst ‘Debt-slavery was indeed 
prevalent’, the ‘British public had learned to react sharply to the word, little as the 
reality might differ from indentured labour on a British plantation’.237 It has been 
argued that in the case of Kimberley, ‘humanitarian motive’ was adopted ‘as a 
convenient rationalisation of his new policy’ of intervention.238 The Friend of India 
acknowledged, however, that ‘We are not fighting the wild and lawless Malays, solely 
in “the cause of suffering humanity”’, although ‘that is what the Government of the 
Straits and some of our contemporaries wish us to believe’.239 
 The belief in the British ‘civilising mission’ and the ‘obligation’ to protect 
indigenous populations is in evidence in the case of Edward Lyulph Stanley (Henry 
Stanley’s brother) of the Aborigines’ Protection Society, who set out his views thus:  
to see our efforts directed to raising uncivilised tribes to a higher social 
level, even though some of those which were incapable of progress should 
die out under the new conditions, rather than keep up barbarous tribes by an 
artificial protection in a state of tutelage, where they exist rather as 
specimens in a natural history museum, or as wild animals in a menagerie, 
and not as responsible and progressive human beings.240 
Clearly, his views were informed by ideas of the ‘civilised’ versus ‘barbaric’ dichotomy 
and ‘extinction theory’. Official British correspondence persistently emphasised the 
need for British intervention to introduce ‘civilised rule and respect for life and 
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property, for the barbarism, anarchy, recklessness, and poverty which are now its 
prominent features’.241 Such proclamations appear highly contradictory considering the 
destruction that British troops wrought in the country, particularly regarding property; 
this discrepancy was also clear in the following statement by Jervois regarding the need 
to rid the country of disaffected chiefs: ‘the question then arises whether, in the interests 
of humanity and civilisation, we should not enter into their country and break down 
their power’. 242  The Times correspondent also unintentionally highlighted this 
contradiction, arguing on the one hand that ‘The restraints of law are intolerable to 
people like the Malays. … [and] must be imposed upon them, if at all, by superior 
force’. On the other hand, the author acknowledged that ‘The orders given to burn the 
villages of Malaya who had not offered the slightest resistance to the troops who had 
hung out the white flag, and against whom there was no evidence of any complicity in 
the offences of Maharajah Lela and the Sultan Ismail, were clearly objectionable on 
every ground of principle and policy’.243 These statements demonstrate an attempt to 
justify British intervention based on a ‘barbaric’ versus ‘civilised’ dichotomy and 
convey the arbitrary nature of such categories which were integral to British 
imperialism. 
 The brutal approach that underpinned the rhetoric of the ‘civilising mission’ is 
made clear by Swettenham’s statement in which he remained unrepentant: ‘I am 
convinced that twenty years of advice ... would not have accomplished, for peace and 
order and good government, what was done in six months by force of arms’.244 In 1912, 
a study of Britain’s role in Malaya described the country’s involvement as changing ‘the 
home of ruthless barbarism steeped in bloodshed and anarchy into a centre of ordered 
and enlightened government’.245 Swettenham observed that during the period prior to 
the British involvement in Perak, little was known about the area and ‘it was firmly 
believed that the race was dying out, and that belief was well-founded so far as the 
people of the Peninsula were concerned’.246 As the opening quote of this chapter shows, 
Clarke also proclaimed that the Malays were marked by ‘mutual deterioration’. Dr. R. 
Little of the Legislative Council in Singapore also supported the view that the 
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population was slowly dying out; interestingly, Little placed the history of Malaya 
within the context of the destruction of ‘South-Sea Islanders, and some American 
tribes’, arguing that the Malays had also suffered a vast population decline and that ‘It 
was necessary that a European Power should now step in to save the Malays from utter 
extinction’.247 Little continues, ‘The Malay had not had, like some of these races, wars 
and invasions to exterminate them. They had not, like the South-Sea Islanders, and 
some American tribes, been wiped away by the introduction of firewater and European 
diseases’.248 In the case of the Malays, Little blamed this demise on the ‘despotic 
Rajahs’, stating: ‘The causes from which the decay of the Malay race originated were 
not external, but internal, and might be summed up in one word––misrule’.249 Little 
advocated the need to protect the peasants and therefore stated: ‘the only way of settling 
the country was to dispose of these chiefs either by hanging or pensioning them’.250 It is 
interesting that Little framed his understanding of the region and justification for 
intervention within the context of the devastating effects of British policies in other 
countries and the resultant destruction of indigenous populations.251   
 The manner in which the colonial administration dealt with the native population 
demonstrates a sense of superiority typical of the British Empire; this superiority 
complex and its accompanying racism are essential to an understanding of Britain’s 
policies in Perak and the nature of the military campaign. As a result of this approach 
the administrators failed to question their own part in these events and believed in the 
inherent righteousness of British policies: for any negative consequences the ‘savage 
native’ could be blamed. The racial language of empire became increasingly 
pronounced in the second half of the nineteenth century and was apparent throughout 
the Perak conflict. One contemporary typically viewed the war as ‘a clash between 
civilisation and “wild aborigines”’.252 Rather than a result of Britain’s expansionist 
policies, the war was often portrayed both in the British press and by those on the 
ground as inevitable on account of the ‘nature’ of the ‘natives’.253 Hence, the ‘civilised’ 
versus ‘barbaric’ dichotomy was very much in evidence in the British press; for 
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example, The Times wrote in response to Birch’s death: ‘The jealousy of ancient 
civilisations which England has supplanted, the ferocity of religious fanaticism, the 
sheer brutality of the savage, have all claimed their victims within our most recent 
recollection, and every loss gave a painful shock to English feeling’. Furthermore, the 
article continues, ‘Whether the Malays have only broken out in a momentary spasm of 
that savage frenzy peculiar to their race we must wait patiently to see’.254 Birch’s 
murder was often viewed in relation to the concept of ‘running amok’, a catch-all 
concept that referred to a murderous ‘illness’ that struck fear among colonists and 
highlighted the ‘irrationality’ and ‘unpredictability’ of the ‘natives’.255 The enquiry into 
Birch’s murder concluded that cries of ‘amok’ were heard as Arshad, Birch’s 
interpreter, was stabbed to death.256  
In the aftermath of the war, The Times advocated the need for Britain’s 
continued presence in the country, based on moral obligation, arguing that ‘the effects 
of a demonstration of power which up to now has done untold good will be annihilated, 
and our blood and treasure expended in vain’.257 Another article discussed the issue of 
annexation and stated that ‘It would certainly be in the interest of civilisation if this 
should be the result of the war which is forced upon us; and we are clearly entitled to 
seize Perak and hold it until indemnified for all the costs of the war, as well as for the 
murder of Mr. Birch and any others who have treacherously fallen…. We are not among 
those who would advocate any attempt causelessly to seize and annex the dominions of 
a neighbour’. The article even states that Birch’s murder was ‘a direct attack on 
England’.258 Jervois justified British policy in Perak to Carnarvon thus:  
My Lord, this is no question of oppression of the Native by the European, 
as some few, –who take the matter up but really do not understand the 
subject would represent it to your Lordship to be. It is just the reverse. 
Those who thus speak are in reality the advocates for the protection of the 
Rajahs in their oppression of the people. I submit that our Policy, in those 
states in which we intervene, should be, to hurt the power of the Rajahs in 
the interests of the freedom of the people. The one implies cruelty, 
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barbarism, and stagnation;- the other protection, civilisation, and 
progress.259 
The Perak War demonstrates the importance of individuals in British colonial 
affairs and highlights the ways in which the metropole could lose its grip on events in 
the colony: in this case politicians in London advocated a minimal role for Britain in the 
area, but nevertheless became increasingly interventionist as a result of the actions of 
ambitious administrators who believed they were acting in the name of the British 
government. Contemporaries including Lord Stanley emphasised this issue and 
criticised the role of the men on the ground and the Colonial Office for the 
consequences of British actions in the area and its ‘neglect in watching over the conduct 
of the Residents, and the selection of them, and a habit of leaving the officials to do 
very much as they thought fit’. Stanley goes on to lament the consequences of this 
approach in terms of  
life and expenditure, and that the whole Malay Peninsula has been set in a 
blaze, and the inhabitants, many of whom have been driven from their 
homes, have been made hostile to us, and we must either retrace our steps 
to non-intervention or assume the responsibility and the cost of securing 
proper government for the people we have now deprived of their 
independence.260 
Stanley recommended fundamental changes to the system of communication between 
the metropole and colony: ‘copies of all letters from the Government to the Residents 
[should] be sent home, so that the Secretary of State may not again have to complain, as 
he has lately done, that Sir Andrew Clarke’s instructions to the Residents had never 
come under his eye’.261 Lyulph Stanley also questioned the role of representatives in the 
colonies and outbreaks of violence, stating the need to stop the impunity with which 
administrators acted, creating in this case ‘a needless war’, for which they would not be 
punished262 and he also highlighted the Colonial Office’s failure to keep its ‘satraps’ 
under control.263 Acts of colonial violence often led to questions at home regarding the 
nature of the British Empire and the role and actions of colonial administrators, as 
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demonstrated by the Morant Bay Rebellion and the ‘Kooka outbreak’.264 Similarities 
between these cases and the Perak War include Jervois’ attempts to rationalise further 
violence in Perak, after the threat was clearly over; in the case of the Kuka ‘outbreak’, 
proof of the ‘intention’ of a more general rising was also sought to legitimise Britain’s 
disproportionate response.265  
 Despite criticism, Clarke continued to defend his own role in Perak and the 
outbreak of violence, writing later that, ‘In place of anarchy and irregular revenues, I 
held out the prospects of peace and plenty’.266 In further justification of his policies 
Clarke wrote that the chiefs ‘were willing to listen to reason, as the vast majority of 
persons, whether wearing silk hats or turbans usually are; and since, I have often 
wondered how many of our useless, expansive, and demoralising wars might have been 
avoided by similar modes of procedure’.267 Clarke failed to acknowledge that it was his 
policies that contributed to the outbreak of a war of this nature, and continued to state 
that ‘A butcher’s bill appeals to the dullest imagination, and speedily brings down 
rewards and honours, which the mere negotiator, however successful, cannot hope to 
obtain. Perhaps some future analyst of causation will be able to tell us for how much 
slaughter and wasted treasure decorations are responsible’.268  
Jervois’ actions completely contradicted Carnarvon’s wishes and were carried 
out without his approval. With regards to Jervois, McIntyre came to the conclusion that 
‘The Perak War is a classic example of the man on the spot embarrassing the home 
government’.269 As Jervois himself acknowledged as he informed Carnarvon of his 
decision to create Queen’s Commissioners: ‘I am sensible that, in acting without 
instructions, I have incurred a grave responsibility’, but he emphasised that Britain 
could now act to ‘further the cause of humanity and freedom.270 Of course, given the 
nature of communications at this time, such situations were difficult to avoid. Evidently, 
Jervois had the backing of the Legislative Council in Singapore and it was emphasised 
there that through Abdullah ‘the chiefs came to us’.271 Furthermore, the Council 
supported Jervois’ actions, in the belief that they were the next logical step to policies 
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initiated by the Colonial Office and Clarke – a view also put forward by Jervois.272 
Jervois defended his actions to Carnarvon and argued that ‘a system of virtual 
administration in Perak, either covertly or openly, was but the logical sequence of the 
terms of the Treaty’.273 As Heussler has highlighted, both Clarke and Jervois went 
beyond their mandate in Perak; indeed, Jervois had inherited a poor situation from 
Clarke which ‘left his successor to face the consequences of half measures and bad 
staffing’.274 It may be correct to conclude that Carnarvon realised that ‘Jervois’s 
demonstration of force would be remembered for years’, thus making annexation an 
unnecessary expense.275 It seems that Carnarvon was willing to wait and see whether 
Jervois’ actions proved to be beneficial to Britain, providing annexation on the cheap. 
One contemporary publication highlighted the apparent contradiction within the 
government’s policy towards Perak, stating ‘we are unable to comprehend or in any 
degree approve of, the indescribable policy which disclaims all wish or intention to 
annex, and yet persistently takes or permits to be taken measures that can lead to 
nothing, but miserable collapse or ultimate annexation’.276 This approach demonstrates 
the tension between the metropole and the man on the spot, but also the fact that 
London did not intervene, as long as the imperial project remained in tact.   
Birch’s actions were clearly a major factor in the outbreak of violence and the 
manner with which he dealt with the chiefs exacerbated the situation. Indeed, he 
believed that ‘Eastern people’ were ‘perfectly incapable of good government, or even of 
maintaining order, without guidance or assistance from some stronger hand than is ever 
to be found amongst themselves’.277 The Times also took the view that the ‘nature’ of 
the ‘natives’ was to blame, rather than Birch, arguing that one needs more than 
‘conceptions of justice, unsupported by any show of force’ to convert ‘the quarrelsome 
Malays into peaceable, industrious citizens, with a proper respect for the public peace, 
the rights of other people, and the benefits of hard work’.278 As Sadka has stated, 
Birch’s murder ‘made withdrawal from existing commitments impossible, and also 
provided, with the full consent of the Colonial Office, a means of destroying resistance 
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and disposing of obstacles to change’.279 As a result of the continuously hasty actions of 
individuals such as Clarke, Birch and Jervois, who sought to make their mark in the 
area, the end result was colonial domination and suffering for the population. The case 
of the Perak War demonstrates how the conflicting aims of the British, their 
overwhelming military might, as well as the inability and refusal – of Birch in particular 
– to understand local customs and the perspectives of the local leaders, created a 
precarious situation which was further exacerbated by the superiority complex and 
racial prejudices of the British colonists. Henrika Kuklick has highlighted that colonial 
officials were concerned with ‘the problems of pacifying and controlling reluctant 
subjects’ and emphasised the need to train potential candidates for the colonies, arguing 
that ‘unless colonial officials were trained to appreciate the cultures of subject peoples 
they were bound to make decisions that would cause offense – and inspire rebellion’.280 
It is clear in the case of Perak that the refusal of the colonial administrators to 
comprehend the grievances of the chiefs was a key factor in the intensification of 
violence and this refusal was informed by racial stereotypes of the indigenous 
population. Clarke referred to the sultans as ‘thoroughbred Pirates’ and believed, as did 
Birch, that ‘The Malays, like every other rude Eastern nation, require to be treated much 
more like children, and to be taught, whether in the question of good government and 
organisation, or of material improvement’.281  
As well as highlighting the importance of individual colonists, this case of 
colonial violence clearly demonstrates the significance of communications between the 
periphery and metropole in the escalation of colonial conflict; the objectives of those on 
the ground were difficult to control. Furthermore, misunderstandings were rife and the 
inexperience of colonial administrators telling. It is clear that both Clarke and Birch 
were deliberately misleading each other and the Colonial Office;282 the latter of whom 
was in favour of caution in this matter.283 Carnarvon had also advised restraint, warning 
Clarke from the outset not to create a situation which ‘may easily lead us further than 
we now intend to go’.284 Importantly, events in Perak demonstrated the need for 
deliberate vagueness with regards to colonial policy; after hostilities in Perak little was 
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done to clarify the role of the Resident and the system clearly encouraged the Residents 
to act at their own discretion.285 Furthermore, this vague approach was taken throughout 
the war in relation to the levels of violence to be undertaken. In contrast, the military 
objectives were clear and the war was to act as a deterrent against future ‘rebellion’ in 
Perak. The war also conveyed the importance of the Imperial Treasury to events in the 
colonies; economy remained a key factor in dictating the likelihood of violence. It has 
been concluded that the military operations in both Perak and Sungei Ujong ‘were 
generally conducted professionally, effectively, expeditiously, and perhaps most 
importantly to civilian administrators and Whitehall wallahs, economically’.286 Whilst 
one can question this perspective regarding the conduct of the campaign, the emphasis 
upon the satisfaction of the treasury is certainly true.287 The conflict resulted in new 
British territory which came under British control in a ‘thinly disguised system of direct 
rule’ in which a diverse group of officials were united by ‘their shared opinion that the 
Malays were unfit for self government’.288 British forces remained in the colony for a 
further 18 months before being replaced by an armed, ‘paramilitary’ police force289 and, 
according to Swettenham the Malays ‘still worked under the shadow of warning they 
had received.’290 
 Ultimately, discussions would continue regarding the nature of the British 
Residency system,291 but it was clear that policies would be informed by a typically 
prejudiced approach; as Frederick Weld, the Governor of the Straits Settlements from 
1880 to 1887 candidly stated for example: ‘I doubt if Asiatics will ever learn to govern 
themselves; it is contrary to the genius of their race, of their history, of their religious 
systems … their desire is a mild, just and firm despotism; that we can give them’,292 
arguing that ‘capacity for governing is a characteristic of our race’.293 In any case, the 
brutal utilisation of force against Perak had its intended effect and the chiefs had been 
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forced into submission. Carnarvon stated that the policy now was to ‘find and train up 
some Chief or Chiefs of sufficient capacity and enlightenment to appreciate the 
advantages of a civilised government and to render some assistance in the government 
of the country’.294 However, as Gullick argues, ‘In 1876, the Malay ruling class was in 
no mood to show itself “enlightened”, which was the code word meaning receptive to 
European influence’.295 As McIntyre has argued, in the aftermath of the Perak War 
changes to the system were minimal and ‘one cannot avoid the conviction that the 
Resident system of government by advice, as it was eventually evolved … bore a 
certain affinity to the Jervois plan’;296 clearly, British military intervention had made 
this uncertain system of government tenable. In the wake of the bloodshed in Perak, the 
British administration in the area became increasingly centralised, widening its 
influence over the following twenty years before establishing British rule in the form of 
the Federated Malay States in 1895. In light of the absence of resistance to British 
troops in the aftermath of Birch’s murder and the continued presence of the British in 
the country and the failure to clarify the role of the colonists, McIntyre’s assessment 
may be correct that perhaps the campaign in Perak ‘should be described as an 
occupation rather than a war’.297 This occupation was to continue until independence 
was granted in 1957 amidst the brutal suppression of the Malayan Communist Party – 
the Malayan Emergency – by the British, which lasted until 1960 and resulted in the 
internment of nearly 34,000 people without trial and the hanging of 226 Communists, ‘a 
figure only exceeded in the post-1945 period by the judicial slaughter carried out in 
Kenya’ in the decolonisation process.298  
 
Conclusion 
The actual resistance to the British authorities in Perak in 1875-6 was very limited, but 
in a bid to suppress any present or future opposition the British carried out destructive 
tactics, which were entirely disproportionate to the situation at hand. In spite of the 
unnecessary violence inflicted in this case, Carnarvon still concluded that Jervois had 
‘not hesitated to discourage all extreme measures in which the innocent have suffered 
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with the guilty’.299 As stated above, Jervois’ proclamation regarding the conduct that 
was expected from the troops was highly contradictory. Jervois wanted to make an 
example of certain areas, but also advocated the need to differentiate between friend and 
foe. Clearly starvation tactics flew in the face of such statements, as did holding 
hostages, destroying abandoned villages and scorched earth tactics: he was more 
concerned with ‘moral effect’ than moral objection. As Kim Wagner has highlighted, 
and as this case shows, considerations of ‘hearts and minds’ in an analysis of colonial 
warfare are not relevant.300 Jervois’ approach is consistent with Callwell’s, which also 
had a ‘mixed message’ with regards to the issue of force.301 The events in Perak 
demonstrate the imbalance in relations between the coloniser and the colonised in the 
British Empire because of the significant amount of resources and the number of troops 
that Britain had at its disposal. This imbalance was underpinned by imperial ideology, 
which presented the indigenous population as ‘barbaric’ and inherently incapable of 
ruling themselves. Whilst the Perak War may have caused relatively few casualties and 
the war was small in scale, it nevertheless highlights the dynamics of British colonial 
violence which led to the disproportionate response of British troops and the 
consequences of that response.  
This war shows a typical approach to colonial warfare as espoused by Callwell’s 
Small Wars, including the need for ‘bold and resolute’ action. However, Anson’s swift 
response was unsuccessful and merely led to further loss of life at Pasir Salak and a 
sense of panic regarding the aims of the limited indigenous resistance.302 It is clear that 
the British campaign was undertaken not only to punish the chiefs for Birch’s murder 
but also to show a significant amount of force towards the general population. After a 
demonstration of British military might, the colonial system continued more or less as 
planned and brute force had served its purpose. Callwell stated the objective of this 
force thus: ‘fanatics and savages … must be thoroughly brought to book and cowed or 
they will rise again.’303 The war also demonstrates the ways in which the Empire was 
expanded without a clear policy from the metropole and is an example of the use of 
extreme measures, in spite of the small scale of the conflict. The war highlights the 
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brutal nature of colonial expansion ‘in which either civilisation or barbarism must rule 
without a rival’.304  
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Chapter 3 
British Suppression of the Hut Tax War in Sierra Leone, 1898-9 
‘The White Man’s Burden’ has been heavy, but time will show that, in 
vulgar phrase, even financially, it will pay.1 
No one would say seriously, if they considered the matter, that savage 
methods are fit for us to use, even if we are dealing with savages.2 
The so-called ‘Hut Tax’ War broke out in Sierra Leone in early 18983 as the result of 
opposition to a tax, which was to be enforced per household by the colonial authorities 
to fund the newly declared British Protectorate in the hinterland of the Colony of Sierra 
Leone. British involvement beyond the boundaries of the Colony had been increasing in 
recent years. Similar to the circumstances which led to the Perak War, indigenous 
leaders were becoming increasingly dissatisfied in the face of increased British colonial 
influence and their expressed grievances were met with obstinacy on the part of the man 
on the spot, which escalated the situation and led to prolonged violence and destructive 
military tactics. The introduction of the tax in the hinterland of the Colony came at a 
time when there was mounting discontent as a result of the arbitrary violence that had 
been conducted by the Frontier Police, which was introduced in 1890. Local chiefs had 
also become increasingly disgruntled at the realisation that they had effectively given up 
their sovereignty via a series of treaties with the British colonial administration. 
Initially, this opposition was voiced in the form of a series of petitions, which 
emphasised the chiefs’ opposition to the introduction of the tax in particular; the 
colonial authorities, however, ignored the petitioners’ grievances and resistance rapidly 
escalated into open warfare. This event shows a clear example of the devastating effects 
that British prejudice and feelings of superiority toward the native population could 
have. This case of British colonial suppression demonstrates how a situation of potential 
conflict could escalate into violence in the colonies; dire British miscalculations were 
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made and this chapter examines the background to the fighting to provide a clearer 
picture of how British rule could result in explosive violence on both sides. This study 
focuses predominantly on the conflict which broke out in the North of the Protectorate 
against the chief, Bai Bureh, rather than the Mende conflict in the South, although the 
two conflicts did overlap.  
 This colonial conflict occurred at a time of increasing pressure and international 
rivalries throughout the British Empire. These pressures were further exacerbated in 
West Africa by the accidental confrontation which broke out between Britain and 
France at Waima in 1893, with fatalities on both sides.4 Due to these tensions, the new 
Governor of the Colony of Sierra Leone, Frederic Cardew, waited until the Anglo-
French boundary agreement was accepted on 21 January 1895 before announcing the 
Protectorate in an attempt to avoid any further tensions between the two countries; ‘It is 
instructive that none of these agreements involved the interior peoples or their rulers, 
whose land and lives were being taken over by these arrangements’.5 The war also 
coincided with a number of uprisings against British rule, which were suppressed 
during this period throughout Africa, making the revolt in Sierra Leone particularly 
‘inconvenient’ for the British administration in London. As Christopher Fyfe has 
highlighted, during the time of the risings ‘when news from Sierra Leone was published 
almost daily, disturbing accounts from all over the Empire filled the English papers’, all 
of which ‘demanded Chamberlain’s attention’.6 Hence, the context of other colonial 
conflicts provided added pressure to the colonists to decisively bring resistance in the 
Sierra Leone Protectorate under control. The revolt in Sierra Leone was part of a 
catalogue of threats to Britain’s international prestige, which had a profound impact on 
the colonial rulers, affecting Britain’s approach to colonial policy into the twentieth 
century.7  
 As Fyfe has highlighted, the first settlement that was sent over from Britain to 
Sierra Leone in 1787 ‘brought dramatic discontinuity’ to the country; ‘During the 
succeeding twenty years three successive settler communities of African descent 
arrived––the 1787 settlers (the so-called “Black Poor”) from England, in 1792 the 
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settlers from Nova Scotia, and in 1800 the Jamaica Maroons’. 8  While this first 
settlement was unsuccessful,9 Freetown became a Crown Colony in 1808, a year after 
the ratification of the Abolition Act in Britain in 1807 and the Colony was to provide a 
settlement for slaves captured (the so-called ‘recaptives’) by the British Navy and was 
thus ‘turned into the centre of [Britain’s] naval actions to suppress the slave trade in 
West Africa … and to try offenders under the Abolition Act’.10 It has been argued that 
the goal of the colony was to create ‘Black Englishmen, [who] would eventually be the 
agents for the propagation of European civilisation’ and Christianity in Africa.11  
 Arthur Abraham has highlighted that the settlers did not penetrate the interior of 
the Colony and that their trade ‘did not extend much beyond twenty-five miles 
inland’.12 Central to British policies in the hinterlands of the Colony was a desire to gain 
economic access rather than political domination in the area13 and as justification for the 
extension of British influence into the interior, the reliance of the Colony on the 
hinterland economically was acknowledged. 14  Abraham has emphasised the 
contradictory forces that were at work at this time as a result of  
a conflict in policy between, on the one hand, the British Government’s 
insistence on barely preserving, and if possible contracting, the existing 
responsibilities in West Africa, and on the other, the men-on-the-spot, the 
frontiersmen, chafing restlessly to extend colonial jurisdiction over the 
adjoining hinterland.15  
That the men on the ground were pushing British influence further than London 
intended was not uncommon in the British Empire, as the previous chapter 
demonstrated. In this case, official policy stipulated that British responsibilities were 
not to be extended; nevertheless several punitive expeditions were conducted along the 
Colony’s frontier, particularly as a result of the actions of British traders who expected 
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protection outside of the Colony’s boundaries.16 British concerns focused on the role 
that the area played in the economics of the Colony and in particular the detrimental 
effects of slave raids as well as trade wars. As Cardew stated, he had ‘no hesitation in 
asserting that the source and origin of all native wars is the slave traffic’.17 Hence, the 
British were slowly increasingly their power in the region and the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act of 1890 had already resulted in ‘consolidating a series of earlier acts, [which] 
empowered the Crown to exercise any jurisdiction claimed in a foreign country as if by 
right of cession or conquest’. At this time, Cardew’s predecessor, James Hay, had 
already begun a process of extending British authority in the interior and so began the 
curtailment of the inhabitants’ rights. For example, two travelling Commissioners were 
introduced as well as a Frontier Police Force in 1890 and a Native Affairs Department 
in 1892, which was established to advise the Governor regarding matters concerning the 
hinterland.18 From 1894, Cardew was to ‘[manipulate] the treaties that his predecessors 
had signed with the interior rulers, suggesting that they had consented to give up their 
countries to the British by virtue of the terms of those treaties’19 and by 1895, the 
‘hinterland was by now a virtual British territory’.20 The formation of a Sierra Leone 
Protectorate was announced on 31 August 1896, and consisted of the hinterlands of the 
Sierra Leone Crown Colony.21 However, as Abraham has highlighted, the treaties upon 
which the Protectorate was based were ‘a downright fraud’.22 Indeed, a lawyer was 
brought in to question the very legality of the Protectorate, given that the land had not 
been acquired by conquest and would thus need to be based on the consent of the 
chiefs.23 The Sierra Leone Legislative Council was now able to legislate for the 
Protectorate as it did for the Colony.24 As J. D. Hargreaves explains: 
In 1896 the remaining regions not conceded to be under French or Liberian 
influence were proclaimed a British Protectorate; which also included, for 
administrative purposes, certain chiefdoms formerly part of the Colony. In 
this period, therefore, the term ‘Colony’ is applied to the peninsula and 
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islands originally settled, with a few predominantly tribal areas around the 
river Sherbro; the term ‘Protectorate’ to territories the size of Ireland, which 
form the great bulk of the area marked ‘Sierra Leone’ on a modern map, 
and whose social organisation was at this time exclusively tribal.25 
The announcement of the Protectorate was arguably ‘the logical conclusion of British 
colonising activities in Sierra Leone, which had begun with the 1787 colonial 
experiment’.26  
 The Protectorate was divided into five Frontier Police Districts based on 
traditional tribal divisions as perceived by the British; however, as Fyfe has highlighted, 
the Protectorate’s ‘limits depended on how the frontiers were decided in Europe––not 
on treaties or chiefs’ consent’.27 Unlike in the Colony, the Protectorate was not to be 
ruled by English law and Cardew argued that the country should be administered ‘as far 
as possible by native law and through the chiefs’ and hence ‘two legal systems 
adjoined’.28 However, it was clear that the colonists would ultimately control the area, 
as one observer stated, ‘Government is to be carried on by the chiefs wherever, and in 
so far as, such government is tolerable; but the white man is to be there, and wherever 
he sees fit he is to have his way’.29 The Frontier Police were employed in an attempt to 
patrol the hinterland as ‘the para-military arm of the administration’s new policy’ and 
their central aim was to hinder the trade of slaves.30 The fact that ‘any slave reaching the 
soil of the Colony was entitled to claim his freedom’ created bitter resentment among 
the chiefs.31 The methods used by the force were a central grievance of the chiefs and 
were also condemned in the local press in 1894, as it was stated that:  
the very body of men sent to the interior for the purpose of impressing the 
natives with a sense of the protecting power of the local government, that 
the very force located in the country to pacify it, and restore the old 
confidence, and open up the trade routes, should degenerate into a band of 
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lawless desperadoes, ill-conditioned rogues and plunderers, terrorising over 
their own kith and kin.32  
‘The activities of the Frontier Police thus contradicted the very raison d’être of their 
establishment’33 and in 1895 Cardew recognised the problems within the force in so far 
as he dismissed thirty of its members and sought reform, although these measures did 
little to contain the violence of its members.34  
 The colonial administration expected the Protectorate to raise its own revenue 
and insisted that it would not be supported by the Colony;35 central to this assumption 
was the imposition of a house tax, which was envisaged by Cardew to fund his plans for 
the implementation of the Protectorate Ordinance completed on 10 September 1897. 
The house tax was to consist of a payment of 5 shillings a year for two room houses and 
10 shillings a year for larger houses and the tax was to be enforced in the three districts 
closest to the Colony (Ronietta, Bandajuma and Karene) and which were therefore 
deemed to be the most important in terms of trade.36 District Commissioners were put in 
place in these three areas, all of whom were previous members of the controversial 
Frontier Police.37 In 1894, Cardew had expressed his belief that the imposition of the 
tax would not be a problem and even in 1897 he stated that an ‘adequate police-force 
and a sufficient complement of white officers’ would ensure peace. 38  Cardew 
mistakenly believed that the tribes were too disunited to join together and oppose the 
tax.39 Cardew was determined to pursue these policies, despite the reservations voiced 
by the Colonial Office; for example Cardew was warned that ‘the general assent of the 
people is indispensable to the success of any laws that be introduced’.40 Furthermore, 
the Colonial Office criticised Cardew’s policies as being ‘too ambitious and 
premature’.41 Despite these concerns Cardew determinedly continued with his policies. 
The tax was just one of many changes being implemented throughout the area and 
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Cardew toured the country to explain his policies in the various chiefdoms, although his 
intention was to ‘explain his plans to the rulers, though not seal their consent––the 
terms were dictated, not negotiated’.42 Furthermore, Cardew acknowledged in the 
aftermath of the conflict that the imposition of the hut tax would hold out ‘no hopes of 
such a consummation’.43 Hence, Cardew was more than aware that his policies would 
lead to discontent, although he erroneously believed that there would be no united 
opposition and he was clearly determined to implement his policies regardless. It seems 
likely that these ‘attempts’ to explain British policy to the chiefs were merely token 
gestures considering Cardew’s view of the native population. Cardew stated that he was 
dealing ‘with a people that are practically savages – some are cannibals – quite illiterate 
and very degraded by ignorance and gross superstition … accustomed to the most 
despotic sway on the part of their chiefs’.44 Cardew’s prejudice clearly affected the 
ways in which he dealt with the indigenous peoples; he viewed them as unreasonable 
and dismissed their points violently, using language which was almost impossible to 
translate.45 The chiefs were particularly aggrieved by the fact that ‘nearly three-quarters 
of the £30,000 spent annually on the Protectorate was paying for the unpopular Frontier 
Police’.46   
 Initially, inhabitants of the new Protectorate voiced their protests to the new 
Ordinance in the form of petitions from the end of 1896 onwards. In the chiefs’ petition 
of 17 December 1896 for example, they took particular issue with the new land laws. 
These laws were relevant to the issue of the Crown’s right to minerals in the 
Protectorate and the question of ‘waste lands’ as perceived by the Governor of Sierra 
Leone, as well as the ‘subsidiary powers in District Commissioners to determine what 
lands were waste or uninhabited’.47 These laws were ultimately repealed, but not before 
they caused much animosity between the chiefs and colonial authorities and also, these 
debates demonstrated a typical of approach of British colonists regarding indigenous 
lands. However, as David Chalmers, who was later commissioned to conduct an enquiry 
into the reasons for the war, argued, ‘it was not a no Man’s Land which was being dealt 
with, or vast tracts peopled only by a few wandering herdsmen, but a populous territory, 
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which had been for ages parcelled out and under definite government, although the 
plane of civilisation might be far removed from a European standard’.48  
The intended house tax was central to the chiefs’ petition and they emphasised 
with ‘evident sincerity’, that ‘we all have been friends with the Queen for a long time’, 
but the incremental takeover of the country had now become clear and they had lost 
their rights without a British conquest of the land. 49  The petitions gave the 
administration ample chance to revise or withdraw the taxes, but only slight revisions 
were later made so that all inhabitants in villages of twenty huts or more were obligated 
to pay a flat rate of 5 shillings, regardless of house size. A petition from 28 June 1897 
was delivered personally by the chiefs to Freetown, however, as Cardew was on leave at 
this time they decided to wait for his return, despite being told that he would not be 
back for two months. On finally meeting with the chiefs on 15 November 1897, Cardew 
provided his explanation for his policies and cut the meeting short when the chiefs 
expressed a desire to consider the matter further; for Cardew, negotiations were out of 
the question.50 That the chiefs would have felt that Cardew did not deal with their 
grievances properly is clear considering his response to the complaint that the country 
was virtually under the rule of the Police; Cardew replied as follows:  
Every act of oppression on part of police severely punished is brought to 
notice of the authorities, but it is you people that so often spoil them by 
bribes &c, and withholding information that would cause their punishment. 
… Though police will be punished when they commit acts of oppression, 
remember they wear the Queen’s uniform and their authority must be 
respected.51  
Cardew also warned the chiefs that if they did not accept the Ordinance then they risked 
being occupied by another European power that ‘might not deal so considerately with 
you as the English do’.52 Cardew did not deny the fact that the chiefs had ultimately lost 
control of their own country, stating ‘Of absolute control, certainly, because only the 
Queen can govern’.53 As Chalmers later summarised, the chiefs were dejected and ‘left 
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in silence’. 54  In contrast, Cardew, came away from the meeting stating more 
optimistically, ‘I was glad to have the opportunity of showing them how they had been 
misled and how unfounded their grievances were’.55 Both before and after the war, 
Cardew stood by the implementation of the tax regardless of the consequences, arguing 
that there is ‘a great principle involved in this struggle which is the right of the 
Government to compel the governed to contribute towards the support of the 
Government which ensures them the security of life and prosperity, just laws and all the 
other benefits of the most advanced civilisation’.56 However, the problem with this line 
of argument was that ‘the people did not want the so-called benefits of his government, 
and they were certainly not prepared to pay for what they did not want’.57  
 Tax collections began on 1 January 1898 and the administration’s actions, as 
well as those of the Frontier Police persistently caused resentment and the authorities 
continued to deal harshly with those who refused to pay or endorse the tax. Fyfe has 
argued that ‘Cardew preferred not to harass his District Commissioners with too many 
explicit orders, relying on their initiative to carry out the policy he outlined. He left it up 
to them to decide how to collect tax, only asking them to combine patience with 
firmness’. 58  Cardew’s vagueness allowed the Frontier Police to undertake severe 
methods to collect the tax. One account describes how ‘They went ruthlessly through 
the chiefdom, demanding instant payment, tying up those who refused till they paid, or 
burning their houses, exacting tax even from small, exempted villages, so raising £300, 
but also bitter hatred’.59 In the aftermath of the war, Captain E. D. H. Fairtclough, 
District Commissioner of Kwalu in the East of the Protectorate, claimed that officials 
went out of their way to ‘avoid anything like irritating or hurting the feelings of the 
natives in any way’;60 however, this argument is unsustainable. With regards to the 
oppressive methods used by the Frontier Police to collect the tax, Cardew admitted that 
coercion was adopted but stated that this was only after ‘it became quite evident from 
the armed gatherings which took place all over the country that there was to be a 
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determined resistance to such collection’. 61  However, this claim seems highly 
improbable, considering the methods utilised by the force over the previous years. The 
failings of the Frontier Police were linked by contemporaries to the ‘nature’ of the 
indigenous members of the force, rather than the system itself and it was claimed that 
they acted as ‘little judges and governors’ and were able to abuse their positions of 
power amongst the indigenous population, without the ‘civilising’ influence of the 
colonists.62  
The central grievance of the chiefs regarding their treatment by the British 
authorities and the Frontier Police was worsened by the arrest of five Port Lokko chiefs 
including Bokari Bamp by Captain W. S. Sharpe, the District Commissioner of Karene; 
these actions were particularly controversial – occurring as they did ‘Without a shot 
having been fired, a blow struck, or the slightest sign of physical resistance offered’ – 
and caused outrage amongst their people.63 The chiefs were asked the following: ‘“Will 
you do your best to order all your people not to molest the Sierra Leonians [the traders] 
for paying the tax?” and “Will you undertake to start collecting the Hut Tax due from 
you at once?”’64  The chiefs replied in the negative, although as Chalmers later 
highlighted neither of these responses were illegal.65 It should be noted that as the chiefs 
were about to be taken away to Freetown, Bokari Bamp told their angry supporters that 
they ‘must sit down quietly, and not do anything, and that he was going to suffer for the 
country’.66 E. D. Morel was critical of the Government’s policies in Sierra Leone and 
accurately described the ensuing violence: ‘Chiefs were dragged from their villages, 
treated as felons, handcuffed and marched off to gaol under the eyes of their unresisting 
people’.67 At the time, Sharpe claimed that the arrest of the chiefs had ‘cleared the 
air’,68 however, he later showed that he was well aware of the antagonising effect that 
the arrests would have on the morale of the general population and admitted that the 
chiefs’ treatment was an ‘indignity’ to them.69 As Chalmers stated, ‘Like the other 
District Commissioners Captain Sharpe was obviously imbued with and acted on the 
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initial idea that imperative and uncompromising force was the factor to be relied on for 
success in connection with the Hut Tax’.70 The chiefs were sentenced to imprisonment 
of between twelve months and two years, as well as hard labour; Sharpe actually 
claimed that he ‘never knew that there was imprisonment without hard labour’.71 
However, Sharpe admitted that he wanted to make an example of the chiefs stating, 
‘Though my sentences on the acting Chief [Bokari Bamp] and four headmen sent down 
appear severe at first sight, it was absolutely necessary, as an example to others, and 
will lighten my difficulties considerably’.72  
During this time, rumours were circulating in the North that the Temne chief and 
warrior from the Karene district, Bai Bureh, was planning a rising against the 
administration. The chief was already well known to the British and was also one of the 
signatories of the Temne petition; he had previously been a British ally.73 Sharpe had 
written to Bai Bureh announcing his intention to visit him and collect the tax from him 
personally; the letter was returned unsigned and Sharpe perceived this action to be a 
clear affront, although Bai Bureh later claimed not to have received the letter.74 At the 
beginning of the conflict Cardew described Bai Bureh as ‘a great drunkard and a 
worthless character, and it is only by a combination of recklessness and good luck that 
he has succeeded in giving trouble for such a long time’.75 Cardew had already tried and 
failed to arrest the chief in 1894,76 a fact that Cardew had not forgotten.77 As rumours 
regarding Bai Bureh continued Cardew decided that a show of force was needed; 
initially a group of Frontier Police was sent out on orders to have Bai Bureh arrested, as 
a result of his having ‘defied’ Sharpe.78 However, as Sharpe and Inspector General 
Major A. F. Tarbet of the Frontier Police set out to arrest him, they were met with a 
group of ‘warboys’ who threw stones, scattered rice over the ground ‘to show their 
contempt’ and jeered at the troops; as the military report states, ‘Capt. Hastings a young 
officer fresh out of England called out “Let us have a plug at them”. This appears to 
have decided Maj. Tarbet who thereupon gave orders to fire then [the District 
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Commissioner] telling him that he must accept the responsibility’.79 Hence, Sharpe had 
been against opening fire on the crowd, however, on Tarbet’s orders the first shots of 
the campaign were fired.80 Major R. J. Norris, the Commanding Officer, claimed that he 
had not been made aware by Cardew of the severity of the situation in Karene, having 
been told by the Governor that ‘there was not such a thing as a fortified town in the 
Protectorate.’81 Further incidents took place which did little to curtail the hostilities 
including a confrontation that occurred in an attempt to disarm the native population in 
Karene in which in Sharpe’s words, ‘a friendly native of Port Lokko, was killed 
practically in cold blood’.82 With the outbreak of violence Cardew ordered in extra 
troops from the West India Regiment; as the violence continued, it was not long before 
martial law was declared in Karene. The proclamation of martial law was made on 2 
March 1898, in which it was pronounced that there was a ‘state of siege’ and that ‘Any 
unauthorised person found carrying swords, firearms, or any offensive weapons will be 
treated as a rebel and dealt with accordingly’; furthermore, the declaration claimed that 
‘Every protection will be afforded to loyal and peaceful inhabitants, who are hereby 
ordered to give all possible assistance in their power towards the suppression of the 
rising which has taken place’.83 The orders of the proclamation were decidedly vague 
and one may question the ways in which local inhabitants were expected ‘to give all 
possible assistance’ and no doubt included, in reality – as it had elsewhere in the British 
Empire – providing ‘active assistance’ to the British Army in suppressing any unrest.84 
Hence, the grounds for Bai Bureh’s attempted arrest were based upon rumours 
that he would refuse to pay the tax and his ‘defiance’ of British authorities in not 
opening Sharpe’s letter; as a result, Sharpe expressed his desire that Bai Bureh and the 
‘ringleaders’ be captured ‘dead or alive’.85 However, it is clear that Bai Bureh’s 
campaign did not begin until the British, and Cardew in particular, had made it apparent 
that there were to be no negotiations regarding British policy. In an atmosphere of 
discontent and hostility, tensions were high: it has been claimed that ‘Whatever the 
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underlying causes, the British administration precipitated the war by firing the first 
shots’, a point also made by Bai Bureh.86 After hostilities broke out Bai Bureh 
undertook a campaign of guerrilla warfare against the British; having previously 
accompanied British expeditions, he was well aware of the fighting techniques and 
organisation of the Frontier Police and the West India Regiment;87 although during their 
first attack, Bai Bureh’s men attempted to fight the British in the open, thus leaving 
them exposed and with sixty men dead. However, ‘This taught them to fight from 
cover, firing out suddenly at the columns marching, distended with carriers, along the 
narrow bush paths’.88 These new tactics initially proved very effective and Bai Bureh 
was able to retain the initiative from 23 February until 1 April with an estimated three 
thousand of his ‘warboys’; during this time the British only took the offensive once.89 
The British campaign was frustrated by Bai Bureh’s strategy which was based upon the 
stockading of towns and villages in which snipers would attack British forces in 
unknown bush territory,90 as well as the targeting of white officers;91 although first-
hand accounts of the campaign make clear that these sniper tactics were largely 
ineffective; as Colonel E. Woodgate stated, ‘the long range shots of the enemy doing us 
no harm – our replies effectually silenced them’.92  
As the British failed to gain the upper hand, the West India troops were left 
demoralised, exhausted and susceptible to disease, leading to an outbreak of smallpox.93 
The tactics used by Bai Bureh made the campaign all the more challenging, as one 
participant stated: ‘Bush fighting is so entirely different, but in its own line far more 
trying to the nerves. The silent march through the almost deathlike stillness of the West 
African forest … the longing to substitute the constant menace of the unseen for the 
exhilaration and excitement of the seen’.94 Brigadier General F. M. Carleton stated in 
relation to bush fighting that ‘You can do nothing in return unless you happen to catch 
the enemy in the open which is very seldom. All you can do is burn their villages and 
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occupy the country’.95 Brigadier General E. Craig-Brown’s account also demonstrates 
the difficulties of fighting against Bai Bureh’s tactics: ‘This was the first time I was 
under fire but as we couldn’t see the enemy we did not fire back. Besides we were 
afraid of hitting our [advanced guard which] had evidently turned a corner somewhere 
ahead for some of their bullets came singing over our heads’.96 Norris was frustrated by 
Cardew’s reluctance to supply further troops and the inexperience of the troops that 
were sent.97 The situation led Norris to blame Cardew for the escalation of the violence, 
stating that he had ‘[assumed] unto himself the supreme command of military 
operations’ and claimed that if reinforcements had been sent immediately ‘I have no 
doubt whatever the insurrection would have been crushed out within fourteen days.’98 
Norris even wrote a despatch directly blaming the Governor for worsening and 
prolonging the situation but Colonel Bosworth refused to forward it.99 Lt. Foulkes also 
criticised Cardew’s interference in the campaign, stating: 
This method of reinforcement in driblets was a mistake, because each 
success over a small column encouraged the enemy and brought in many 
‘war boys’ from outlying districts. The Governor naturally wished to 
economise in the force employed, and perhaps he relied on his title of 
Commander-in-Chief to specify its size, instead of leaving the matter to the 
judgement of the Officer Commanding the Troops.100 
Clearly, from a military standpoint a swift and decisive blow to the resistance was 
perceived as necessary and Foulkes’ statement reflects Callwell’s work regarding the 
‘moral effect’ of such violence.101 It is evident that in this conflict the fighting 
conditions for the troops were particularly trying; one field report also described ‘the 10 
hours almost continuous fighting in high dense bush and occasional forest with frequent 
masked stockades’ in which ‘[t]he rearguard was continually harassed during the first 
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five hours of fighting’.102 As Lt.-Col. J. W. A. Marshall described in his military report, 
the stockades posed a particular challenge for the European troops: ‘It is absolutely 
impossible for European eyes to discover them by an outward sign; occasionally a 
particularly quick-sighted native will discover the locality of a stockade by some slight 
indication such as a dead twig, or some drooping leaves overhead’.103 In his description 
of the stockades, Foulkes later conveyed the basic nature of Bai Bureh’s weapons: ‘Old 
muzzle-loading guns, charged with black powder and filled with stones and pieces 
chipped off iron bars and rods, were thrust through the interstices and discharged at the 
passing column, and later some of our own capture rifles were used against us.’104 The 
difficult fighting conditions were further heightened by the climate in which there was 
‘intense heat and want of water’.105 As Peter Burroughs has stated, West Africa was 
viewed as a ‘graveyard’ for British soldiers and ‘service there equivalent to a death 
sentence’.106 The difficult environment was worsened by the actions of the enemy, as 
highlighted by Marshall: 
nearly every night the bivouacs were deluged with rain; it was 
comparatively seldom that the troops were sufficiently fortunate to sleep in 
towns, for if the last town attacked during the day was not set on fire by 
shell fire of the attacking party, it was frequently burnt by the enemy on 
being driven out, so as to leave no shelter for the troops.107  
Foulkes also criticised the abilities of the West India Regiment, stating that ‘they looked 
well in their picturesque uniform, but they were made of poor fighting material’, 
furthermore, they were ‘untrained in bush fighting’.108  
The British campaign was logistically challenging and the military had great 
difficulties providing constant supplies to the troops. As the military report for Karene 
stated for February, ‘It is as much as we can do to send up even a few days supply at a 
time, which means incessant convoy duty with heavy casualties each way and no troops 
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consequently available for actual operations against Bai Bureh’.109 In April 1898 
Cardew stated that much of the troops’ time had been taken up with supplies and ‘the 
true objective, which is Bai Bureh and his territory, has been neglected’.110 A great 
number of carriers were required, however, conditions were particularly harsh for the 
carriers who were employed locally and who were not only targeted by Bai Bureh’s 
men, but were also not cared for adequately by the Regiment. Records describe how 
there were ‘Problems of not being able to cook rice on board for the carriers’ and that 
they went 25 hours without water, with the report suggesting ‘inhuman conduct’.111 So 
bad were the conditions that it was stated in one report that: ‘No more [carriers] can be 
obtained and the desertion or defection of those at present employed might lead to a 
disaster’.112 The carriers were also left open to attack as ‘operations were mainly 
confined to the provisioning of Karene, 25 miles from Port Lokko, and convoys with 
large numbers of carriers were constantly passing between the two stations’. 113 
However, on Marshall’s arrival at the beginning of April, British tactics were changed 
with regards to provisioning and the British campaign was turned around: ‘Intermediate 
bases were established between the villages and fortified … and in them ammunition 
and supplies were accumulated, so that columns could set out and return to them 
unencumbered by long lines of carriers.’114 A further tactic was introduced in the form 
of flying columns which ‘were sent out from the centres [and] which took the enemy by 
surprise and inflicted serious casualties on them for the first time’.115 Central to the role 
of these flying columns was the decimation of the surrounding area. During Major 
Buck’s command of the flying column the tactics used were acknowledged thus:  
the operations at Karene appear to have been confined to making 
expeditions with small parties to destroy neighbouring towns and villages 
which had given shelter to the insurgents, these operations took place on the 
10th, 11th, 12th [March], and the troops were unmolested except on the last 
day when they were fired on as they advanced to Rotshing on the Little 
Skarcies [sic], and 4 carriers were wounded.116  
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While the indigenous resistance sought to hinder the flying column by firing the 
surrounding grass, Buck’s men also undertook this tactic and he stated that ‘We set fire 
to grass [and] to leeward side of the path we were following’.117 Buck makes clear the 
destruction that ensued as a result of these tactics: ‘They gave us sufficient space to 
form up the column 860 without danger of being burnt out. … At this time whole 
country was in aflame for about a mile all round. Tried to make a start about 4, but 
found the road impassable owing to the fire. So laagered in open on burnt plain.’ 
Conditions were difficult for the men under Buck and both ‘Men and carriers [were] 
much distressed owing to great scarcity of water’.118 With regards to the work of the 
flying column, Marshall claimed ‘that everything has been done in the Kassi country 
which a flying column can do. The country has been traversed through and through and 
Bai Bureh has absolutely no town or scarcely any “fakais” [bush camps]’.119 
At the end of April further violence erupted in the South of the Protectorate and 
‘Within a week the whole country was practically up in armed resistance’.120 However, 
the violence in the South was markedly different and the Mende tribe carried out a 
series of murders of British and American subjects, predominantly missionaries, as well 
as Africans in European dress, attacking the Creole population in particular. 121 
Disturbing accounts emerged of acts of violence targeting ‘European’ elements of 
society, and the victims included men, women and children; estimates regarding the 
number of fatalities range from 300 to 1,000 people.122 Although, the District Surgeon, 
Dr Berkley claimed that ‘The women, as a rule, were not killed, and in many cases 
became the means of bringing to justice the murderers’.123 It has been argued, however, 
that despite the dissimilarities between the two campaigns, ‘the underlying causes of the 
two risings were the same’.124 Cardew was of the opinion that if the initial revolt in the 
North had ‘not been protracted, the [Mende] rising would probably not have taken 
place’, 125  arguing that Bai Bureh’s successes had provided them with 
‘encouragement’.126 The chiefs in the Bandajuma District had also refused to pay the 
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tax in January 1898 and ‘offered armed resistance’ and Cardew had received a report 
from District Commissioner C. E. Carr during this time, which stated: ‘Unless a firm 
attitude shown now movement will gather force and state of affairs become serious’.127 
Cardew therefore recommended sending out a company of troops to the area,  
for I believe if we show force now we shall have no difficulty in the future, 
whereas if we let the natives once think that the Government is vacillating 
we shall have a very troublesome time before us and probably loss of life, 
but this, I do not apprehend if we send now some troops, the news of it will 
be carried all over the Protectorate and it will have a great moral effect, and 
will make them realise that the Government is in earnest.128 
It has been argued that ‘The Mende war had a peculiarly brutal, indiscriminate, 
and xenophobic character, which contrasts dramatically with the Bai Bureh war in the 
north’.129 As Cardew claimed, ‘The Timinis have conducted their war in a fairly 
humane and civilised manner, and, except in a few cases, not committed acts of murder. 
But the [Mende] have spared no one: all aliens on whom they have laid their hands have 
been butchered’.130 Although the District Commissioner of the Sherbro Islands T. J. 
Alldridge noted that, ‘The smallest rumour of warlike description brought in was 
immediately magnified and distorted until it struck absolute terror into the people’.131 
Although the Mende rising was different in nature, their motives were essentially the 
same. The Mende attempted to fight the British in open warfare,132 and casualty 
numbers were therefore assumed to be high.133 The Mende did not offer an organised, 
systematic attack but rather spontaneous attacks upon ‘unsuspecting opponents’,134 
which then ‘degenerated into a series of uncoordinated attacks’.135  
As Bai Bureh’s forces continued to frustrate British attempts to bring the rising 
under control, the British resorted to a policy of scorched earth in which they 
systematically burnt down towns, villages, food stores and crops,136 regardless of 
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whether the inhabitants put up resistance against the British; looting was also standard 
practice in this procedure.137 For example, Sharpe told Chalmers that as a column 
marched on the town of Mapolonta, ‘the carriers broke loose and began looting the 
houses’.138 Major Donovan was killed trying to rescue one of his hammock boys who 
ran into the town of Kabantama to loot and was killed by the enemy.139 The British 
military reports provided endless lists of the villages that they had burnt down as the 
forces traversed the country, for example: ‘Maj. Stansfield’s column since arrival at 
Karene had destroyed without opposition Mabanna, Maboma, Mabunto, Bantuto, 
Sandugu, Magbolonto and Rochain’.140 Buck received orders that certain villages were 
to be ‘razed to the ground’, although it was also stated that, ‘Of course you must use 
your own discretion as to necessity of destruction of towns’.141 The orders also 
stipulated that: ‘Any prisoners are to be brought here for disposal by the [District 
Commissioner]’.142 As Marshall’s field report made clear, during his time in command 
he went out of his way to destroy the surrounding area: ‘Leaving convoy in Romula I 
started out at daybreak to destroy surrounding [fakais]. Burning 2 returning to Romula 
about 9am’.143 Marshall alleged that the destruction of towns and villages was a 
necessity, arguing that ‘if you left any towns and villages near the camp you were 
always being fired into’. However, Marshall revealed his true motivation as he was 
questioned by Chalmers in his investigation: when asked specifically whether his aim 
was to destroy the towns and Marshall replied: ‘Certainly; to make an example of it, and 
intimidate the other states’.144 With regards to looting, Sharpe stated that: ‘What was 
looted was burned. We endeavoured to discover every rice store and burnt it. Of course 
there was a certain amount of organised looting for supplies’.145 In these ways, the local 
population was forced into a state of submission and left to fend for themselves in an 
area wrought by devastation. As the British gained control over the area, it was stated in 
the field report that throughout the march the troops had ‘Found all towns empty’ and 
on arriving at a town where the inhabitants were present, they ‘Drove people out of 
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Rochain who had commenced the rebuilding of houses which were destroyed’.146 As 
early as February it was stated that ‘The rest of the Kassi country is in a state of revolt, 
the whole of the people being in the bush’.147 Accounts of the campaign have made 
clear that in their encounters with the local population the British were met with fear, 
rather than opposition: Cardew stated that Marshall had reported that ‘the natives 
though much frightened appeared to be animated by no hostile intention’. 148 
Furthermore, Marshall also described that on arrival at Gbinti the locals ‘came to meet 
me as ordered but on my arrival they ran away’.149 Norris described how he would 
approach villagers with a white flag, ‘to try and bring friendly people back to 
villages’.150 
Michael Crowder and LaRay Denzer have claimed that ‘Cardew was very 
alarmed by the systematic burning of villages and towns. If villages and towns were to 
be burned, he urged that they be carefully selected and limited to Bai Bureh’s chief 
towns’.151 The targeting of his towns was certainly adhered to and any area or buildings, 
which could be linked to Bai Bureh were immediately destroyed, for example: 
Marched thence to Robellung one of [Bai Bureh’s] chief towns, and burnt 
it, thence moved forward to the banks of the Little Scarcies – driving the 
enemy across the river and shelled the town of Rokomal on the opposite 
bank in which large numbers had taken refuge; it was set on fire.152 
In response to Cardew’s apprehension, Buck argued that ‘events necessitated the 
destruction of the principal towns of Bai Bureh and of all villages where armed people 
were met. The whole of his country has risen, and I see no other way of punishing the 
offenders than by destroying their towns, though it may seem hard on the women and 
children’.153 On being asked about the ‘objective of the operations’, Sharpe later stated 
that ‘The impression that I had was, that being unable to arrest [Bai Bureh], we 
destroyed his country, and that of other Chiefs also whom we were unable to arrest’.154 
However, Sharpe maintained that ‘the commander did not go through peaceful country 
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burning revengefully, but every road was stockaded, and we were fired on from many 
of the towns’.155 However, the field reports of the operations clearly state that numerous 
towns were destroyed when no opposition was met. Furthermore, Chalmers posed the 
question: ‘Would it be correct to suppose that the whole of the inhabited places in the 
district [of Karene] were destroyed?’ Sharpe replied: ‘I think there were a few left 
which we could not find; but practically the whole are destroyed: that was our 
object’.156 According to Chalmers’ official report the result of the British operations in 
the Timini region,  
was, up to the time the Imperial troops were withdrawn at the beginning of 
the last rainy season, as affecting the natives, the laying waste of a country 
of about thirty miles’ radius round Karene, and the destruction of 97 towns 
and villages, having an aggregate population of over 44,000. The number of 
killed and wounded, and of aged persons, women, and children, who 
suffered indirectly, is not known.157  
Hence, it is evident that the general population was made to suffer for the 
uprising. It was also alleged for example that in burning the town of Mafouri, ‘a woman 
who was sick inside one of the houses perished’.158 A further issue that affected the 
general population was that of food supplies; Tarbet acknowledged before the end of 
February that ‘there was a serious food shortage due to the rice supply being cut off 
because people had deserted their villages and abandoned their farms’.159 Chalmers also 
recognised repeatedly throughout his report that the population would suffer into 1899 
as the war had led the people to abandon their homes and had thus not cultivated the 
land.160 Santigi Keareh, one of the Port Lokko chiefs arrested at the beginning of the 
conflict stated after eight months of hard labour in which they had to ‘break stones’, 
‘All our towns are ruined … Nothing remains, the rice and all is burnt up’.161 
Discontent regarding the treatment of the chiefs continued throughout the conflict and 
already in March British-employed messengers reported that ‘every one they had met 
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begged for the release of the imprisoned Port Lokko chiefs’, and that the people wanted 
to return and continue their occupations, ‘I therefore reported to the Governor that in my 
opinion if this was done, it would not only be a gracious act, but would lead to an early 
pacification of the country’.162 However, it was not until September 1898 that Cardew 
announced to Chamberlain that the Port Lokko chiefs were to be released on payment of 
the outstanding tax amount of £95 15s.163 Military records also convey that the harsh 
treatment of the chiefs by the British, which had begun with the collection of the tax, 
continued into the war:  
Told the king and chief that as I was not at all satisfied they were not siding 
with Bai Bureh that on the march I intended to place them in front of the 
advanced guard so that if I was attacked they would probably be the first to 
be shot.164  
Although, it was later stated in the report that the chiefs would be placed in the main 
body of the advance, it is nevertheless clear that the chiefs were treated with great 
contempt.  
A further consequence of the war, according to Norris, was that discharged 
carriers would ‘ravish women, steal the root crops, and loot houses, the bad feeling 
caused thereby being most harmful to the country’.165 A field report also included the 
need to investigate claims of rape by a member of the West India Regiment: rather than 
go through the proper channels, Norris decided he would ‘enquire into the matter 
myself’ and concluded thus: ‘Investigated charge of rape which was unsupported by 
evidence and incompatible with medical testimony. Case dismissed.’ 166  Norris 
nevertheless attempted to reassure the local population, stating: ‘I however gave 
complainant to understand that had the charge been proved severe punishment would 
have been awarded, and then told her to let people in town understand that they would 
receive every protection’.167  
Throughout the conflict there was a great disparity between the capabilities of 
the British Army and the indigenous fighters as was clear at the town of Romula where 
Marshall reported that ‘great opposition was experienced’ and hence ‘It was found 
                                                
162 ‘Karene Report on Recent Operations’, WO32/7623. 
163 Cardew to Chamberlain, 14 September 1898, CO879/55.  
164 ‘Karene Expedition: Staff Diary’, WO32/7624. 
165 Chalmers Report Part II, 624.  
166 ‘Karene Expedition: Staff Diary’, WO32/7624.  
167 Ibid. 
 118 
necessary to shell and set fire to the town in the rear of the enemy’s position, before the 
enemy could be driven out. A large number of rifles were used by the enemy, but the 
bullets whistled harmlessly overhead’. The report continues: ‘At last the enemy were 
driven from their stockades and from the town with considerable loss, and as the 
country on the far side of the town was comparatively open, were pursued with greater 
loss for some considerable distance’.168 At the beginning of March, the troops – under 
Major W. B. Stansfield – arrived in Port Lokko to support Norris’ troops, who had been 
under fire. As The Times’ correspondent described, the area and resistance were soon 
destroyed:  
The village, being situated on the side of a hill, offered an excellent target, 
and, as practically no rain had fallen in this district for some months, it was 
ablaze in about a quarter of an hour. Immediately the firing began the 
inhabitants beat a hasty retreat, and it is probable that there was little, if 
any, loss of life. The work of destruction was practically completed before 
darkness fell, but the village continued to burn intermittently during the 
night. On the following morning (Sunday, March 6) it was seen that the 
entire village was destroyed with the exception of the chief’s hut, and the 
razing of this to the ground was reserved for the soldiers after the boats 
should have left. Not a sign of a native was to be seen.169  
As the report for this period conveys, the local inhabitants were highly disturbed 
by this attack, which led to ‘heavy loss of life’, with many wounded and from which 
‘[m]any people had fled in terror’.170 The British military sought a variety of ways to 
gain the upper hand, for example, Foulkes made hand grenades out of cigarette tins.171 
Historians have estimated the number of casualties of the British forces as: ‘the lives of 
six officers (including deaths from disease) and twelve men, with thirteen officers, 
seventy-three men (including Frontiers) severely wounded, and carriers estimated 
137’,172 however, there has been no attempt to estimate the casualties of the indigenous 
population. It has been argued that the lack of figures for the enemy dead was a result of 
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the practice of the wounded and dead being taken as they took flight,173 but there are 
numerous examples of the British discovering the many bodies of the dead and dying 
upon victory and the field reports from the campaign do sometimes provide the number 
of casualties.174  
Through scorched earth tactics the British campaign eventually gained the upper 
hand in the conflict and successfully defeated the ‘insurgents’ through a war of 
attrition.175 By June the British authorities appeared to have the situation under control, 
although the campaign had to be postponed due to the onset of the rainy season. It has 
been argued that at this time, ‘Hunger and prospects of famine the following year 
damped the ardour and spirits of the leaders and war boys and many faded away from 
the devastated area’.176 Interestingly, Chalmers supplied evidence in his report that ‘Bai 
Bureh made repeated overtures for a termination of the war; once in March, another 
through the Rev. Mr. Elba’ and again in October 1898 indirectly to Chalmers himself.177 
These attempts were in vain and in October, the ‘hunt’ for Bai Bureh was resumed.178 
For the British, there could be no end to the military campaign until Bai Bureh was 
captured and punitive measures would continue in the Protectorate until this aim was 
achieved; as Marshall stated, ‘I hope that Bai Bureh’s powers of resistance are 
completely broken but he will always be a disturbing element till he is caught’.179 As he 
was sought, the small detachments of the West India Regiment were ‘fired on 
occasionally from stockades––two soldiers killed, nine wounded––destroying the 
remaining villages, until November the [12th] when at last [Bai Bureh] was taken’.180 
Bai Forki, the Paramount Chief of Port Lokko and an alleged ally of Bai Bureh’s, was 
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also amongst the ‘three principal insurgents’ sought by the British.181 Furthermore, at 
the end of April, Bai Forki’s towns and villages to the east of Port Lokko were 
‘punished’.182 Marshall declared at this time to Cardew that within the district of Port 
Lokko, ‘All towns except Romasundu and Kamen burnt’.183 As Bai Forki continued to 
be sought in May, Carleton found the chief’s abandoned home and described the 
destruction that he undertook: ‘I selected anything worth taking from his wardrobe and 
belongings, made the remainder into a pile and burnt them and his house’. Not only did 
the troops destroy the chief’s house, but they also went on to the ‘work of burning all 
towns and killing all inhabitants who resisted us’.184 Carleton was instructed to move on 
before the end of operations, but as the military report states, ‘Captain Carleton’s 
operations … were successful and Bai Forki, all his followers apparently having 
dispersed, surrendered to the District Commissioner. Captain Carleton’s loss was but 
one man wounded.’ 185  Marshall believed that these actions would ‘have had a 
widespread and wholesome effect’.186  
Some of the troops in the campaign had a distinct lack of knowledge regarding 
the background to the conflict; Craig-Brown was part of the West India Regiment and 
arrived into Sierra Leone at the end of January as discontent was mounting in the North. 
Craig-Brown wrote home to his mother, explaining the situation thus: ‘The government 
here started a hut-tax lately on the supposition that to pay it the occupant would have to 
work occasionally, [which] was considered highly desirable’.187 Interestingly, he states 
that the ‘natives’ ‘don’t seem to see it in the same light, for when the frontier police 
came to collect the taxed they got angry and tried to bullying the force [sic]’.188 
Carleton’s correspondence conveys that he failed to differentiate between the military 
campaign in the North and the sporadic violence in the South; the Mende conflict 
clearly left an impression on the British troops due to the brutal manner in which several 
missionaries were killed, and Carleton concluded that ‘Wounded sick and prisoners I 
would kill after what I saw’.189 Carleton was involved in the campaign throughout the 
Protectorate and his attitude was clearly affected by events in the South and the two 
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British campaigns increasingly turned into one battle to bring the country under control. 
Carleton felt justified in carrying out brutal methods of retribution and he described the 
Army’s tactics in Taiama in a letter to his father thus:  
They rushed after them killing every man they came across. The women 
and children were spared but every other soul caught was killed and right 
glad I was of it. In all I supposed about 200. There were no wounded 
brought in and no prisoners with one or two very rare exceptions. The place 
was now in our hands and we proceeded to burn all the villages except the 
one with the double stockade which we reserved for our own use.190  
The corpses were later thrown into the river. This is a rare admission in the case of 
Sierra Leone that the practice of burning villages was accompanied by the killing of the 
enemy men that came into the hands of the British troops. This fact demonstrates the 
significance of the differing nature between the conflicts in the North and in the South 
and that massacres of this nature were informed by the sporadic targeting of civilians in 
the South by the Mende. Interestingly, while Carleton wrote to both his father and sister 
directly after these events, it is only to his father that he recollects the violence that was 
involved in the campaign. In contrast, Fairtclough’s description of these events to 
Chalmers was very vague: ‘we found [the area] strongly stockaded. It composed of 
eight towns. Finally we drove them out and destroyed all the eight towns except one, 
where we slept that night’.191 Woodgate’s report was similarly vague: ‘with the loss of 3 
killed and 5 wounded … the insurgents retreated towards Mano leaving a considerable 
number of dead’.192 He also acknowledged that the attack on Taiama was followed by a 
day of ‘pursuit of those in retreat’.193 The challenges of documenting British colonial 
violence are highlighted in this case, as official colonial sources conceal the extent of 
the violence inflicted and the fact that ‘no quarter’ was offered in this instance to 
captured and wounded troops. Carleton’s account of his time in the Protectorate 
demonstrates his indifference or disgust towards the native population; for example, in 
one battle a man was shot in the foot: ‘Poor devil, he had to march about fifteen miles 
that day with his hands tied behind him and a nasty hole in his foot. He was one of the 
villainous looking type of native [sic] I had ever seen and I had no compassion for him’. 
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When the man’s health did not improve, rather than provide medical attention, he was 
turned out of the British camp in order to die: ‘He would have died I expect within 24 
hours after being released.’ Carleton further stated that ‘My heart is hardened against 
these people and I know that nothing is bad for them’, thereby demonstrating the 
rationale which enabled him to take part in extreme violence.194 
As Denzer has stated, in the North, victory had been achieved through the 
destruction of Bai Bureh’s town and ‘the forces of “civilisation” had demonstrated their 
worst aspect’.195 This destruction was also continued throughout the South against the 
Mende. It is interesting that despite the significantly different conflicts in the North and 
South, British military responses throughout the country do not appear to have differed 
greatly. The main difference was that those involved in the Temne conflict in the North 
did not face the death penalty, while many Mende were accused of murder and were 
executed. In March 1898 Cardew had instructed Sharpe that if ‘life has been taken by 
[Bai Bureh’s] order whether of Frontier Police or others … he should be tried for the 
capital offence’.196 However, it seems that Chamberlain’s influence led to a more 
moderate approach in this regard; Cardew had requested from Chamberlain ‘authority to 
enact Ordinance trial of insurgent bands for capital punishment by Special 
Commission’, 197  however, Chamberlain responded clearly to this request, stating: 
‘Capital punishment will not be allowed for any cause less than murder’, and insisted 
that, ‘Corporal punishment must not be inflicted on account of refusal to pay hut tax, as 
I consider that it would be illegal to inflict corporal punishment under existing 
Ordinances’.198 Despite the severe punishment of the five chiefs in Port Lokko, Cardew 
responded that there ‘has not been a single case of corporal punishment on account of 
refusal to pay hut tax, and will not be’. 199  While in this example Chamberlain 
represented a more moderate approach, it was not always the case that politicians were 
in favour of less extreme methods than the man on the spot.200 
By June, Cardew had acknowledged that the Temne and the Mende should 
receive different punishments,201 although he did suggest that Bai Bureh might be tried 
for treason, ‘so obliging the Colonial Office to consider, what had never been clearly 
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defined, the legal status of the Protectorate and its inhabitants’. It was ultimately 
concluded that treason could not have been committed as the Protectorate was 
established under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, and Bai Bureh thus remained ‘foreign’; 
in the end though, he was never actually tried.202  As Fyfe has highlighted, the 
authorities looked for a swift conclusion to the war and to this end the Colonial Office 
sent Deputy-Judge G. A. Bonner from England to travel around the country with a panel 
of assessors to try any capital cases. However, no counsel for the defence was present 
and the whole process was clearly flawed. There were 96 confirmed hangings – 
although Cardew only reported 83 – and the rest were imprisoned.203 Three chiefs, 
including Bai Bureh were deported to the Gold Coast. It was the case, however, that 
Cardew expressed his desire to focus official punishment for the uprisings on the 
‘ringleaders’.204 It was believed that strong measures were necessary ‘or there will be 
difficulties in keeping the natives in subjection, and troubles will be in store for the 
future’.205 
 A further development in the pacification of the Protectorate was the ‘punitive 
expeditions’, which began after the rainy season in November as the conflict drew to a 
close and continued until April 1899. During these expeditions, ‘Four thousand troops 
would be marched almost simultaneously in six companies from different points, and 
would pass through the whole of the Hinterland’. 206  The columns traversed the 
countryside leaving behind devastation everywhere they went and included the burning 
of towns, which had already been deserted and clearly the objective was collective 
punishment for the unrest, particularly considering that the conflict was all but over. 
Cardew ordered this ‘re-establishment of authority’ thus: ‘I propose that about five 
columns of such strength as O/C Troops may consider suitable should start next 
November from such points as [Port Lokko], Songo Town, and Bonthe, and completely 
traverse the Protectorate’. 207  These columns included ‘995 troops, under fifty-six 
officers, with 4,295 carriers’.208 Cardew further recommended that ‘boat expeditions 
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should be sent up the rivers and creeks’.209 For the most part, the unrest had already 
been over for some time; as Cardew reported, Woodgate inspected the Karene area at 
the beginning of August in which he states that there were ‘reports that Bai Forki’s 
warboys were mustering for an attack on Port Lokko [which] resulted in an insignificant 
raid on the outskirts of that town by a few insurgents’, although Cardew also 
acknowledged that they ‘were said to have been impelled to this act by hunger’ and that 
‘one of the insurgents was shot by a friendly native and the rest were dispersed’.210 As 
the field report for this period makes clear, the military expeditions were carried out for 
‘punitive purposes’ and it was stated that Bonthe would be targeted due to the fact that 
the district had not ‘been thoroughly traversed in the earlier stages of the operations’; 
the report then concludes that ‘These columns met with no opposition and no casualties 
were reported’.211  
 Clearly, Cardew anticipated little indigenous resistance and did not expect the 
expeditions to take more than three months, believing the chances of opposition to be 
‘very doubtful’.212 Cardew was motivated by a desire to reassert British authority and 
conduct a policy of collective retribution; he also wanted the population living in remote 
areas to witness the might of the British Empire as ‘the natives have had no evidence of 
the power and resources of Her Majesty’s Government other than the presence of 
isolated posts here and there, consisting of three or four men of the Frontier Police, and 
of small patrols from the same force passing occasionally through their country’.213 
Cardew admitted that ‘We, in fact, had been holding the Protectorate with the proverbial 
“corporal’s guard”, and, as has happened again and again in our previous Colonial 
history, when something was done which the natives did not like they rose, and the 
country had to be conquered’.214 These examples of ‘British power’ are often absent 
from studies of the war in Sierra Leone, which generally conclude with Bai Bureh’s 
capture.215  
In December 1898 Chalmers spoke out against ‘Further military expeditions or 
demonstrations’, stating that ‘the whole scheme is bad; the country is being sunk in an 
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abyss of debt to carry out a mistaken policy’216 and in January 1899 he emphasised that 
the people wanted peace and Chalmers recommended in his report that ‘all punitive 
expeditions should cease. Enough has been done for punishment’. He goes on to argue 
that ‘The continuance of arrests, prosecutions, even military promenades, have the 
effect of unsettling and terrorising….’217 Chalmers gives economic reasons for stopping 
the practice, but also acknowledges that such actions ‘will yet leave feelings of distrust 
and hatred which will make the work of governing in future far more difficult than 
heretofore’.218 In preparation for the punitive expeditions even the chiefs were expected 
to play their part: ‘To supply the columns and ease as far as possible the cost of 
transport, instructions have been issued to the native chiefs concerned, to have rice 
stored in certain quantities at the following points … the rice will be received in lieu of 
house tax’.219 After Karene was brought back under control in the summer of 1898, 
Cardew still argued that further British violence was deemed necessary so ‘that the 
insurgents should confess themselves thoroughly subjugated before terms are granted to 
them’.220 
The Aborigines’ Protection Society (APS) was outraged by British actions in 
Sierra Leone, and highlighted the legacy of ‘reckless slaughter’ that had already taken 
place under Hay, Cardew’s predecessor.221 The article demonstrates that the burning of 
villages was already common British practice in Sierra Leone.222 Cardew’s policies are 
also criticised, as well as the longstanding abuses of the Frontier Police, which Bourne 
describes as ‘terrorism’.223 However, this criticism appears to have had no effect on the 
running of the campaign; the APS article appeared in August 1898, but the nature of the 
campaign did not change, as demonstrated by the punitive expeditions. As in the case of 
Perak, the colonial violence in Sierra Leone led to debates in the metropole regarding 
the role of administrators. In particular, the levels of power that the Ordinance granted 
the new District Commissioners were criticised, with particular reference to the highly 
inexperienced men who took these jobs, with ‘far more power than they could be relied 
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upon to use discreetly’.224 Cardew defended the choices made regarding the Frontier 
Police and the District Commissioners stating that ‘military men’ were ‘more fitted 
from their training and habits of command to administer justice and bring the natives 
under control’.225 Hargreaves highlighted that as the administration was unwilling to 
employ Creoles to undertake these roles, they were left with young and inexperienced 
men.226 As Fyfe has argued, Britain introduced ‘racial rule’ into British West Africa 
from 1887 onwards; as he states, ‘authority was to be grounded on a simple racial 
principle––white gives orders, black obeys’.227 Bourne’s article also made claims that 
‘Hundreds of natives have been shot down, many more hundreds have died of 
starvation’.228 There has been no further historical investigation into these claims, the 
article having been dismissed by one historian as ‘an intemperate indictment of 
government policy in Sierra Leone, based largely on distorted reports from the 
Freetown press’.229 However, given the level of destruction throughout the country and 
the fact that all cultivation ceased throughout the disturbed areas during the conflict, it is 
quite conceivable that there were many inhabitants who succumbed to starvation. Also, 
the article’s discussion of other aspects of the conflict corresponds with various 
accounts of the rising. There was some further criticism of the British government from 
various international commentators and several national newspapers denounced the 
government for ‘whitewashing a discreditable scandal’.230 Also, during the conflict the 
irony of the British destruction of the country was not lost on the press; as the Daily 
Telegraph stated: ‘So far as we are informed, most of the huts on which he [the 
Governor] intends to collect the debts have been burnt down, if not by the people 
themselves, by the soldiers’.231  
 Mary Kingsley was particularly critical of the Government’s role in Sierra 
Leone and argued that the tax was obnoxious to the native population: ‘One of the root 
principles of African law is that the thing that you pay any one a regular fee for is a 
thing that is not your own – it is a thing belonging to the person to who you pay the 
                                                
224 Ibid., 225.  
225 Cardew to Chamberlain, 20 September 1898, CO879/55.  
226 Hargreaves, ‘Sierra Leone Protectorate’, 64.  
227 Fyfe, ‘1787-1887-1987’, 414.  
228 Bourne, ‘The Sierra Leone Troubles’, 228-29.  
229 Hargreaves, ‘Sierra Leone Protectorate’, 74.  
230 Fyfe, History of Sierra Leone, 600.  
231 Cited in Denzer and Crowder, ‘Bai Bureh’, 206.  
 127 
fee’.232 Morel also criticised Government policy regarding Sierra Leone and particularly 
the ‘autocratic power’ of the civilian and military men on the spot. As a counter to this 
power, Morel emphasised the importance of ‘independent criticism’, which ‘so long as 
it is legitimate, should be exercised by the public at home’.233 Morel blamed the 
Government and Cardew in particular for the outbreak of the war, further stating that in 
British-occupied West Africa, ‘Punitive expedition follows punitive expedition’.234  
 As in the case of the Perak War, Stanley of Alderley once again questioned the 
actions of British colonists on the ground in the case of Sierra Leone and in the House 
of Lords he argued against claims of a ‘moral justification’ for intervening in the 
Protectorate. However, Lord Selborne responded by condemning Stanley for his 
critique of troop conduct, arguing that ‘Under circumstances of great climatic 
difficulties, of complete isolation in many cases, and in dealing with absolutely savage 
tribes, on the whole the officers who go out from this country show marvellous 
patience, great tact, and great humanity’.235 However, in the House of Commons the 
events of the conflict were not presented in such a positive light:  
first, the tax was to be imposed upon the miserable inhabitants–people who 
were to receive the blessings of English rule and civilisation; secondly, 
there was the enormous cost of collection; and thirdly, war was to be waged 
against the people, and their huts destroyed. A more criminal policy could 
not be carried out, if, instead of Sir Frederick [sic] Cardew, a Governor had 
been selected from Colney Hatch.236  
Michael Davitt continued to state his hopes that ‘the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
will take some steps to try and have this trouble settled without having these unfortunate 
people mowed down by Maxim guns … [and] to avert the scenes with which we are 
now only too familiar in these petty wars and expeditions on the West Coast of 
Africa’.237 
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 The nature of the methods utilised by the British military was conveyed clearly 
in the British press, along with an emphasis on the challenges of colonial warfare. For 
example, The Times stated that:  
In the bush it will always be difficult to get on even terms with the natives, 
poorly armed though they are. Of course it is always open to the soldiers to 
burn the villages they meet with on the line of the march (as, indeed, they 
did between Robat and Port Lokko), but in that case there will be no huts 
left upon which to levy a tax.238 
However, the newspaper also emphasised the need for the punitive expeditions to 
‘capture and “smash” Bai Bureh’, and argued the difficulty of dealing with ‘men of the 
Bai Bureh type, who are constantly starting up, and, by the aid either of religious 
fanaticism or of a warlike personality, contrive to acquire a large following, it is 
practically impossible to deal satisfactorily’.239 Hence, the conflict was typically viewed 
as a result of the ‘nature’ of the ‘native’.  
The British undertook an approach in Sierra Leone of ‘divide and rule’, which 
can be seen not only in the use of the Frontier Police, but also in the creation of the 
Protectorate itself. As Fyfe has argued: ‘White was divided from black, Colony from 
Protectorate, tribe (everyone was officially assigned to a “tribe”) from tribe, chiefdom 
from chiefdom’. 240  He goes on to state that ‘Constitutional and legal anomalies 
separated the Protectorate from the Colony’, which meant that inhabitants of the 
Protectorate were now technically foreigners in the Colony.241 The Creole population – 
including all recaptives – had been declared British subjects in 1853.242 Scholars have 
highlighted the antagonistic relationship between the Colony and the Protectorate;243 
resentment had intensified in the Protectorate regarding the house tax as a result of the 
fact that the Colony was exempt.244 The role of the Frontier Police in this strategy of 
divide and rule is also clear, as Hargreaves explains: 
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Most of its rank and file were Protectorate men recruited in Freetown; all 
these, presumably, had in some way become dissatisfied with tribal society, 
and some were malefactors or runaway slaves. The dispersal of the force in 
small detachments, sometimes of a corporal and two men, made abuses 
easy to practise and hard to detect. Charges of extortion, looting, rape, and 
brutality were common, and continued even after Cardew, in his early days, 
had made provision for better supervision by officers.245   
Employing security forces from rival areas was a common tactic used by the British 
throughout the Empire. Cardew had stated to Bosworth in Norris’ presence ‘that it was 
entirely against his policy setting one tribe against another’, although it was then 
pointed out to the Governor ‘that this had been the invariable custom in former 
campaigns’.246  
 Cardew’s role in the war is illustrative of British colonial practices more 
generally and highlights the importance of individuals to the colonial process. Cardew 
played an integral role in the outbreak of the war due to his determination to enforce the 
Ordinance and his lack of flexibility in the face of opposition. Cardew displayed great 
arrogance and prejudice towards the indigenous population, with a superiority complex 
typical of the administrators of the British Empire. Cardew’s time in South Africa as a 
soldier has been highlighted as decisive to his experience and later conduct in Sierra 
Leone, as well as being influenced by Wolseley, whose policy towards native 
populations has been described as ‘Divide and refrain from Ruling’.247 It has been 
argued that Cardew’s approach which was ‘superior and paternalistic and contemptuous 
of African elites was conditioned by the racial climate of fin de siècle South Africa’.248 
Cardew seems to have made no genuine attempts to communicate with the population 
and continually blamed them for the hostilities; as Denzer has pointed out, even four 
months into the war Cardew continued to blame the violence on the Temne’s alleged 
propensity for slavery and their aversion to the ‘methods of civilisation’.249 He justified 
the devastation wrought by the British forces as a result of Bai Bureh’s ‘resistance to 
Her Majesty’s troops’.250 In the aftermath of the conflict, Harry L. Stephen defended 
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Cardew, concluding that ‘no one can doubt that [his] chief aim is to lift the Protectorate 
out of the welter of slavery and violence in which it has existed as long as we have 
known anything about it’.251  
That Cardew and his policies were to blame was certainly the conclusion 
reached by Chalmers. However, before Chalmers’ enquiry was even finished, Cardew 
had convinced the Government that the tax was not to blame, and should not be 
abolished. Selborne, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, supported Cardew and wrote 
on 11 May: ‘the hut tax is not the sole or even the primary cause of the present 
disturbance. It is the resentment of the savage at the encroachments of civilisation’.252 
Chalmers, however, concluded that ‘If I could have found that the insurrection was the 
result of an inevitable conflict between ancient barbarism and an advancing civilisation, 
I would willingly have taken this view’.253 Hence, while holding Cardew responsible for 
the outbreak of the war, Chalmers also viewed the events within a dichotomy of the 
‘civilised’ and the ‘barbaric’, stating that the ‘native’ was ‘only just emerging from 
barbarism’ and ‘[i]n many respects he is but a grown-up child, and requires the 
Government to think and act for him’.254 Although, Chalmers does acknowledge that 
‘there is, even amongst some English officers, a confused, unacknowledged idea that 
different methods of treatment will do for people with dark skins than would be suitable 
for white people’.255 The imposition of the tax was subsequently continued without 
event; the people had ‘learnt their lesson’ in dealing with the British Empire.256 One 
observer stated that the rising was inevitable, as ‘[i]n the history of nations the power of 
the sword must be felt first’.257 This article also alludes to the ‘punitive expeditions’, 
which took place in the aftermath of the disturbances, although it states that ‘it was 
determined to consolidate the victory by a peaceful demonstration of the power of the 
white man’.258  
Cardew defended his policies in response to the Chalmers Report and he 
justified the role of the Frontier Police, arguing that an approach of ‘moral suasion and 
peace palavers, and of advising chiefs to be good children and giving them presents to 
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make up their quarrels’ was insufficient.259 Furthermore, Cardew justified the harsh 
measures undertaken by the District Commissioners and the Frontier Police in the 
collection of the tax, claiming that these measures were necessary as a result of the fact 
that they were dealing with people who were ‘practically savages’ and stated, ‘I fail to 
see what other course the District Commissioners could have adopted under the 
circumstances than that of repression’.260 Despite the devastation caused by the rising 
throughout the country, Cardew remained unrepentant and continued to assert that the 
events had been to the country’s benefit: ‘Deplorable as have been the sufferings of the 
insurgents during the recent disturbances, severe as has been their punishment in the 
numbers that have been killed in the fighting that has ensued on their rising, the present 
condition of the Protectorate will, notwithstanding, compare favourably with that of 
1894’.261 
In the aftermath of the war, Cardew attempted to paint a picture of tranquillity 
and by 17 January 1899, Cardew declared that peace had been restored and that 
the natives are returning to their towns and villages and cultivating their 
lands, that they have accepted the house-tax as an accomplished fact, and 
that I am informed from every direction they are paying it readily wherever 
it has been imposed.262 
However, Matthew Nathan, who acted on Cardew’s behalf while he wrote up his report 
in England, ‘saw large devastated areas and wondered whether the inhabitants, even if 
willing, could raise the tax-money’.263 Fyfe has argued that a ‘facade of peace and 
order’ followed the war in which Frontier Police abuses continued with impunity.264 
Unfortunately, Chalmers missed an opportunity to genuinely investigate the reasons 
behind the outbreak of the conflict: as Fyfe has highlighted, ‘in his anxiety to discredit 
the government, [he] spoilt his own case by accepting evidence unsifted’.265 It is clear 
that whilst the house tax may have sparked the unrest, it was ‘more than just a protest 
against a particularly obnoxious feature of colonial rule’.266 Chalmers’ report was 
ultimately ignored and arguably buried; Cardew’s policies and the Government’s 
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actions were defended. The enforcement of the tax was continued; Cardew argued to 
Chamberlain of ‘how impossible it will be to carry on the administration of this 
Government either without it or a large annual grant in aid from the Imperial 
Exchequer’, an argument that would have gone a long way to convince Chamberlain to 
keep the tax in place.267 Furthermore, Cardew continued to argue that withdrawing the 
tax would not only be detrimental to the colonisation process in the Protectorate but also 
to future attempts to impose a tax throughout the British Colonies on the West Coast of 
Africa.268 Rather than repeal the tax in the wake of the war, Cardew argued the need to 
extend it further throughout the region, including the Colony;269 this extension was 
needed, he argued, ‘for [the Protectorate’s] administration but also to pay off eventually 
the heavy expenses entailed by the rebellion’.270 In any case, the enforcement of the tax 
continued and the displays of strength, which the British undertook throughout the 
interior, had their intended effect and the indigenous population realised that for now 
they would have to accept a British colonial presence.  
Unfortunately, Chalmers returned from Sierra Leone in poor health and died on 
5 August 1899, thus unable to defend his report. Delays in the report’s publication had 
already been utilised to hold-up political discussions regarding the war.271 Chalmers’ 
wife, J. A. Chalmers, highlighted that a political debate on the report was deliberately 
suppressed and she argued that while Chalmers provided the report in its entirety prior 
to the prorogation of Parliament, ‘it was presented by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies without evidence and documents, but along with the criticisms of the 
Governor of Sierra Leone’, further stating that ‘Only in September, when Parliament 
was dispersed and the affairs of the Transvaal were exciting an acute public interest, 
were the evidence and documents … put within reach of members of Parliament, and of 
the public’.272 Clearly, Chamberlain had already decided to back Cardew at Chalmers’ 
expense. While the report was in no way an investigation into the nature of British 
tactics throughout the country, it nevertheless highlights the brutality of the British 
campaign and the rationale of the British officers for utilising this force. The report 
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therefore remains a key document in our understanding the nature of this British 
military campaign.  
Contemporary accounts reveal the racial prejudices of the colonists, for example 
Lt. C. Braithwaite Wallis presents British rule in the area as motivated by ‘moral duty’. 
Wallis also emphasised intertribal wars which ‘caused the land to run red with blood’, 
as well as the dominance of secret societies in the country, particularly the Poro273 and 
described the country as a ‘land reeking with fetish and superstition’.274 He contrasted 
the present situation with the previous years in which there was a ‘total lack of all 
civilised law and order’.275 For Alldridge it was incomprehensible that the people could 
not want British rule, as opposed to the ‘tyranny’ of the chiefs276 and argued that ‘the 
rebellion did not at all represent the feelings of the masses’.277 Hence, British expansion 
and the establishment of the Protectorate were presented as a ‘moral duty’ and were 
further justified by the British utilisation of the issue of slavery. Although, Chalmers 
pointed out in his report that Cardew had stated in 1895 that ‘slave traffic has practically 
ceased within the Protectorate’.278 Nevertheless, Cardew argued that the rising was ‘a 
reversion to the old order of things, such as fetish customs and slave-dealing and 
raiding’.279 However, it is clear that the key issue for British intervention was the 
detrimental economic effects of the slave raids, rather than any moral obligation.280 
Further undermining Cardew’s claims regarding the British suppression of slavery, as 
Hargreaves has highlighted, domestic slavery remained lawful until 1928.281 Fyfe states 
that Cardew ‘did not risk antagonising chiefs irretrievably by abolishing domestic 
slavery, as originally intended. The Protectorate Ordinances merely allowed slaves to 
buy their freedom for £4 (£2 for a child), and declared that slavery would not be 
recognised by law. Masters could not legally retain slaves against their will, but were 
not made to free them’.282 Nevertheless, as Fyfe has argued, by proclaiming the war to 
be a fight against those who wanted to maintain the slave trade ‘it became much more 
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difficult for Cardew’s opponents to decry his policy on humanitarian grounds’.283 As 
Esme Cleall argues, ‘Slavery operated as a key signifier for imperial wrongs, racism and 
violence in British imperial discourse’. After the abolition of slavery, the issue remained 
an emotive one in Britain. At the same time as the conflict in Sierra Leone these issues 
were being debated in the metropole regarding the ‘punitive indenture’ of Bechuana 
‘rebels’, including women and children. This conflict was also the result, in part, of an 
imposed hut tax.284 Contemporary accounts of the conflict demonstrate clearly the 
doctrine of the ‘civilising mission’ which was embedded in the British Empire. A 
despatch from Fairtclough, which was controversially reproduced in The Times prior to 
the completion of Chalmers’ own investigation, argued that the rising was a result of 
‘the growing desire of the native chiefs to throw off English rule with the civilising 
influences which accompany it’, also emphasising the natives’ propensity for human 
sacrifice and cannibalism.285  
 As discussed in chapter 1, colonial warfare entailed colonial ‘standards of 
warfare’ mixed with superior weaponry, the ability to conduct long-term military 
campaigns, and the ability of the British to call on large number of troops from across 
the Empire. These factors meant that in most cases indigenous opponents could do little 
more than delay the inevitable in the fight against the colonists.286 The war in the Sierra 
Leone Protectorate was certainly fought by the population as ‘a last struggle to preserve 
their independence, a final rejection of the imperial rule which had come upon them so 
gradually that few recognised it for what it was’.287 As Crowder has highlighted, there 
was a sense of fatalism in the attacks of indigenous populations on the colonisers;288 it 
was only a matter of time before brutal British military tactics forced them into 
submission. In this case, the British wreaked havoc and destruction across the country, 
fighting a campaign not just against the ‘insurgents’ but also against the population as a 
whole – tactics of guerrilla warfare typically result in a blurring of lines between 
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combatants and civilians.289 The effects of the British methods of violence have been 
much neglected in the historiography – although the investigation undertaken by 
Chalmers is revealing with regards to the effects of these tactics. While Denzer’s 
summary of events based on official correspondence acknowledges the destruction of 
villages, despite a lack of opposition, this fact is stated but not explored.290 Although, 
Denzer does acknowledge that Cardew expressed his own alarm regarding the use of 
these tactics, as discussed above.291  
The contradictory nature of the British Empire and its approach to colonial rule 
is made clear by British claims of indigenous ‘barbarity’ in juxtaposition with the 
‘civilised’ colonisers; the British military campaign demonstrates both the use of such 
dichotomies to justify colonial policies and how meaningless such categories are. Mark 
Levene has also highlighted this contradictory nature, arguing that in colonial wars 
European powers tried to keep reports of their own killing ‘off the map’, whilst 
highlighting the atrocities of the ‘insurgents’, and thus ‘the whole profile of one’s 
actions could be justified to the outside world – as indeed to oneself – as rational, 
legitimate and civilised’.292 Contradictions are also apparent in the British approach to 
law and order in the country, the legality of the Protectorate and the highly questionable 
trials that were conducted at the end of the war; these issues were a common theme 
throughout the Empire, as discussed in chapter 1. Chamberlain stated in the House of 
Commons for example that ‘229 natives were tried; of these 77 were undefended, of 
whom 62 were convicted, and of these 33 were executed’; as justification for this 
situation he claimed that ‘local practitioners were unwilling to be engaged and it was 
found impossible to provide for the defence in all cases’.293 The colonial authorities also 
introduced ‘The Insurgents’ Temporary Detention Ordinance’ in 1898, which enabled 
‘the Governor by a simple order to cause the arrest and detention in prison of any 
person within the Colony or Protectorate without any charge being made against him, 
and without evidence so long as the Governor sees fit’.294 As the Ordinance stated,  
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All persons … in any way concerned in the arrest of any persons who were 
engaged in such rebellion or reasonably suspected thereof or have been 
instrumental in their detention and imprisonment are hereby indemnified 
and held harmless for anything done by them in the arrest, detention, and 
imprisonment, and no action at law or otherwise shall be maintained for 
their having been so arrested, detained, and imprisoned, and no Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall be issued on his or her behalf.295 
The ordinance also extended to cases of arrest and detention prior to the passing of the 
Ordinance, thereby confirming that the colonists acted with impunity.296 Cardew was 
reluctant to withdraw this policy, despite Chalmers’ recommendation to do so in his 
report. Chalmers argued against the Ordinance and stated the need to keep ‘in 
accordance with clearly and firmly defined lines of justice’.297 That martial law was 
declared in the Protectorate was not unusual; this tactic was used throughout the British 
Empire ‘for the military governance of civilian life’.298 As Tom Lloyd has argued, the 
context of the second half of the nineteenth century was key in enabling British 
colonists to ‘reshape’ the discourse and utilisation of martial law; in this regard the 
context of the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865 was a key event.299  
 As stated above, previous punitive expeditions had taken place in the country at 
the behest of the colonists and the reaction to the revolt in 1898 can therefore be seen as 
part of a wider pattern of British colonial violence that had already been utilised in 
Sierra Leone on a smaller scale. Bourne argued that ‘many minor disturbances and 
much reckless slaughter, [led] to the very serious and widespread risings that have now 
brought Sierra Leone to the verge of ruin’.300 The role of the men on the spot in such 
violence was debated; already in 1882 one commentator acknowledged that the 
inexperience of British officials was a central problem in antagonising the local 
population: ‘Their usual term of office is so short that they have no time to learn the 
peculiarities of the neighbouring tribes and of British relations with them with that 
mastery of detail which alone could fit them to regulate such matters’. The article 
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continued to argue that the resulting antagonisms of this approach led ‘too often [to] 
risings, which have to be put down with bloodshed and burnings’.301 Smaller punitive 
expeditions had already formed part of the relationship between Britain and the interior 
of Sierra Leone, particularly in the 1880s, but the scale of the British operation in the 
Hut Tax War would overshadow them all.302  
 The Hut Tax War would not be the last time that a British military campaign 
was frustrated by the guerrilla tactics of an enemy and it has been highlighted that the 
methods used against Horatio Herbert Kitchener’s military campaign in the Boer War 
(1899-1902) led him to ‘become increasingly frustrated with the Boers’ guerrilla tactics 
and duly “concentrated” native civilians into camps in order to deprive the enemy 
combatants of shelter in support’.303 Similarly, martial law would also be declared in 
this case and the offences were more detailed and included: ‘treasonable or seditious 
acts and words, or acts and words tending to excite disaffection, disloyalty or Distrust of 
the Government’.304 In the case of the campaign against the inhabitants within Bai 
Bureh’s district of Karene, a direct targeting of the local population was not possible 
due to the fact that local inhabitants generally fled their villages before the British 
arrived; however, the people were targeted indirectly through the destruction of their 
villages and provisions. As Denzer states for example: ‘The villages of Robarring, 
Robin, and Manis––all having assisted and sheltered warboys––were destroyed and 
burned without resistance’.305 It was however stated in Marshall’s report that troops 
proceeded in one instance to ‘visit those towns near the mainroad which afforded shelter 
to the “war-boys” who attacked the convoys. Every village was cleared, luckily without 
any casualties on our side, though the enemy were not driven out without some 
trouble’.306  
In consideration of the effects of guerrilla warfare on a European colonial 
power, Callwell acknowledged that European technological prowess lost its 
effectiveness in the face of such tactics;307 as stated above, the British in Sierra Leone 
                                                
301 ‘Our Policy in West Africa’, The Times, 26 December 1882, cited in Sierra Leone: Further 
Correspondence Respecting the Proceedings at the Jong River in May 1882, C.3597 (1883), 31.  
302 See Enclosure 1, C.3597; Abraham, Mende Government, 71-73. 
303 Donald Bloxham et al., ‘Europe in the World: Systems and Cultures of Violence’, in Bloxham and 
Robert Gerwarth (eds), Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 19. See also: Surridge, ‘An Example to be Followed’.  
304 Army orders as cited in Townshend, ‘Martial Law’, 178.  
305 Denzer, ‘Diary: Part I’, 55.  
306 Chalmers Report Part II, 619-20.  
307 Callwell, Small Wars, 91. In the case of Wilhelmine Germany’s colonial conflicts see: Trutz von 
Trotha, ‘“The Fellows Can Just Starve”: On Wars of “Pacification” in the African Colonies of Imperial 
 138 
also had to adapt their tactics in order to defeat Bai Bureh and his men. That British 
weapons could prove ineffective is also clear from a field report for the Karene District, 
which stated: 
The constant sweeping of the horizon with rifle fire does much more harm 
than good. It has no effect on the enemy and consequently gives him 
confidence, discloses your position, probably inflicts untold misery on 
innocent people, prevents them coming in who might wish to make 
submission, and absolutely precludes the possibility of your opponent being 
taught a severe lesson.308 
As Craig-Brown highlights, these tactics were used thus: ‘Empty villages were tested by 
firing volleys thro’ them to drive out any enemy lurking amongst the huts’.309 These 
tactics left the British short on ammunition and Norris complained with regards to this 
‘wasted’ and ‘unnecessary expenditure of ammunition’ or ‘uncontrolled firing’.310 An 
ill-defined enemy was typical in colonial warfare and Denzer has argued that ‘Bai 
Bureh’s methods taught the British a lesson in guerrilla warfare and were the inspiration 
of several treatises on “bush” warfare’.311 One of these works was Hints for a Bush 
Campaign by Lt.-Col. M. F. Montanaro. He argued the merits for the destruction of 
indigenous towns when faced with defeat by the enemy and argued that ‘As when 
fighting the tribes on the North-West frontier of India, so in West Africa it is often 
necessary to punish the enemy by destroying his towns and villages’.312 Callwell also 
updated Small Wars to incorporate lessons from the Sierra Leone campaign, as well as 
tactics of bush warfare more broadly, highlighting the expenditure of ammunition and 
the challenges of being fired at in the bush, as well as the tactic of setting fire to 
bushes.313 
The events in Sierra Leone were part of a wider pattern of British colonial 
violence and should be considered within the context of current debates regarding the 
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308 ‘Karene Expedition: Staff Diary’, WO32/7624. 
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nature of colonial violence. Firsthand accounts of the conflict convey that the troops 
viewed their opponents as ‘illegitimate’, based on the lack of a formal army and this 
viewpoint contributed to a blurring of the lines regarding combatant and noncombatant 
targets. Furthermore, the actions of a few in the South of the Protectorate and the killing 
of missionaries in particular contributed to the impression on the part of the troops that 
their opponents throughout the country were ‘fair game’. Contemporary analysis of the 
campaign in Sierra Leone demonstrates the presence of deeply embedded prejudice and 
a sense of superiority and must be viewed within the wider context of British colonial 
warfare and an increased willingness to resort to more extreme violence to suppress 
opposition to British rule in the colonies.314 The British clearly had a catalogue of 
techniques that they could and would utilise if necessary.315 As the case of Bai Bureh 
demonstrates, British assumptions and prejudices led the administrators to condemn the 
chiefs before violence had even occurred. During this conflict there seems to have been 
a pattern in which the British authorities provoked the local population, which then led 
to retaliation, and was followed by condemnation and used to justify brutal suppression 
by the British – this is a pattern that can be identified in other cases of British colonial 
violence, including the Perak War.  
While historians have focused on the background to the war and the true reasons 
for the rising, paying particular attention to Bai Bureh and his war tactics, there has 
been a failure to examine Britain’s own brutal military campaign. There is also a lack of 
assessment regarding contemporary British accounts of the conflict and how they fit 
with British colonial policies and attitudes more generally.316 Daniel Magaziner has 
highlighted the problem of primary sources in the aftermath of the conflict, arguing that 
‘They discounted what seemed strange, what seemed not to fit their preconceived 
explanations for native unrest. They not only replicated contemporary debates in their 
first drafts of history, but in many ways hid alternative drafts from future historians’.317 
Magaziner argues that we can approach the sources anew, ‘prepared to reconstruct 
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accounts empty of prejudice, to allow the rising and its actors to speak in their own 
debates, not those of their conquerors’.318 This chapter is based on a reassessment of the 
official documents and correspondence held at the National Archives, as well as the 
Chalmers Report on the disturbances and Cardew’s response; the latter two documents 
were clearly flawed and subjective, but they nevertheless prove useful to this research. 
The present study is indebted to key works on Sierra Leone, which have been referred 
to throughout this chapter. However, the focus here has been a consideration of the 
escalation of the violence on the part of the British Army and the extent to which 
methods were dictated by events and the actions of the men on the ground. It is the case 
that there is a lack of sources from an indigenous perspective on the war – although 
Chalmers’ collection of witness testimonies provides us with some evidence. 
Nevertheless, the colonial records are indicative of British concerns of the time and they 
therefore leave us with little reference to the wider effects of the war on the general 
population; for example, the British records show no interest in how the people rebuilt 
their lives in the wake of the devastation of whole areas, nor the numbers that were 
starving in the war’s aftermath, many of whom had to flee from their villages 
throughout the conflict and live in the bush. This chapter considers representations of 
the war in the British press, as well as published first hand accounts. Accounts written 
by soldiers, including private correspondence, provide new evidence that sheds further 
light on the nature of the British military campaign and the ways in which British troops 
sought to justify the devastation that ensued throughout the country. While primary 
sources written from a British perspective represent only one perspective, they 
nevertheless further our knowledge and understanding of the events surrounding the 
brutal suppression. Indeed, British perspectives are integral to a study of the nature of 
the British military campaign and the extent to which this war can be seen as part of a 
wider pattern of colonial violence throughout the Empire.  
Conclusion 
Overall, the British tactics utilised in this case were very similar to those in Perak and 
the destruction of the local area was key in both conflicts. The British were unable to 
deliver a ‘crushing defeat’ against Bai Bureh and were forced to fight the enemy in the 
bush, against snipers and an enemy that refused to engage in open battle.319 The 
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‘decisive’ action against Bai Bureh and his men came in the form of punitive 
expeditions, which served as a ‘theatrics of military power’ and allowed the system to 
continue more or less as planned, with the Ordinance in tact.320 At times, the violence in 
the Protectorate escalated in the face of significant indigenous opposition as well as the 
context of events in the South of the Protectorate and the murder of European 
missionaries for example. However, this conflict was marked by widespread 
destruction. In Wolseley’s The Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field Service, the need to 
inflict punishment in the face of ‘savage’ opponents was emphasised, but ‘the burning 
of villages containing nothing of value’ was advised against. He argued that villages 
could be easily rebuilt and such a tactic merely enrages without inflicting due 
punishment. As an alternative, Wolseley advised that ‘a raid into territory of a hostile 
tribe just at the season when their crops are ripe can inflict serious loss by the 
destruction of their corn….’321 Similarly, Callwell stated that the destruction of villages 
should be avoided and that the best way to bring ‘foes to reason is by rifle and sword, 
for they understand this mode of warfare and respect it’. However, Callwell admitted 
that circumstances did not always permit open warfare and sometimes villages and 
crops must be destroyed.322 Such was the case in Sierra Leone. The British beat Bai 
Bureh through tactics of attrition and destruction, based on the actions of flying 
columns, which traversed the country, leaving a trail of destruction in their wake.323 The 
principle of collective punishment was accepted particularly in terms of the destruction 
of all areas associated with the chief – while Cardew may have expressed ‘alarm’ 
regarding the destruction of villages, clearly he took no action to reverse these tactics, 
and Chalmers’ report clearly conveys the scale of the devastation throughout the 
Protectorate. This conflict highlights the many challenges that empires faced in 
suppressing ‘irregular’ opponents and reflects the concerns of Callwell regarding 
difficult conditions for European troops in the colonies – West Africa, and Sierra Leone 
in particular, was known as the ‘white man’s grave’.324   
 In a manner similar to Clarke, Jervois and Birch in the case of Perak, Cardew’s 
arrogant manner and racial prejudices created a situation in which opposition became 
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unavoidable. The events that led to the war are essential to understanding the nature of 
the violence when it broke out. Cardew refused to negotiate the terms of the 
Protectorate Ordinance with local leaders, who initially conveyed their objections 
peacefully in the form of petitions. The role of the Frontier Police demonstrates the 
ways in which violence was already inherent to the system, prior to the establishment of 
the Protectorate and punitive expeditions had been undertaken throughout the century. 
The Colonial Office had voiced concerns regarding Cardew’s approach and did not 
want him to antagonise the local leaders; this advice was ignored, however: no action 
was taken to limit Cardew’s approach and the military campaign once it was underway. 
Cardew persistently blamed the ‘natives’ for the violence and, after indigenous 
resistance was shown, the British priority remained the demonstration of the strength of 
the British Empire and the extension of its rule.  
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Map of Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
 
 
 
Source: Wikimedia Commons. Accessed 18 July 2016. 
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Chapter 4 
The British Reconquest of the Sudan, 1896-99 
That a new and better Sudan will be raised up over the ashes of Gordon, 
and all those brave officers and men who have perished in the loyal 
performance of their duty, is the fervent hope of every well-wisher for the 
prosperity of Egypt.1 
Now and then I caught in a man’s eye the curious gleam which comes from 
the joy of shedding blood⎯that mysterious impulse which, despite all the 
veneer of civilisation, still holds its own in a man’s nature, whether he is 
killing rats with a terrier, rejoicing in a prize fight, playing a salmon, or 
potting Dervishes. It was a fine day, and we had all come out to kill 
something. Call it what you like, the experience is a big factor in the joy of 
living.2 
The reconquest of the Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces came after the Mahdists had 
successfully kept the British out of the country for over a decade, having established 
power in 1885 under the Mahdi, Muhammed Ahmad.3 Previous studies of the war have 
been carried out with particular focus on the final major clash of the campaign, the 
Battle of Omdurman and the features specific to Horatio Herbert Kitchener’s military 
tactics as Sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian Army. Whilst historians have 
highlighted issues of controversy including the highly contentious practices of killing 
the enemy wounded or leaving them for dead, there has been little systematic study of 
the brutalities of this campaign. Historians have considered Britain’s successes during 
the reconquest in terms of the Anglo-Egyptian campaign’s exploitation of huge British 
technological advantages and Kitchener’s brutal utilisation of the famine conditions in 
the country throughout the period to some extent, but there has been little attempt to 
place these events within the context of a wider pattern of British colonial violence.  
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 Although Kitchener and the Anglo-Egyptian forces were the subject of interest 
and debate in the wake of the Battle of Omdurman, historians have paid relatively little 
attention to the conduct of the Anglo-Egyptian forces under Kitchener during the 
reconquest of the Sudan and its aftermath. However, reports soon emerged from the 
front of the alleged mass slaughter of the wounded, the looting of the Mahdist capital, 
as well as the destruction of the Mahdi’s tomb; central to these claims was an article 
written by Ernest Bennett, a war correspondent present at the final battle.4 As M. W. 
Daly has highlighted, Kitchener ‘“categorically” denied in February 1899 that he had 
ordered or allowed the Mahdist wounded to be massacred, that his troops had carried 
out such a massacre, that Omdurman was looted, and that civilian fugitives in the city 
were deliberately fired upon’. However, as Daly concludes, there is evidence to support 
all of these claims, excluding the latter.5 As G. W. Steevens, a war correspondent 
present in Omdurman stated: ‘It was not a battle, but an execution’;6 this is clear if one 
considers the human cost of this one battle: the official figures state that 11,000 
Mahdists were killed and over 16,000 seriously wounded – although the number of 
actual fatalities would have been significantly higher due to the neglect and killing of 
the wounded;7 in contrast, Anglo-Egyptian forces lost just 48 men and 382 were 
wounded.8 However, as P. M. Holt has emphasised, whilst the extent of the bloodshed 
led to criticism in Britain, the war still had overall support.9 Military historians in 
particular have highlighted aspects specific to Kitchener’s campaign such as the 
importance of new technology to the conflict. Technological developments which were 
central to Kitchener’s victory include: the use of telegrams; the newest developments in 
weaponry; steamers; as well as Kitchener’s impressive Sudan Military Railway, which 
he pursued in defiance of the advice he received from railway engineers who described 
his plans as ‘foolhardy’, but was subsequently described as ‘the deadliest weapon’ to be 
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used against the Mahdists.10 By July 1898, the Sudan Military Railway covered 285 
miles from Wadi Halfa to Atbara.11  
 Since the death of General Charles Gordon at Khartoum in 1885 at the hands of 
the Mahdists, there had been continued support in Britain to avenge his death; V. G. 
Kiernan described Gordon’s death as giving ‘a generation of Englishmen an emotional 
symbol of civilisation stabbed by savagery’.12 These strong feelings were heightened by 
propaganda primarily conducted by F. R. Wingate, ‘the chief source for gathering news 
about the Sudan’ and ‘chief propagandist for its reconquest’.13 Not only was Wingate 
the Director of Military Intelligence of the Egyptian Army, he also translated and edited 
European prisoner accounts of the Mahdist regime. These accounts, which were 
‘unrelieved descriptions of bloodshed and oppression’, fuelled the perception of the 
Mahdia as a brutal, barbaric regime with bestial and savage tales, which were 
undoubtedly exaggerated. 14  However, it is clear that atrocities against the local 
population did take place, notably at Metemmeh in 1897, where almost the entire 
community was massacred, after local resistance to the Mahdia was shown.15 As 
Kiernan highlighted, Mahdism ‘was indeed very far from angelical, but Europe treated 
it as purely diabolical, one more witches’ brew of African primitivism and Muslim 
fanaticism’.16 British war propaganda encouraged the perception of the Sudanese as a 
‘savage race’; these prejudices were only exacerbated by the famine conditions suffered 
by the population. Rudolf Slatin, who was held captive by the Mahdists for eleven 
years, provided a dire account of the starvation in Omdurman: ‘I saw three almost naked 
women … they were squatting round a quite young donkey ... they had torn open its 
body with their teeth, and were devouring its intestines, whilst the poor animal was still 
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breathing’. Slatin goes on to convey his disgust at these ‘maniacs’.17 As Holt has stated, 
these works ‘should be regarded primarily as war-propaganda’.18 With regard to the 
movement under the Khalifa ‘Abdallahi Muhammad (the Mahdi’s replacement after his 
death in 1885), Holt states that ‘there was a constructive side to his reign, which has 
received little attention from writers whose gaze has been focused upon picturesque 
horrors and atrocities which our grandfathers believed were committed only by 
barbarians’.19  
 The reconquest campaign began in 1896 with the Dongola Expedition, although 
the key battles did not take place until 1898; the Battle of the Atbara on Good Friday (8 
April 1898) was a telling precursor of the devastation that was to result five months 
later in Omdurman. Participants at the Atbara recollected Kitchener’s orders prior to the 
battle and his words were recalled by Lt. A. Unsworth: ‘The Sirdar wishes to impress 
on the minds of the men two words, when in front of the zariba “Remember Gordon”. 
He says the enemy in front of you are Gordon’s murderers’. Unsworth goes on to state: 
‘You should have seen the look of determination on the mens [sic] faces when these 
words were read. It augered ill for Fuzz Wuzzy [sic]’.20  Various accounts have 
described how Kitchener explained the terms under which the enemy could surrender, 
emphasising the ‘Throwing down [of] arms, and shouting “Aman” (peace)’,21 however, 
it is clear that this order was not always adhered to. As one soldier described: ‘When we 
were on the march I could hear the troops saying that they would make sure that every 
Dervisher [sic] they passed, they would make sure that he was dead before leaving 
them, and they kept their word. But it was a horrible sight to see the dead women, men 
and children. It made my blood run cold for a short time, but I soon got warmed up’.22 
Major-General G. M. Franks also stated that ‘the few left alive tried to quit and were 
shot down, it was hot work I can assure you’.23 That only a limited number of retreating 
enemy soldiers were taken prisoner is also made clear by Major-General Granville 
Egerton as he described an incident which occurred in the months after the battle:  
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a young native boy suddenly rushed at me making tremendous protestations 
and threw himself at my feet. On an interpreter being sent for it turned out 
that he was a lad whom I had had made a prisoner at the Atbara. There were 
not many prisoners at the Atbara fight, and I supposed he was 
disproportionately grateful.24  
Further tactics used by the Anglo-Egyptian troops included setting alight huts 
filled with enemy troops, in order to force the enemy out into the open, or to be 
otherwise burnt alive, as a result: ‘Some of the enemy ran out and were shot down; 
others perished in the houses. The method was drastic, but it saved many casualties 
among our own men.’25 Franks also confirmed that ‘the cotton clothes of some of the 
killed and wounded Dervishes had caught and they were horribly burnt’.26 The chaos of 
the battle is made clear by descriptions of the battle’s aftermath: ‘Dead dervishes, 
donkeys, ponies, camels and in places women and children lay dead and wounded in 
indescribable confusion – the smell was a bit like a slaughter house.’27 Furthermore, it 
was stated that ‘the so-called humane conduct of the Englishman’ was in evidence ‘who 
except in a very few occasions, where officers were on the spot to prevent it, spared 
nothing except the animals’.28 Indeed, it has been claimed that during the first phase of 
the battle ‘it was almost impossible to take prisoners’.29 Some troops expressed their 
horror at the carnage they witnessed and took part in: ‘I collapsed with a headache and 
consequently didn’t go over the field after, but I think the sight of those rifle pits full of 
writhing bodies and frightful wounded as we passed over them didn’t invite a second 
visit.’30 However, other men were notably unmoved by the scenes that they witnessed. 
Unsworth stated for example that the ‘sight of the mutilated bodies had no more effect 
on me than the sight of a wounded fly would have’31 and justified the killing of the 
wounded thus:  
The wounded, are, if anything, more dangerous than the non-wounded. 
They are 10 times more cunning. I daresay you have read about their tricks 
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shamming dead etc. Several of our fellows received their wounds from 
supposedly dead men. We were all warned about their cunning before the 
battle, and told to make sure that a man was dead before we passed him. 
We obeyed: and it was as well we did so.32  
It is clear that the killing of the wounded was part of a larger practice within the 
campaign and those who were involved felt little remorse; accounts of the battle suggest 
that many troops did not recognise their enemies as fellow human beings. This 
dehumanisation of the indigenous population, and the enemy in particular, is in 
evidence in accounts of the campaign. Indeed, Unsworth describes the experience in the 
battle as ‘exhilarating’ and claimed that his own behaviour was ‘cool, and callous, and 
took as deliberate aim, and was as careful to unload my rifle when rising off the knee, as 
if I had been on a field day on the Fox Hills at home’.33  
While the victory at the Atbara was publicly portrayed as a success, privately, 
criticisms were raised regarding the tactics chosen by those in charge and one 
participant subsequently described the conflict as a ‘chaotic dogfight’. 34  Most 
participants in the battle tended to criticise the commanding officer of the 1st British 
Brigade, Major-General William Gatacre, who is said to have conducted the battle in a 
manner of ‘improvisation’. 35  Gatacre was an unpopular and controversial figure 
amongst his men and was awarded the nickname ‘Back-acher’. 36  The results of 
Gatacre’s tactics were described thus: ‘What followed was utter chaos – as we had 
foreseen, all of us Infantry men, the Camerons were not going to stand and wait, they 
broke in with us, and the interior of the Zareeba became a confused mob of mixed 
soldiery, wild with excitement, and firing in all directions’.37 Firsthand accounts of the 
battle suggest that a period of ‘free reign’ took place and it has been stated that ‘Both 
British and Egyptian Army officers temporarily lost control of their men who rampaged 
through the Mahdist camp venting their blood-lust indiscriminately’.38 The battle was 
subsequently described as taking ‘less than half an hour of actual fighting, against a 
horde of half-starved and ill-armed savages’.39 With reference to enemy losses Egerton 
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stated, ‘The ditch behind the zareba bushes was literally brimful––there is no other 
word for it––with dead and dying men, showing the accuracy of the Camerons’ 
fire….’40 The boost to morale for the Anglo-Egyptian campaign was described as 
‘greater than that of any event since the fall of Khartoum in 1885’.41 The British victory 
did come at a price; casualties on the Anglo-Egyptian side were predominantly 
Sudanese with 57 killed and 386 wounded compared to the British brigade’s 26 killed 
and 99 wounded, of a force of some 13,000; the injuries suffered in this battle were 
particularly horrific.42 Egerton highlighted the poor conditions for the British wounded 
in the battle’s aftermath:  
I went down to the British field hospital, passing the native hospital, with 
its crowd of wounded men, on the way. It is here that the seamy, horrible, 
senseless side of war comes home to you, and I shall never forget the sight 
of those poor fellows lying spread over the desert wherever a little shade 
could be found amongst the mimosa bushes.43 
 Whilst the Battle of the Atbara proved devastating for the Mahdist forces, the 
slaughter of the Battle of Omdurman on 2 September 1898 would overshadow the 
previous conflict: the casualties at the Atbara are thought to have been 3,000 killed on 
the enemy’s side; the number of wounded is a matter of contention, however, but Holt 
has estimated a figure of 4,000: this issue will be discussed further below.44 In 
comparison, as stated above, 11,000 of the Khalifa’s army were killed and 16,000 
wounded in Omdurman. It should therefore come as no surprise that ‘[i]n this massacre, 
rather than battle, 3500 shells and half a million bullets were fired by the invaders’.45 
Contemporary accounts of the aftermath of Omdurman describe the enemy wounded 
lying unaided on the battlefield, waiting to die. Winston Churchill, who was present in 
Omdurman both as a war correspondent for the Morning Post and as a soldier, was 
horrified by the consequences of Kitchener’s policies and described the struggle of the 
wounded to reach the river, many of whom had lost limbs, and recounted how he had 
witnessed survivors still fighting death a week after the battle: ‘there were still a few 
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wounded who had neither died nor crawled away, but continued to suffer’. 46 
Furthermore, Churchill criticised Kitchener’s failure to reissue the order given prior to 
the Battle of the Atbara that the enemy wounded should be spared.47 Churchill’s claims 
regarding the neglect of the enemy wounded are confirmed by Medical Officer Major 
Adamson’s description of his departure from Omdurman several days after the battle: 
‘The voyage is a horrible memory, at least the first day of it, for all along the river edge 
were dead or wounded dervishes, great vultures tearing at the corpses or waiting 
patiently for the wounded to die.’48 Wingate reported that ‘those who were too severely 
wounded to move from the battlefield were carried into the town by their relatives or 
friends and tended to in their own homes’.49 Wingate justified this neglect of the 
wounded claiming that it would have been ‘manifestly far beyond the capabilities of the 
military field hospitals’ to care for so many wounded.50 Henry Keown-Boyd has also 
argued that economic considerations and lack of personnel were ‘the nub of the matter’ 
and states that the ‘expedition’s budget had not allowed for any such contingency and to 
that extent the Sirdar did not bear the ultimate responsibility’.51 Furthermore, whilst he 
states that ‘it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Kitchener was indifferent to the 
fate of the wounded’, he argues that this indifference was directed ‘not only to the 
enemy wounded’52 and accuses Kitchener of a ‘disregard for the comfort and well-being 
of his own men’.53 Keown-Boyd therefore argues that ‘in many instances the most 
merciful treatment [the enemy] could expect would be a bullet or a swift thrust of the 
bayonet’.54 In attempting to comprehend the role of ordinary soldiers in extreme 
violence it is therefore important to consider the immense suffering of the rank-and-file 
in colonial campaigns. The conditions could be extreme and it appears that the British 
authorities did little to alleviate such situations. As Peter Burroughs has highlighted 
regarding ‘the balance sheet of imperialism’ it was ‘[a]s much a record of callous 
indifference to human suffering, incompetence in high places, and the wanton waste of 
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expendable cannon fodder as of bravery and honour, glory and self-sacrifice’,55 and 
therefore Kitchener’s apparent indifference to the suffering of his own men and the 
enemy wounded is less surprising.  
 Regarding the killing of the enemy wounded it is evident from accounts of the 
conflict that there were incidents in which the enemy wounded did attack Anglo-
Egyptian troops and G. F. Clayton stated: ‘the wounded would stick a spear into you if 
you were not careful’.56 However, as Bennett argued in his controversial article, ‘the 
actual instances in which our men have been injured by wounded Dervishes are, after 
all, extremely few in number, and in any case it does not seem fair, because of 
occasional acts of treachery on the part of individuals, to decree the slaughter of the 
wounded indiscriminately.’57 Furthermore, Bennett argued that the past behaviour of 
British troops in the Sudan was partially accountable for the violent actions of the 
wounded and stated that ‘The wounded Dervish has become dangerous because he fully 
expects to be killed’.58 In any case, such isolated incidents have little to do with the 
neglect of the wounded over a period of days, leaving them to die unaided in their 
thousands; it is clear that the killing and neglect of the wounded was not merely a 
matter of necessity and whilst General Neville Lyttelton claimed that the bayoneting of 
the wounded ‘had to be done’, he admitted that ‘some of the men thoroughly enjoyed 
this sort of work’.59 Adolf von Tiedemann, the German military attaché, was present at 
the battle and described the horrific injuries suffered by the enemy troops, as well as the 
killing of the wounded, although he also defended Kitchener’s campaign. Clearly 
‘lessons’ regarding colonial warfare could also be gained in this way and Tiedemann’s 
failure to condemn the actions suggests a consensus regarding the treatment of the 
enemy in and after battle.60 The indifference that British troops showed towards the 
wounded is evident in contemporary accounts of the battle; an example is an incident 
recalled by Lyttelton as he revisited the battlefield a few days after the Battle of 
Omdurman:  
I rode over the battlefield, a grisly sight. I saw two wounded Arabs who had 
been shot through both thighs and unable to walk. They were propelling 
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themselves along the ground in a sitting position with short sticks and left a 
conspicuous track in the sand. A day or two later after I came across the 
two just arriving in our lines, I should say nearly 3 miles from where I had 
first seen them.61  
It is curious that the enemy wounded were not helped after the British wounded had 
been attended to and accounts of the battle’s aftermath convey that British troops were 
able to revisit the battlefield over a number of days; nevertheless, it is clear that there 
was no concerted attempt to alleviate the horrendous suffering of the enemy wounded. 
Captain D. W. Churcher conveys a rare admission of failure in this regard: ‘The General 
and some of our officers rode over the battlefield this morning and say its [sic] a most 
awful sight, as there are a lot of men not dead yet, and the dead are in heaps. I saw quite 
enough on the 2nd and have no wish to go again, but I do think they might either have 
the wounded brought in or killed’.62 As Bennett stated, ‘the military surgeons were so 
numerous and the hospital arrangements so excellent that surely some help might have 
been afforded to the wounded wretches lying about the desert four miles away, after our 
comparatively trifling number of wounded had been carefully attended to.’63 However, 
this was not the case and British forces were swiftly withdrawn in the aftermath of 
Omdurman and a permanent garrison of a mere 250 men was subsequently set up.64 The 
motivation for the conduct of the Anglo-Egyptian troops needs further consideration; in 
the aftermath of the fighting, where thousands lay wounded, the fact that the British 
‘simply turned their backs and marched away’ may be explained by the effects of 
British propaganda, which were made clear by Churchill: ‘the unmeasured terms in 
which the Dervishes had been described in the newspapers, and the idea which had been 
laboriously circulated, of “avenging Gordon”, had inflamed [the soldiers’] passions, and 
had led them to believe that it was quite correct to regard their enemy as vermin - unfit 
to live’.65 Gordon’s death has been described as a ‘shock to racial pride’ in Britain.66 
There is no doubt that the memory of Gordon and the effectiveness with which his 
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‘revenge’ was impressed upon the troops had an impact on the actions of the British 
soldiers involved.  
 As mentioned above, at the forefront of the controversy regarding this battle was 
Bennett’s article, in which he made various accusations at Kitchener for the military 
conduct during the reconquest. With regards to the practice of killing the enemy 
wounded he wrote, ‘Any man who, after the killing and wounding of 26,000 Dervishes 
with the total loss to his own side of 500 casualties all told, was still unsatisfied and 
lusted after the blood of wounded men must be little better than a brute beast.’67 One 
soldier’s denial of Bennett’s claims presented a rather peculiar argument; after stating 
that Bennett’s claims were ‘clap-trap’ he continued: ‘I regret very much that we have 
not nearly exterminated all the Baggaras [tribesmen], only, unfortunately, they are 
endowed by Nature with strong knees, and many escaped.’68 Further controversy was 
created by Kitchener, who once again displayed his ruthless attitude with regard to his 
treatment of the Mahdi’s tomb which was targeted for destruction and the remains, 
except for the skull, thrown into the river. Kitchener’s orders caused so much 
controversy at the time that he was obliged to write directly to Queen Victoria 
explaining his actions, although as Daly has argued, ‘It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the arguments of safety and expediency were hastily contrived to 
answer unexpected criticism in Britain.’69 General Hunter assessed the situation thus:  
The Mahdi’s tomb was a splendid target and was hit in the centre of the 
dome at the third round. It is beautifully built of red brick and lime, and 
took some demolition. You are at liberty to assign any cause you please to 
its removal. We may say that so long as it stood it was a menace to our rule 
and an inducement to a revival of fanaticism. We may say that in its semi-
demolished state it was a danger to life and limb. Anyhow so long as it 
stood it was a conspicuous memorial to celebrate the Victory of the Savage 
over us, and now that it ceases to exist our disgrace may be forgotten.70 
Despite some public criticism of Kitchener, those who served under him were generally 
positive; Captain Alfred Edward Hubbard for example was highly complimentary 
regarding Kitchener and his campaign and stated that ‘I do not suppose that a better 
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organised campaign has ever been known in the history of warfare – Everything was 
carefully thought out and plan laid with the greatest prudence and forethought and with 
consummate skill….’71 However, such declarations of order conceal the realities of the 
battle and contradict the events of the day, for example regarding the ‘military folly’ of 
the charge of the 21st Lancers, which has arguably endured as the dominant image of the 
battle.72  
Bennett’s article also raised the issue of the proceedings on the night after the 
battle, which he described thus: ‘All that night Soudanese troops roamed at large about 
the city. All night long shots were being fired. What precisely happened nobody will 
ever know’.73 However, little attention has been paid to the actual events. It has been 
stated that whilst the ‘rest of the Army settled down along the roadways through the 
suburbs’, in the aftermath of the battle, ‘only Maxwell’s Brigade remained in the great 
enclosure to complete the establishment of law and order’.74 Egerton described the 
chaos that ensued: ‘We bivouacked amongst the suburbs … and the shooting all round 
was incessant, probably looting and a general repayment of old scores’, and he 
continues that ‘[t]hey captured four big Baggara Emirs next day, all severely wounded 
from the fight and shot them the next morning’.75 Egerton’s account conveys the 
anarchy that resulted throughout the evening after the battle:  
The noises, the screams of agony and terror, the shouting and the constant 
discharge of rifles and whistling of bullets in the city purlieus on either side 
of our bivouacs were somewhat disconcerting, but came no nearer, and 
apparently meant no harm to us.76  
Egerton explained these events as being a result of ‘semi-savage blacks [who] had come 
home again flushed with victory borne upon the tide of the Anglo-Egyptian success, and 
much hidden wealth was unearthed and many an old score was paid off in these 
moonlight hours’. 77  Lt. R. N. Smyth stated: ‘I believe the Sudanese raided and 
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slaughtered the night after the battle to a great extent. I am very glad. If I had my way 
every man we captured on the battle field should have been shot at once then and there, 
cold blood or not. If you had seen the condition of our dead you would have said the 
same.’78 However, these events were not only a result of the actions of the Sudanese 
troops and Colonel John Maxwell himself admitted his involvement in individual 
killings in private correspondence with Wingate almost ten years after the occurrence: ‘I 
have always considered a dead fanatic as the only one of his sort to extend any 
sympathy to – I am very sorry for them when dead! For this reason I quietly made away 
with a bunch of Emirs after Omdurman and I was very sorry for them after all was 
over’.79 Thus, it is clear that the Sudanese soldiers were not only permitted by the 
British forces to carry out acts of revenge on the local population, they were actively 
encouraged and British troops, including their own commander, took part. The evidence 
also suggests that the British forces deliberately targeted the Emirs; the Battle of the 
Atbara resulted in the deaths of all the Khalifa’s Emirs, aside from the elusive Osman 
Digna, whose role in the battle was limited and who once again escaped.80 As Ronald 
Lamothe has argued, Sudanese soldiers of the Egyptian army could also be motivated 
by vengeance as many of them had previously been enslaved by Baggara tribe members 
or had been captured by the Mahdists and forced to fight for the Khalifa; now that they 
had been captured by the Anglo-Egyptian forces they were able to ‘avenge’ the ‘“social 
death” they [had] suffered via the Baggara’. 81  Although, as Lamothe highlights, 
Sudanese soldiers enlisted into the Egyptian army prior to 1903 were also recruited ‘for 
life or until medically unfit for further service’.82  
 Based upon considerations of the conduct of Anglo-Egyptian troops in both the 
battles at the Atbara and in Omdurman it is clear that similar tactics were undertaken in 
each instance and included the killing and neglect of the wounded, as well as the killing 
of enemy troops who were attempting to surrender. Bennett argued in his article that 
whilst the deaths of 3,000 Mahdists were announced after the Battle of the Atbara, there 
was ‘practically no mention of the wounded’. This he links with the assertion that ‘It is, 
of course, an open secret that in all our Soudan battles the enemy’s wounded have been 
killed. The practice has, ever since the days of Tel-el-Kebir, become traditional in 
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Soudanese warfare’.83 Lt. Samuel Cox noted in his diary in the aftermath of the Atbara 
that the ‘enemy’s losses are estimated at 8,000 to 9,000, mostly killed, as they asked no 
quarter, and few prisoners were taken’.84 As mentioned above, Holt provides the figure 
of 4,000 wounded, but does not divulge how he arrives at this figure. Claims that the 
wounded at the Atbara were systematically killed were publicly disputed by Gatacre in 
particular, who described the ‘good feeling’ that was apparent in the aftermath of the 
battle between the wounded prisoners and the men in the British camp.85 Keown-Boyd 
has also claimed that whilst there was no official count of the enemy dead, this does not 
represent a cover up as the dead in Omdurman were ‘meticulously counted’.86 However, 
the failure to count the wounded at the Atbara does seem curious and eye-witness 
accounts make clear that the actual events regarding the treatment of the wounded and 
those willing to surrender does deviate from the official version. It has been claimed by 
’Ismat Hasan Zulfo that Kitchener sought deliberately to conceal the number of dead, 
fearing a backlash as a result of the Armenian massacres and also wanted to ensure that 
as many Mahdist troops as possible be killed to prevent them from regrouping in 
Omdurman.87 Keown-Boyd has claimed that some of the Mahdist wounded, ‘perhaps 
the luckier ones, were shot or bayoneted by the advancing troops’ and goes on to state 
that there ‘was nothing unusual about that and it had indeed been customary on both 
sides since the earliest days of the Mahdist revolt’.88 However, it is difficult to find 
accounts of the killing of the Anglo-Egyptian wounded by Mahdist forces; one example 
is Private Thomas Edwards’ recollections of the Battle of Tamai, which took place on 
13 March 1884. Edwards stated that ‘A dozen of them [enemy troops] just round me 
were engaged in spearing every wounded man of ours they came across’.89 It is 
nevertheless clear that prisoners of war were taken, as Egerton highlighted for example, 
‘Indeed, we had serving in the ranks at Omdurman some hundreds of men who had 
been taken prisoners at the Atbara in the previous April’.90 As Lamothe has highlighted, 
these men were ‘swiftly incorporated into the Sudanese battalions they had just met in 
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battle’.91 And at Omdurman there were also an alleged 38,000 enemy soldiers who were 
taken prisoner by the British, further adding to the post-battle chaos and as Churcher 
described: ‘There are thousands of dervish prisoners in a large enclosure close by, and 
the whole town is full of wounded men’.92 
 Firsthand accounts indicate that the Anglo-Egyptian practices being used 
throughout 1898 in the Sudan were already part of a pattern of violence, which had been 
apparent in earlier battles between the Anglo-Egyptian forces and the Mahdists; for 
example, as the following account suggests in reference to the Battle of Abu Klea on 17 
January 1885, which was part of the Gordon Relief Expedition:  
The square had been rushed and broken, and some of the fuzzi-wuzzies had 
penetrated it as far as the centre, but not one of them who went in got out. 
All were shot and bayoneted. Some feigned death and came to life again 
when they saw a chance of rising for a moment and killing a British soldier. 
No mercy was shown to them.93 
However, Private William Burge still expressed his relief that the enemy troops who 
had managed to escape ‘were allowed to go in peace’.94 However, Lt. Percy Marling 
described how, on the morning after the battle, he was part of a column that journeyed 
back to the water wells and states that ‘We repassed the battlefield on our right, where 
our dead were still lying unburied, and came across a lot of wounded [Mahdist soldiers] 
whom we shot at once’; the column then returned to the camp for breakfast.95 The 
extreme nature of this military campaign was clear from the beginning of the Dongola 
expedition which began on 7 June 1896 at the Battle of Firket, a key battle in the British 
occupation of Dongola; as one participant stated, Kitchener’s ‘object was not merely to 
drive the Dervish forces from [Firket]. For a purpose so limited a much smaller force 
than he had concentrated at Akasha would have sufficed. He meant to thoroughly break 
up, destroy, and make prisoners of [Emir] Hammuda’s force’.96 As further confirmation 
of the uncompromising approach that was to be taken at the beginning of the Dongola 
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campaign, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury suggested to Lord Cromer, Consul-General of 
Egypt, that ‘with search lights and a maxim gun you could prevent an enemy’s camp 
from supplying itself with water from the river – and so starve it out’.97 Major Farley 
recollected that fighting during the Dongola campaign was also conducted in an 
uncompromising manner as ‘no quarter [was] given or asked’ and that ‘many of them 
were only waiting the opportunity to surrender, an [sic] as they came out with hands in 
the air, they were duly put in the bag’.98 It has been described how ‘Hut after hut had to 
be cleared out at the point of the bayonet, and the nature of the resistance is shown by 
the fact that 80 Baggara corpses were found, after the battle, in one hut alone.’99 A. 
Hilliard Atteridge, a correspondent for the Daily Chronicle, described the fate of enemy 
soldiers at Firket who had tried to take ‘refuge on an island, from which a party of 
Sudanese were dislodging them’ and ‘Shots on the opposite shore told that our 
Friendlies were hunting down those who had crossed the Nile’.100 Escapees from the 
battle were persistently pursued, in accordance with Kitchener’s aims for this campaign 
and [t]he river bank and the border of the desert were strewn for miles with their 
dead’.101 Atteridge justified the actions of the expedition in Firket, claiming that ‘it must 
be remembered that this was not a case of villagers defending their homes’, and that it 
was ‘really a camp of brigands’;102 although he later conceded that a small number of 
women and children were amongst the dead and wounded.103 Atteridge also claimed 
that Surgeon-Captain Hunter went to the aid of the enemy wounded, although such acts 
of compassion appear to have been rare.104 A further practice that was conducted 
throughout this campaign was the burning of villages, which was also an integral 
component of British colonial warfare generally.105 In late 1897, Hunter wrote to 
Kitchener to inform him that on the return march to Berber he would be separating from 
the others to ‘burn [the] mosque, Digna’s houses and half the town and join the column 
later’.106 It has also been claimed that during the Dongola campaign, ‘The forts at 
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Shendy were destroyed, and the place burnt.’107 Churcher described how after Mahmud 
Ahmed (the Khalifa’s nephew and principal general)108 had left his headquarters in 
Shendy, prior to the battle at the Atbara, ‘the 18th Batt: Egyptian Infantry went up in 
gunboats and practically destroyed the place and burnt all Mahmoud’s stores’.109 
 Further brutality within the Dongola campaign is conveyed by the selectivity 
with which prisoners were taken, one account states that ‘500 of the less desperate 
characters’ were taken prisoner; in addition, at least 40 Emirs were ‘among the slain’.110 
Lt. Alford and Lt. Sword described the surrender of Mahdist troops thus: ‘most of the 
enemy had no fight left in them, in token of which they advanced holding up both hands 
over the head, and indicating by every means in their power that they were peaceably 
inclined’. Whilst these troops were put through ‘an examination before the Intelligence 
Staff’, ‘the Baggara who were routed out of the scrub resisted desperately; and as they 
persisted that Allah was on their side … and attempted to demonstrate the fact on their 
hearers, there was no alternative but to put them hors de combat’.111 With regards to the 
enemy wounded, it has been claimed that many were brought in from the battlefield, but 
the extent of British hospitality has been disputed: ‘we read in the papers that “it was a 
pleasant sight to see the English officers giving up their tents to the wounded Dervishes, 
and sitting in the sun whilst the latter were having their wounds dressed”’ and 
concluded that ‘It made us angry to read such nonsense’, although they then claimed 
that ‘the enemy were attended to in our hospital with as much care as our own wounded 
received’.112  
 In considering the motivations behind such a brutal approach to this campaign 
one must consider the conditions for the troops, for which Gatacre in particular seems to 
have been responsible in the lead-up to both the Atbara and Omdurman battles. Lt. 
Ronald Forbes Meiklejohn described that Gatacre’s approach, which included ‘barely 
articulate and alarmist speeches to the troops’113 made the men ‘thoroughly jumpy’ and 
claimed that his methods were responsible for an incident in the run up to the Atbara 
battle in which two men were bayoneted as a result of the overreaction of those on 
guard to a donkey wandering into the zariba in the middle of the night.114 Throughout 
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the ‘long hot summer’ of 1898 the British awaited the rise of the river to proceed with 
their final advance and Gatacre insisted upon the troops sleeping fully dressed and being 
ready for battle at any moment, and this included incessant ‘night alarms’ in the early 
hours,115 coupled with boredom, tedious drills, fatigues and marches throughout the 
day.116 The conditions for the troops were worsened further by Gatacre’s insistence that 
it be ‘a tee-total expedition’.117 Such difficult circumstances were heightened by the 
temperatures that the troops had to endure and, as Cox reported: ‘Very hot in the day, 
reporters not allowed to send temperatures home to papers, yesterday it was 115˚ in the 
shade.’ 118  Moreover, many soldiers suffered from dysentery and enteric fever 
throughout the summer leading to more deaths on the Anglo-Egyptian side than the 
Battle of the Atbara.119 Clayton described the frustration that resulted from Gatacre’s 
tactics and stated that as a result, ‘… everyone is longing to get at Mahmoud and smash 
him … It is very trying continually sleeping in ones clothes, especially ones boots, and 
we shall all be very glad to stop it [sic].’120  
Whilst in retrospect, the victory of the Anglo-Egyptian campaign may appear to 
have been inevitable, this was certainly not the case, despite Kiernan’s assertion that 
‘Perhaps an anachronistic kingdom, incapable of further development, could only end 
like this, in a sort of heroic suicide’;121 the troops were only too aware that the 
numerically superior Mahdia could prove victorious, in the correct circumstances. The 
Anglo-Egyptian forces had suffered a series of humiliating defeats against the Mahdists, 
notably the massacre of the Hicks Expedition in 1883, as well as the death of Gordon.122 
As Robert Lethbridge of the Northumberland Fusiliers later contemplated, if the Khalifa 
had attacked at night,  
our superiority of weapons would have counted for little and brute strength 
alone would have told, I don’t like to think what the result would have 
been. As it was, he did just what we wanted and attacked us at day-break 
and you know how we welcomed them.123 
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Or as Hunter condescendingly put it in the aftermath of Omdurman: ‘The tactics of the 
enemy have helped us. Poor devils, they tried to draw conclusions and they nearly hit 
the right one’.124 It was the thought of military action that kept the troops going. For 
example, Kitchener’s announcement of his intention to attack in April 1898 was met 
with a positive response:  
Only those who have experienced the hardships and privations of a 
campaign, can understand the almost electrical effect that an announcement 
of this description has on the troops. To feel that the campaign is nothing 
but a dreary course of incessant discomforts, without any apparent 
compensation, is wearying to body and mind.125  
The change to the troops’ morale was described as ‘magical’.126 Thus, the hardships 
suffered by the troops awaiting battle were to make them even more anxious for action, 
as Unsworth states: ‘each man resolved to make the Khalifa pay dearly, when he met 
him, for all the discomfort he had caused us, no matter how indirectly’.127 The fear that 
one would miss out on military action was often conveyed in letters home: for example, 
Captain S. Astell described his discontent regarding rumours of starvation amongst the 
Mahdist troops at the beginning of the campaign, although only insofar as this fact 
affected the chances of a thorough victory against the enemy: ‘We are growing weary, 
horrible rumours coming in that the Dervishes are starving, their allies deserting, so they 
may cave in and then we shall have borne the burden & heat of the day for nought’.128 
Such trying conditions were typical in colonial warfare and the following chapter 
discusses their contribution to the extreme nature of colonial campaigns. 
 The practice of looting, which was carried out by Anglo-Egyptian forces in the 
aftermath of the reconquest, also led to controversy. Looting appears to have been 
standard practice amongst the British in the Sudan, as indeed across the Empire, and 
even the resultant horrors of the Atbara conflict did not deter troops from returning to 
the battlefield, as H. P. Creagh-Osborne noted the following day: ‘Went into zariba to 
loot in [the] afternoon - a horrible sight.’129 Eyewitness accounts also demonstrate that it 
was the norm for war correspondents to partake in the looting of enemy corpses. Hunter 
                                                
124 Hunter, 14 October 1898, SAD/964/4. 
125 Alford and Sword, Egyptian Soudan, 210-11.  
126 Ibid., 210-11.  
127 Unsworth, 6 September 1898, SAD/233/5. 
128 Captain S. Astell, ‘Diary of Dongola Expedition 1896’, SRM BV/121.  
129 Creagh-Osborne, Diary Extracts, SAD/643/1. 
  163 
recounted an incident in which a wounded enemy soldier ‘jumped up among some press 
correspondents, and camp followers who were looting the dead’. 130  Hunter also 
expressed his annoyance that whilst most British troops camped on the outskirts of the 
town on the night after the Battle of Omdurman, ‘The cunning beggars, the blacks did 
nothing but loot the prettiest girls and best trophies to be had’.131 Furthermore, Farley 
recalled that war correspondents during the Dongola Expedition in 1896 were ‘well up 
with the fighting line and reaped a rich harvest in the way of loot’, later commenting 
that the correspondents had, again, gone ‘a looting’.132 Carleton, who would go on to 
fight in Sierra Leone, was also present at Dongola and wrote home to his sister: ‘I am 
sorry to tell you I have not secured as much loot as I would have liked … there is an 
order that all loot is to be handed in’.133 Hunter expressed the troops’ delight in the 
aftermath of the Battle of Omdurman and demonstrates the relationship between looting 
and further violence thus:  
we could now enjoy ourselves like boys ratting in a stack yard. And we did 
have an afternoon, poking into houses, in and out of narrow alleys, kicking 
down doors, forcing gateways, chasing devils all over the place, most 
surrendered, but we had to kill some 300 or 400.134  
Hunter thus reveals both the extent of the looting which took place and suggests the 
terror that was experienced by the local population in the wake of their ‘liberation’. As 
Bennett stated: ‘the ignorant villagers who were compelled to hand over their food to 
soldiers already abundantly supplied with all manner of stores could scarcely be 
expected to fully appreciate the blessings of British “protection.”’135 Clearly, looting 
was standard practice on the part of the Anglo-Egyptian forces and it accompanied their 
victories across the country.136 
As the victors entered Omdurman in the after of the battle in 1898, they were 
met by a city of desperate inhabitants due to food shortages; Steven Serels has argued 
that the swift victory at Omdurman was due in part to the ‘failure of the grain market’ 
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which brought famine, weakening both the Mahdist state and indigenous resistance to 
the Anglo-Egyptian campaign.137 That conditions were dire in the area is conveyed by 
Churcher’s encounter with a woman on the outskirts of Khartoum, prior to the Battle of 
Omdurman: 
so I rode up and found a woman looking fearfully emaciated with a dried up 
empty water skin, so I called up my groom and told him to give her water 
out of my water bottle he was carrying, and she simply lapped it down; the 
water soon revived her and I found out she had escaped from Kerreri near 
Khartoum and both her husband and son had been killed, but she had 
managed to run away.138 
Most commentators conveyed their disgust on arrival into Omdurman and Egerton 
described the city as ‘the conglomeration of mud huts, foul alleys, squalor and noisome 
smells’.139 However, unlike many other soldiers, Churcher also took the time to address 
the condition of the local population and described that a regiment had just left and in 
their wake: 
the ground [the regiment] occupied is covered in people, mostly women and 
children, grubbing for fragments of biscuits or any other food that the men 
may have left, and devouring it on the spot. They actually dig up the 
cookhouse refuse pits after they have been filled in, and gnaw the old 
bones. … even now there are crowds of emaciated looking creatures with 
hardly any clothes on, searching among the dust and stones for fragments. It 
makes one perfectly sick to see it, but one cannot do anything as we have 
only just enough food for ourselves.140 
However, on the evening after the Battle of Omdurman, British accounts contrast with 
the miseries suffered by the local population; for example, Hunter described how he 
was given ‘a mug of soup and a mug of the best champagne’, after which, he ‘slept till 
dawn like a top, after one of the best days I have ever passed’.141 Churcher claimed that 
the local population initially welcomed the British into Omdurman: ‘At 5.00pm we 
started again, the 2nd Brigade leading and marched right through the town of 
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Omdurman and all the natives cat-called and cheered us and pressed our legs, poor 
beggars, they were nearly all slaves and no doubt jolly glad to see us’.142 However, 
further misery was to come and Zulfo has argued that Kitchener’s orders which 
permitted the troops to plunder the Khalifa’s grain stores and houses soon became 
confused and were extended to the homes of the general population and he even states 
that deaths resulted as people tried in vain to defend their properties.143 In contrast, 
Babikr Badri claimed that the opening up of the Khalifa’s grain stores to the general 
population saved many Sudanese lives.144  
Firsthand accounts of the Battle of Omdurman make clear that troops observed 
the first moments of combat with fascination and contemporaries such as Bennet 
Burleigh described the conflict as ‘one of the most picturesque battles of the century’,145 
although such descriptions hide the reality of the resulting carnage. Many participants 
described the spectacle of the battle, for example, Franks stated:  
When one saw the whole enormous army marching straight onto us it gave 
a sort of indescribable thrill through one – a sort of mixture of excitement, 
admiration and awe. There is something in the very sight of such an 
overwhelming mass of men, miles and miles of men in masses that is 
extraordinarily awe inspiring.146  
Some troops also expressed admiration regarding the bravery of their enemy and 
Unsworth describes an incident in which a Mahdist leader ‘managed to get within 500 
yards of the zariba before he was shot down. He seemed to bear a charmed life and 
every one near me was so impressed by his valour’ and he concludes by stating: ‘I was 
sorry to see him fall for he was a brave man and no doubt had he reached the zariba he 
would have been treated with every consideration by our troops’; 147  although, 
Unsworth’s descriptions elsewhere demonstrate an indifference to the suffering of the 
thousands of dead and wounded enemy soldiers. Alford and Sword were only able to 
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articulate their admiration for the enemy through racist assumptions typical of the time: 
‘It is sad to think that men with such innate pluck should be such brutes’.148  
In his assessment of the Battle of Omdurman, Byron Farwell concluded that 
‘cool efficiency had triumphed over hot religious fanaticism’.149 Such a representation 
of the reconquest and the use of modern weaponry seeks to encourage the ‘civilised’ 
versus ‘barbaric’ dichotomy which was central to Britain’s violent and destructive 
imperial project. This dichotomy was also used by participants to try and understand 
their own feelings and reactions to these events: ‘One’s feelings are really quite unusual 
at such a time, and I take it all the old primeval savage blood left in our highly civilised 
bodies is asserting itself a bit.’150 The dialectic of ‘civilisation’ increasing ‘barbarism’ in 
the Sudan was also expressed by Kiernan in reference to Kitchener’s treatment of the 
Mahdi’s tomb: ‘Civilisation was learning something from barbarism, as well as the 
other way about’.151 That Western ‘civilisation’ remained on the precipice between 
‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’ was a common belief within the context of social 
Darwinism.152 Joanna Bourke argues that the dichotomisation of the ‘civilised’ versus 
‘barbaric’ in the context of warfare can be seen as part of an attempt to ‘encourage the 
fiction that the people being killed were not “really” human’.153 Trutz von Trotha has 
stated within the context of colonial and ‘total’ warfare that ‘Because of the strict 
ethnocentric opposition between “us” and “them”, the opponent tends morally to be no 
longer considered a member of the human race’. Furthermore, this indifference of the 
invading army to the suffering of the ‘enemy’, then ‘naturally’ extends to the 
vanquished population as a whole.154 The unfavourable views of the British soldiers 
towards the Mahdists were conveyed by Carleton, who demonstrated a typical lack of 
compassion for the enemy in a letter home to his sister during the Dongola campaign: ‘I 
have got a bad sore throat which I am convinced has been brought on by dead dervish. 
The worst time of day to smell them is at meals’, further speculating: ‘I wonder if all 
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dead people smell as bad as dead dervish. I fancy not’.155 Carleton went on to express 
similar disgust towards the ‘savage’ enemy in Sierra Leone, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.   
 When one reads accounts of the effects of British war tactics it is quite clear that 
they were anything but ‘civilised’; ‘cold’ British technology essentially turned the 
warfare into a one-sided massacre. As Bennett states: ‘Anyone who has seen the effects 
of shell fire – bodies ripped open, jaws torn off, and kindred horrors – may find it 
difficult to differentiate very markedly between accursed usages inseparable from every 
system of warfare, civilised and barbarous alike.’156 Churchill, who was highly critical 
of Kitchener in particular and the methods used by the Anglo-Egyptian forces more 
generally, described the opening scenes of the battle thus: ‘bullets were shearing 
through flesh, smashing and splintering bone; blood spouted from terrible wounds; 
valiant men were struggling on through a hell of whistling metal, exploding shells, and 
spurting dust – suffering, despairing, dying’.157 The idea of the Mahdist ‘fanatic’ was 
clearly a political tool used to justify the campaign, as soon became evident on the 
battlefield; as Edward Spiers has highlighted: ‘The more perceptive recognised that this 
was not an unruly mass of fanatics, but an organised army’.158 Representations of the 
war as cold and distant through modern technology are significant and typical of a 
broader pattern of Eurocentrism that emphasises the ‘civilised’ methods of Western 
powers in comparison to ‘savage’ African tribes; thus underplaying the real nature of 
modern warfare. Churchill summed up the conflict thus: as ‘probably the most signal 
triumph ever gained by the arms of science over Barbarians’.159 Steevens provided a 
revealing portrayal of the Battle of the Atbara:  
in one superb sweep, near 12,000 men moved forward towards the enemy. 
All England and all Egypt, and the flower of the black lands beyond, 
Birmingham and the West Highlands, the half-regenerated children of the 
earth’s earliest civilisation, and grinning savages from the uttermost 
swamps of Equatoria, muscle and machinery, lord and larrikin, Balliol and 
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Board School, the Sirdar’s brain and the camel’s back––all welded into one, 
the awful war machine went forward into action.160  
Steevens’ description suggests that the Anglo-Egyptian army represented a bringing 
together of ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’ warfare; Kiernan described the methods undertaken 
by the Mahdists in the form of ‘[m]ass charges’, as ‘the final spasms of a dying order’: 
as Kiernan highlighted, such tactics were finally laid to rest as a result of their 
devastating results in World War I.161 Vinay Lal highlights, within a discussion on 
colonialism and genocide, the importance of the ‘immense disparities of power’ and 
emphasises the British Empire’s ‘disequilibrium in military strength’ against colonial 
opponents, arguing that ‘The loving lyricism with which Churchill describes the battle 
of Omdurman … should obscure neither the terrible tedium experienced by Kitchener’s 
men nor the moral lessons drawn from this conflict by European observers’. This 
‘tedium’ Lal links with the bureaucratisation of killing in reference to the work of 
Hannah Arendt, and states that ‘the moral distancing that takes place when pulling the 
trigger and the filing of papers become tasks akin to one another’.162 However, such a 
view, comparing the slaughter of Omdurman with the role of Schreibtischtäter 
underplays the importance of the realities of face-to-face killing. The latter was very 
much a part of the reconquest campaign (as well as the Holocaust), and also featured in 
the final battle at Omdurman, notably as a result of the ‘gallant but reckless charge’ of 
the 21st Lancers, which ‘accounted for nearly half of the Anglo-Egyptian fatalities at 
Omdurman’.163 The importance of face-to-face killing within modern European warfare 
has been reemphasised by Joanna Bourke who argues the need to ‘put the killing back 
into military history’.164 As Eric Weitz has also highlighted, new technologies ‘by no 
means eliminated face-to-face brutality’.165  
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 Scholars have previously highlighted contradictory aspects of the British 
Empire, emphasising the ideological nature of such European categorisations as 
‘civilised’ and ‘barbaric’. 166  As Kiernan has argued, the central justification of 
European colonialism, the ‘civilising mission’, represented ‘a feeling that expansion 
ought to have some ideal purpose, a goal beyond sordid greed’.167 However the 
‘civilising mission’ was based upon the premise that ‘Whatever a white man did must in 
some grotesque fashion be “civilised”’.168 That the British soldiers perceived their role 
as a wider part of this ‘mission’ is clear from the accounts of participants in the 
reconquest; for example, as conveyed by Unsworth’s concluding remarks regarding the 
Battle of Omdurman: 
It was a great day and I do not think I ever saw so much happiness and so 
much misery all together – for we released thousands and thousands of 
people but also we killed and wounded thousands and thousands of these 
horrid cruel Baggaras and now perhaps there will be a long peace for this 
miserable country which is in these parts nothing but an immense tangled 
jungle full of wild beasts.169  
British soldiers were able to comprehend their role in mass slaughter as a ‘necessity’ 
and this belief was informed by their understanding of the ‘barbarity’ of the ‘natives’. 
As E. W. C. Sandes argued: ‘Vast territories were thereby re-opened to the benefits of 
peace, civilisation and good government’, however, his following statement was more 
to the point: ‘The death of Charles Gordon was avenged, and British prestige 
reinstated’.170 One participant in Omdurman justified his role in the slaughter thus: 
‘Well, I think it has been a war in a righteous cause, as the barbarities of these 
Dervishes put your pet Armenian Atrocities quite in the shade.’171 The case of the 
reconquest demonstrates the contradictory nature of European colonial conflicts and the 
selectivity of the colonial invaders, which Kiernan fittingly calls ‘the peculiar imperial 
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squint’.172 The hypocrisy with which Europeans labelled the ‘civilised’ and the ‘savage’ 
was in evidence during the reconquest and the methods used by the British clearly 
contradicted their justifications for invading the country in the first place, as their 
conduct was anything but ‘civilising’. As Bourke argues, ‘The words “civilisation and 
barbarism” were the great watchwords of the nineteenth century … the barbaric has 
taken up residence in the house of the civilised. Indeed, it never left it.’173 
In order to understand the brutal policies directed at both the Mahdists and 
Sudanese civilians one has to turn to the racial prejudices and superiority complexes 
prevalent in Britain and throughout its Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Racism was highly important to justifications for British imperialism and was clearly 
utilised during the campaign. Such racism extended to war correspondents, for example 
Burleigh, in a classic, easily-replicated assertion, stated, ‘Your Arab is picturesque but 
poisonous’ and concludes, ‘He dislikes steady, hard work, is a dreamer with a deeply 
religious tinge, but all the same cruel and remorseless in the pursuit of any object’.174 
Prejudices are also evident in the accounts of many soldiers and correspondents who 
could not hide their disgust at what awaited them in the aftermath of the Battle of 
Omdurman. As one soldier recounts: ‘the accursed place was left to fester and fry in its 
own filth and lust and blood. The reek of its abomination steamed up to heaven to 
justify us of our vengeance’.175 As Daly has highlighted: ‘That a sprawling and 
populous city, hours after its bombardment and occupation by an invading army, host to 
thousands of the wounded and dying who had escaped the carnage of the battlefield, 
should offend the aesthetic and moral senses of war correspondents may be 
surprising.’176 Furthermore, many accounts expressed both disgust and fascination 
regarding the indigenous peoples; particularly targeting the female population. For 
example, as Farley travelled through the country, he commented that ‘all along the 
waters [sic] edge raced a horde of half-demented women, completely naked except for a 
girdle of “boot-lace fringe” and ululuing us frantically’. 177  Alford and Sword 
summarised the female population of Dongola as being ‘appallingly hideous’, whilst 
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considering the male population ‘exceptionally handsome’.178 With regards to their 
fellow troops, it was stated that: 
One regiment of blacks was bivouacking opposite the spot where our boats 
were moored, so that we had ample opportunity of studying them. They 
were just like children, with their incessant chatter, in their honest 
simplicity and love of fun.179 
As Gustav Jahoda has highlighted, the preoccupation with these themes was typical of a 
wider European racism in the nineteenth century and perceptions of the indigenous 
peoples of the colonies and this thinking contributed to the invading troops’ ability to 
distinguish themselves from the indigenous populations and prevent them from being 
viewed as fellow human beings.180 Alex Hinton argues that debates regarding the 
‘savage nature’ of the indigenous populations were presented through ‘stage theory, 
which posited “savages” at the bottom of the hierarchy leading to “civilisation”’. Within 
this way of thinking, ‘the “civilised” were responsible for helping these “child-like”, 
“uncultivated”, “irrational” beings to “progress”’.181 As Hinton states, this hierarchy led 
to a series of binary oppositions, which ‘buttressed colonial policies that, while aimed 
primarily at economic exploitation and territorial aggrandisement, could be legitimated 
in terms of the “white man’s burden”’;182 thus upholding the logic of European 
imperialism and its self-assigned ‘civilising mission’. One aspect of racial categorising 
was the advocacy throughout the British Empire of ‘martial races’ and as Lamothe 
argues, informed by this way of thinking, the British often viewed Sudanese soldiers as 
preferable to Egyptian soldiers; looking to the future, Wingate viewed the Sudanese as a 
‘martial race’ and saw the Sudanese battalions as having great potential for employment 
throughout the British Empire.183 These racial categories were also encouraged by 
military figures key to the British imperial project, including Wolseley, whose career 
spanned the Indian Mutiny and warfare against the Zulus and Ashanti, the annexation of 
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Egypt after Tel-el-Kebir and then to the Sudan in an attempt to relieve Gordon.184 In his 
article ‘The Negro as a Soldier’, Wolseley argued that  
the natural instinct of the savage from the interior of Africa went far to 
make up for his want of intelligence as a soldier. The instinct of some 
breeds of dogs—the setter, pointer, and retriever—renders it easy to teach 
them their special work, which other species, though equally intelligent, 
cannot be effectively taught.185 
Key figures such as Wolseley, Gatacre and Kitchener who were present throughout the 
British colonial campaign in the Sudan represented a link between this and other 
campaigns. Such individuals are important regarding our understanding of a wider 
pattern of colonial violence throughout the Empire and their role in the continuance and 
development of British colonial brutality needs further investigation.  
 The British military clearly had a general contempt for the country and its 
inhabitants, although as Lamothe has argued, relations between British and Sudanese 
troops were marked by a complex dynamic, which ‘rather than being non-existent or 
exclusively racist, [was] marked by both respect and disdain’.186 However, special 
attention was paid to the Baggara tribesmen who were seen as ‘fierce, war-like, vicious 
and treacherous’187 and were described by Wingate as the ‘Red Indians of the Sudan’.188 
Franks stated in relation to the enemy having been pursued into the desert:   
I don’t see how the infantry can possible escape [sic], and I fancy those 
who don’t die will drift in and give themselves up. Except of course the 
[Baggara], who for an excellent reason are not at all likely to come in. A 
[Baggara] is looked upon as equivalent to a mad dog out here. He is the 
man who has laid desolate and de-populated all this country which was 
once prosperous and full of people … Destroyed and ruined those districts 
and butchered men, women and children and revelled in horrors of the most 
awful description. So he carries his own death warrant in his name.189  
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This viewpoint appears to have been shared by many Sudanese soldiers, as The Times 
correspondent E. F. Knight argued, ‘They hate the Baggara, for very good reasons, and 
were they not carefully kept in hand would give the men of that tribe no quarter, and 
would kill the wounded outright, regarding them, and rightly so, as noxious reptiles’.190 
Franks made it quite clear that whilst the Baggara could not expect mercy if they tried 
to surrender, the ‘Blacks’ would be welcomed as they ‘make very fine soldiers in our 
Black regiments. We had a lot of Firkah captives fighting gallantly for us yesterday’.191 
Acts of revenge seem to have been encouraged and condoned by the British; Keown-
Boyd claims that during an attack prior to the Atbara battle on 25 March, troops were 
despatched to attack Mahmud’s headquarters at Shendy ‘the object being not only to 
destroy the place and its small garrison but to hamper Mahmud’s line of retreat and 
further demoralise his army by capturing their women and other belongings’.192 In the 
aftermath of Omdurman, Lethbridge claimed that ‘There was no resistance to speak of 
in the town, because part of the army had rushed back to the town during the night and 
the Yaalins [sic] amongst them, seeing the way the fight was going, turned and 
slaughtered the Baggaras and other Dervishes’.193 The British were keen to exploit local 
tensions in their utilisation of divide and rule strategies. Not only were Sudanese 
soldiers recruited into the Egyptian army because they were ‘widely regarded as the best 
fighting material in the region’, it was also the case that ‘they had come to represent a 
military gain or loss in a zero-sum game taking place between the Egyptian Army and 
Mahdist forces’.194  
 A further demonstration of the inconsistent approach of British colonialism can 
be found in Britain’s experimentation with new and controversial weaponry during the 
reconquest, including the use of lyddite shells,195 which proved to be devastatingly 
effective, particularly against the basic weapons of spears and ill-maintained rifles of 
the Mahdists. As Burleigh stated, ‘there was to be a new cartridge case for the 
Omdurman campaign’, which was known as the ‘man-stopper’.196 The contradictory 
nature of British colonial policies is made clear by the use of dum-dum bullets and the 
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debates which ensued; explosive bullets had already been banned as a result of the St. 
Petersburg Declaration in 1868, a decision that was justified on the grounds that 
… the progress of civilisation should have the effect of alleviating, as much 
as possible, the calamities of war; that the only legitimate object which 
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
force of the enemy; that for this purpose, it is sufficient to disable the 
greatest number of men; that this object would be exceeded by the 
employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled 
men, or render their death inevitable.197   
The use of these bullets, it was concluded, was contrary to ‘the laws of humanity’.198 
However, in the aftermath of the Chitral conflict in 1895, British authorities advocated 
the use of explosive bullets in colonial warfare. This usage was justified in Britain with 
typically racist arguments regarding the ‘nature’ of ‘savages’, as Spiers explains: ‘The 
enemies whom Britain encountered were not armies from the European countries who 
had signed the St. Petersburg Declaration, but “fanatical natives”, “savages”, and 
“barbarians”’.199 It seems that concerns regarding this deviation from the declaration 
had more to do with fears that explosive bullets would later be used in European 
warfare, rather than any moral objection to their utilisation in the colonies.200 For 
example, whilst Professor Friedrich von Esmarch expressed his horror regarding the 
effects of these bullets, he conceded that their use might be excusable in a war with 
‘fanatical barbarians’.201 Furthermore, justifications for the use of the illegal bullets 
turned to racist arguments such as the following: ‘Civilised man is much more 
susceptible to injury than savages ... the savage, like the tiger, is not so impressionable, 
and will go on fighting even when desperately wounded’.202 Such arguments were 
typical at the time and can be seen as part of the ‘scientific’ racism of the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, which appeared to be given credence through endorsements by 
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members of the medical profession. As Mark Levene describes, the British were 
successful in their objections to the criminalisation of the bullets at the Hague 
Convention in 1899, based on the heretofore mentioned argument that ordinary bullets 
were inadequate in a colonial context; evidently the British saw their one-sided victory 
in the Sudan as justification for the use of this brutal means of warfare.203 As Kiernan 
put it, they were left ‘to be used against wild animals or wild men.’204 To be sure, 
Gatacre was so intent on utilising the effects of explosive bullets against the Mahdists 
that he ordered his men to file the tips off their ammunition to give them the same effect 
as a dum-dum bullet, as Meiklejohn recalled: ‘The General [Gatacre] says that our 
bullets have not got sufficient “stopping power” for savages, so we are to file off the 
tops to make them expand’205 and as one soldier concluded: ‘we have just finished the 
last box to-day; so that is 300 boxes of Dum Dums for Fuzzy Wuzzy to stomach’.206  
The concept of ‘civilised warfare’ is important to our understanding of the 
prejudice with which the British engaged in colonial wars; such conflicts were 
underpinned by imperial ideology which presented the indigenous population as 
‘barbaric’ and ‘inferior’ and thus not subject to the same ‘standards’ of European 
warfare; hence the development of weaponry purely designed for use in the colonies.207 
As Alex Bellamy explains, ‘societies had to fulfil the “standards of civilisation” in order 
to enjoy the protection of civilised rules. If they did not, they fell outside the moral 
order’.208 Geoffrey Best has argued that there was an expectation that the ‘progress of 
civilisation’ would lead to ‘less inhumanity in warfare’. However, this optimism was 
unfounded and ‘From St Petersburg to The Hague it was downhill all the way’.209 The 
use of explosive bullets highlights the different standard between colonial warfare and 
‘civilised’ European wars.210 The distinction that the British troops made between 
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themselves and the ‘natives’ is in evidence both in the tactics they used, and throughout 
their diaries and correspondence.  
 Bennett discussed the moral basis of Kitchener’s military tactics and considered 
the extent to which British military exploits were subject to international law. Bennett 
argued that Britain remained morally bound to laws such as the Geneva Convention of 
1864, which included the protection of the enemy wounded, even if imperial wars were 
not being fought against signatories of the legislation.211 In the context of the Zulu War, 
Mark Lieven has demonstrated how ‘genocide came close to being adopted as official 
policy’ by the British, in the face of defeat.212 Lieven’s article shows how practices such 
as the killing of wounded enemy soldiers were already being used extensively and 
considers the development of these practices as part of ‘the logic of European 
imperialism’.213 In relation to the contravention of official standards of warfare, Bennett 
stated:  
To assert that because Dervishes or Zulus never signed the Geneva 
Convention or the Projet of the Brussels Conference we are at liberty to 
pillage their villages after surrender or to kill their unarmed wounded is 
simply monstrous.214  
Interestingly however, Bennett privately sought to remove himself from the article in a 
letter dated 2 March 1899 to Slatin. Bennett explained that he had been approached ‘by 
one of our greatest international lawyers and a prominent member of our House of 
Commons to write an article on the conditions of warfare which exist in conflict’ and 
stated that his ‘only wish was to indicate how absurd it was to make international rules 
about warfare which none of the nations of Europe even keep’215 and that ‘[t]he whole 
drift of the article has been to a great extent misunderstood and misrepresented’.216 
Bennett’s private withdrawal from an article so strong in content is peculiar; however, it 
does not appear that he tried to distance himself from the article publicly and his book 
published the same year also supports the views which were articulated in his article; he 
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argued in reference to the massacre of the enemy wounded that, ‘It is worth 
remembering, too, that the mutilation of the human body is not the exclusive monopoly 
of barbaric peoples’.217 Whilst Bennett was certainly more sympathetic than most 
contemporary observers, he too expressed contradictory views regarding British 
colonial warfare. On the one hand, Bennett had the prescience to state that,  
Sorrow is the same the world over and the terrific carnage of the day’s 
fighting had taken away the bread-winner and protector from thousands of 
poor homes in the Sudan, and doomed many a household to starvation.218  
On the other hand, he justified the reconquest thus ‘Mahdism has vanished, never to 
return, and once more the arms of Great Britain have advanced the cause of civilisation 
and “made for righteousness” in the history of the century’.219 Regardless of Bennett’s 
possible regrets with reference to his publications, there is clearly evidence to support 
key aspects of his claims and the debate that ensued proved instructive. For example, 
Charles à Court responded to the article, stating that it was ‘a confused jumble of 
hearsay evidence, upon which no one would hang a dog, mixed up with twaddle 
concerning international law, which has nothing to do with a savage tribe which was 
neither a nation nor had any law’.220 For some, the idea of indigenous populations in the 
colonies being protected by the same laws as Europeans was incomprehensible. 
Burleigh, who was also present at the battle as a war correspondent, strongly refuted 
Bennett’s claims regarding the slaughter of the wounded, as well as the occurrence of 
looting in the battle’s aftermath. Burleigh argued that ‘To set up a pretext that such 
monsters are entitled to the grace and consideration of the most humane laws, is to 
beggar commonsense and yap intolerable humbug’, and continues ‘Yet British self-
respect was such, Mr Bennett to the contrary notwithstanding, that the Dervishes were 
treated as men, and not as wild beasts’.221  
 Historians have previously identified the exploitation of the famine conditions of 
the local population in the country as early as the 1880s on military and political 
grounds; famine conditions were created in the country by the drought and low Nile of 
1888222 and Holt has made clear the political importance of the ensuing famine. Holt 
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describes how the local tribes in the Tūkar district hoped for the restoration of Egyptian 
rule with the decline of Mahdist power in the area, and has argued that ‘At this time 
trade with local tribes was proceeding through Suakin and the import of grain was to 
some extent alleviating the hardships caused by famine. The military authorities were 
strongly opposed to this policy, as it amounted to feeding the enemy. The political 
authorities thought differently, since it was desired to win over the Mahdia’.223 
However, as Mike Davis summarises, Kitchener – with ‘cruel genius’ – ‘simply ignored 
his civilian superiors and cut off the food supply to eastern Sudan. The tribes starved 
and Kitchener won easy fame defeating the remnants of the jihad at Turkar in February 
1890.’224 Serels highlights the disparity between British and Mahdist supplies, which 
the British used to their advantage to curtail Mahdist military successes. In contrast, the 
British could rely on unlimited Egyptian and international resources.225 Hence, ‘The 
benefits of food insecurity’ had been recognised in the 1880s and 1890s226 and were 
used against the Mahdist state, as ‘part of a process that stripped victim communities of 
their resources and that resulted in a recurring, inter-generational cycle of famine and 
food insecurity.’227  
Clearly, the famine conditions in the country were further worsened for the 
general population by the reconquest and the Mahdist army also frequently raided towns 
to support their war effort. However, if these forces were subsequently defeated by 
Anglo-Egyptian troops, everything that was left behind was viewed by the British as the 
spoils of war and was not returned to the local community, thus making no attempt to 
alleviate the plight of the local population.228 As Wingate reported in 1897, the Mahdist 
force based in Metemmeh was  
living entirely on the grain obtained by foraging parties on both banks. For 
this purpose Mahmud had 14 nuggers plying between Shabluka and 
Kitayab seizing grain supplies in the villages. … It is the custom of the 
villagers to secrete a reserve of grain by burying it in the ground, and 
gradually these supplies are being unearthed by the foraging parties and 
brought in, whilst the unfortunate villagers, to escape the depredations of 
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the Baggara horsemen and Jehadia, have huddled together on the numerous 
islands in the neighbourhood, and are suffering great privations.229  
Hence, the local population were caught in the middle and suffered greatly as a result of 
the conflict. In order to stave off the Mahdists across the riverbank, the British provided 
‘a liberal supply of firearms to natives’230 and disarmament would later prove to be ‘a 
long and difficult task’ for the new government under the Condominium Agreement231 
and contributed to the development of ‘a state of anarchy’ in certain areas of the country 
in the aftermath of the reconquest.232 Clearly, Kitchener at the very least, exploited the 
scarcity of food to his advantage against the enemy and it seems that he was well aware 
that many of the Mahdist troops were starving in the lead up to the Battle of the 
Atbara.233 Furthermore, reports on the battle make clear that one military tactic was to 
drive the enemy into the desert to ‘perish’.234 The presence of the Anglo-Egyptian 
troops was also a burden upon the local population as they were put under pressure to 
provide food for the troops and little sympathy was shown if supplies were not 
forthcoming. Hunter complained about the local population’s behaviour in Berber in 
1897 and stated: ‘The dervishes plundered a good deal, but I have no doubt that the 
scum of Berber had a good look in too. The Sirdar made a contract for 1000 ardebs of 
doora [sic] divided amongst certain Sheikhs.’ He goes on to complain that ‘Up to date, 
not one grain has been delivered [from 1000 previously], nor is there any sign of it 
coming, nor is there any intention on the part of the sheikhs to deliver it, nor did any 
such intention exist in their minds when they signed. Such is my firm opinion.’ As 
punishment, he stated that ‘Failing immediate compliance with the orders, I propose to 
seize their property and send them for disposal, after flogging them here, to the 
Sirdar.’235 However, it is clear that the city of Omdurman was under great strain with 
regards to food supplies, a situation that was worsened by the presence of an ‘army of 
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some 50,000 in and around Omdurman [which] had to be fed, not to speak of the 
civilian population.’236  
 The Anglo-Egyptian campaign was presented as one of liberation for the 
Sudanese, as Burleigh’s following claim makes clear: ‘the rehabilitation of the country 
through the setting up of just government will be in the nature of discharging a duty 
long incumbent on Great Britain’.237 Alford and Sword stated in the aftermath of the 
Anglo-Egyptian victory in Dongola that ‘effectual steps were made to morally reclaim 
the province’, although they failed to recognise the suspect method of trying to achieve 
this aim by placing ‘The whole country … under military law’.238 In response to the dire 
condition of the lands they claimed that it ‘had been allowed by its wretched inhabitants 
to go almost out of cultivation, and to relapse into desert. They had preferred to remain 
idle rather than sow for the Dervish to reap and had only cultivated little patches 
sufficient for their own use’, however ‘under the new order of things, they not only 
provide for their own use, but cultivate large areas for export purposes’;239 the extent to 
which this was beneficial and ‘liberating’ to the local population is however 
questionable. Despite the devastation wrought throughout the surrounding area, 
Kitchener concluded that the Dongola expedition had resulted in the end of ‘constant 
Dervish raids and attacks on the villages … and to relieve, to their intense delight, the 
large suffering population of the Province of Dongola from the barbarous and tyrannical 
rule of savage and fanatical Baggaras’.240  
 One aspect of oppression that the British emphasised was the Mahdists’ support 
of slavery in the Sudan.241 However, as Daly has pointed out, the Condominium 
Agreement created by the Anglo-Egyptians to establish a new government in the 
country went out of its way to ‘prohibit trade in slaves, not slavery itself’. 242 
Furthermore he states that due to the problem of a labour shortage, the Condominium 
adopted ‘a pragmatic policy that decried slavery, took some steps to root out the trade, 
but simultaneously upheld and even enforced the continuation of domestic slavery’.243 
As Serels has highlighted, the number of slaves in the Sudan at this time is difficult to 
determine as ‘Junior officials were explicitly instructed by their superiors not to use the 
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term “slave” in any official correspondence’; as he highlights, ‘Senior Anglo-Egyptian 
officials had good reason to hide their activities because, under their watch, tens of 
thousands of slaves were imported into Northern Nilotic Sudan each year’.244 Britain’s 
approach to slavery in the Sudan in the nineteenth century was typically contradictory; 
on the one hand, the trading of slaves between Egypt and the Sudan was viewed as 
‘vivid proof that, without British vigilance, Egypt would relapse into despotism’,245 and 
on the other, Britain did very little to make abolition feasible. In Omdurman the new 
administration was now responsible for thousands of starving inhabitants, including the 
38,000 prisoners that were taken in the battle, as well as the families of the 11,000 
Mahdist soldiers who were killed and the 4,000 that had fled with the Khalifa in the 
battle’s aftermath. However, as Serels argues, ‘Anglo-Egyptian officials were unwilling 
to provide free grain subsidies to the large dependent civilian population and, beginning 
in December 1898, starving war captives and their families were put to work’, building 
Kitchener’s vision for ‘the new Anglo-Egyptian capital, turning productive farms into 
building plots, roads, the Governor’s Palace, Gordon Memorial College, and houses of 
worship’.246  
 Correspondence from Wolseley, author of The Soldier’s Pocket-Book for Field 
Service, was notably lacking in humanitarian sentiment and he demonstrated his disdain 
for the region in his correspondence. Writing to Slatin, Wolseley expressed his regrets 
regarding his time in the country thus: 
At one time I lived in the hope of being able to destroy every vestige of the 
Mahdi’s town, and no one can know better then you do how nearly that 
wish was realised. … I rejoice to think that you are no longer compelled to 
live amongst savages and that you have come home safe....247  
M. G. Talbot’s comments to Wingate, in the aftermath of the Battle of the Atbara in the 
area of Korti, demonstrate the negative effects of the occupation:  
We’ve got in most of the dura [sic]. I fancy we’ve skimmed them pretty 
well. I hope they will have enough left for seed. In most places I fancy they 
                                                
244 Serels, ‘Feasting on Famines’, 205-207.  
245 Eve M. Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism: Egypt, Great Britain, and the Mastery of the 
Sudan (London: University of California Press, 2003), 3.  
246 Serels, ‘Feasting on Famines’, 191-92. For a discussion of the complicated relationship between Egypt 
and the Sudan, and the former as a ‘colonised coloniser’, see: Troutt Powell, A Different Shade of 
Colonialism, 6. Osterhammel, Europe, 27.  
247 Wolseley to Slatin, 25 August 1895, SAD/439/599. 
  182 
are alright [sic], but I believe the requisition has fallen hardly on some 
districts. I am sending them in to Omdurman pretty often and expect a good 
many refugees now.248  
Clearly little was done to improve the situation as Talbot’s update to Wingate the 
following year demonstrates: ‘People live upon water nuts and are dying in large 
numbers. No dura [sic] there and very sad especially as it is all due to the Khalifa 
having been allowed to stop where he is. Grain is still very dear here, and there doesn’t 
seem to be any prospect of its getting cheaper.’249 Thus, it is clear that the reconquest 
was not undertaken to benefit the local population and after victory, Kitchener went on 
to administer the country to the detriment of its inhabitants: for example the renewed 
famine in the country in the years 1898-9 was further exacerbated by the arrival of 
government officials who cornered the market, thus pushing up the prices; the 
appropriation of camels which would usually have been used to bring grain to the 
markets, were now employed in brick carrying for Kitchener’s building designs; 
Kitchener even claimed that the famine helped in acquiring cheap labour for the 
building of new infrastructure and allegedly stated, ‘The natives around Goz Abu Guma 
are starving ... and you can get as many as you like for a handful of dhurra a day’.250 
Kitchener’s priority was clearly the building of the new city.251 With regard to the 
exploitation of local labour for the building of the railway, as proposed by Kitchener, it 
was stated that ‘The great advantage of his proposal is that the line, if made at once, 
would be practically made by corvée labour’, arguing that in any case the line would be 
built at some stage and ‘could never be made nearly as cheaply as at present’.252 
Clearly, Kitchener took little action to alleviate the dire conditions throughout the 
country and he also expressed his belief that the famine conditions would be of help in 
capturing the Khalifa,253 who had been on the run since the British took Omdurman and 
was killed during the Battle of Umm Diwaykarāt on 24 November 1899, in which, 
‘Once again the machine-guns won the day’.254 Although, as Daly highlights, Wingate, 
who was to become both the new Sirdar and General-Governor of the Sudan, ‘was 
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never to forget that militant Mahdism had been beaten down, it had not given up … and 
that more than Maxim guns would be needed to win the battle for the respect of the 
Sudanese’.255 The country was therefore to be ruled vigilantly and severely under the 
Condominium; nevertheless, British propaganda continued to take a tone of ‘glowing 
self-congratulation’, arguing the ‘benefits’ of the reconquest for the Sudanese.256  
With Britain’s renewed efforts to defeat the Mahdia in 1896, the treatment of the 
local population had already proven to be severe; a Sheikh, who had assisted Digna 
largely in the matter of supplies was tried by summary court martial and initially 
sentenced to death, although Kitchener then commuted this sentence to five years’ 
imprisonment; it was stated that this harsh sentencing was believed to have ‘produced a 
profound and salutary impression on the district.’ Furthermore, the Gemilab tribe was 
then informed that ‘his ultimate treatment might largely depend upon their 
behaviour’.257 Serels has also conveyed the harsh treatment meted out to inhabitants on 
the frontier prior to the campaign; for example in 1889 amidst the famine Anglo-
Egyptian military officers found that two merchants at Wadi Halfa, ‘Abd al-Jabar 
Amwad and Ibrahim Muhammad, were selling supplies to a Mahdist expedition and 
were subsequently executed.258 Scholars have also described a minor disturbance in 
1899, which involved two of the Mahdi’s sons and one of his Khalifa’s, Muhammad 
Sharif, in which three members of the Egyptian Army were injured. In the aftermath the 
three men were put under house arrest until they were tried by court martial; they were 
found guilty and subsequently shot. As Peter Clark states, ‘Even the Khalifa had 
restrained himself from shedding the blood of the Mahdi’s family. But there was no 
public response or protest’.259 It is therefore clear that Kitchener was determined to rule 
harshly, ‘fearing that any leniency might be interpreted as weakness’.260 
The current historiography does acknowledge the controversies that arose in the 
aftermath of the reconquest to some extent; comparisons of the conflict have even been 
made with Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf in 1991.261 In Spiers’ reappraisal of the 
reconquest, he briefly acknowledges the killing of the wounded, and limits these 
occurrences to the actions of soldiers who ‘followed orders and bayoneted those 
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feigning injury or those injured who still posed a threat’.262 Whilst he references 
Bennett’s article denouncing this policy, he does not attempt to engage with the 
contemporary debates surrounding these claims. Furthermore, he defends British 
conduct regarding the poor medical treatment of the wounded, stating that ‘Contrary to 
Mr Bennett’s subsequent claims, the dervish wounded were not totally neglected. 
Officers … gave food and water to the dervish wounded, doctors administered first aid 
in field hospitals, and a central hospital was established to treat the wounded in 
Omdurman’.263 However, for those who remained on the battlefield, there was to be no 
aid, and as Spiers himself highlights, British units were sent home while the neglected 
wounded were left for dead along the riverbank.264 Zulfo merely states that the 
individual resistance offered by the wounded after the battle ‘led finally to another of 
the features of the war – the killing of the wounded even after their surrender’.265 Daly 
perhaps devotes the most attention to the issue of killing the enemy wounded and he 
addresses the accusations made in Bennett’s article, particularly regarding the 
destruction of the Mahdi’s tomb and looting; within his discussion, he acknowledges 
that the ‘killing of the wounded soldiers on the day of battle pales in comparison with 
the horrific neglect, related by Churchill and others, of the wounded left on the 
battlefield’.266 Keown-Boyd makes no attempt to hide the brutality of the campaign, 
claiming that these tactics were a normal part of Anglo-Sudanese warfare; he accepts 
the killing of the wounded, in Churchill’s words, as ‘the customary Soudanese 
precautions’ and emphasises the overriding importance of economic considerations in 
explaining the campaign’s military tactics. Keown-Boyd concludes that ‘the campaign 
had been an object lesson in the maximum utilisation of limited resources’.267 In 
contrast, Holt acknowledges the debates thus: ‘The immense bloodshed caused criticism 
in Britain, despite the general emotional response of exultation at the overthrow of 
barbarism and the avenging of Gordon’ and he also discusses the controversy caused by 
Kitchener’s treatment of the Mahdist’s tomb.268 Hence, there has been a failure within 
the historiography to deal with the wider implications and issues regarding the British 
campaign and conduct of British soldiers.  
                                                
262 Spiers, ‘Campaigning under Kitchener’, 72. See also: idem, Victorian Soldier in Africa, 147.  
263 Ibid., 74.  
264 Medical Officer S. L. Cummins cited in ibid., 74.  
265 Zulfo, Karari, 233.   
266 Daly, Empire on the Nile, 3.  
267 Keown-Boyd, A Good Dusting, 243. Churchill, River War, vol. II, 154-55. 
268 Holt, Mahdist State, 240-41.  
  185 
These events need to be addressed within a wider framework of mass violence. 
Only a select number of historians have acknowledged the sheer brutality involved in 
Kitchener’s campaign and there has been no thorough investigation into these claims to-
date. Levene has discussed the case and comes to the conclusion that ‘for all its racial 
nastiness, [Kitchener’s] campaign did stop short of outright genocide’.269 However, 
Levene does not elaborate on the controversies of the reconquest and the brutal tactics 
of violence that the campaign involved; instead he focuses on Kitchener’s exploitation 
of the famine conditions in the country. Nevertheless, Levene includes the reconquest 
within a review of a ‘pattern of fin-de-siècle genocidal or sub-genocidal reactions to 
revolt’, which he concludes were ‘not simply a series of coincidences’.270 The timing of 
the conflict is important within the context of the development of European imperialism 
and the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in which Britain’s dominance was already waning at the 
end of the nineteenth century. As Levene argues, during this time, ‘the iron-fist 
generals, the ones who were prepared to contemplate radical solutions to colonial 
insurrections, replaced those who operated by the book’.271 As the present study 
demonstrates, one can certainly include Kitchener within this analysis. Other examples 
of brutality at this time include British involvement in the suppression of the Boxer 
Rebellion (1900-1).272 Clearly the practices of violence against the Zulu were also 
relevant in this case as discussed above regarding the massacring of the enemy 
wounded.  
Historians have debated the true grounds for the reconquest and have tended to 
focus on the events leading up to the war, particularly within the context of international 
relations, the Fashoda Incident,273 and its wider implications for Europe. Factors that are 
key to understanding the escalation of the campaign’s violence include: the role played 
by fear of external threat, concerns regarding international prestige in the face of 
potential defeat and the importance of the humiliating withdrawal of Egyptian and 
British forces in 1885; it is clear that the advocacy of avenging Gordon was a key 
propaganda tool, which proved highly effective. In the context of this historical 
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background of failure and the mounting international pressure felt within the Empire at 
this time, it is clear that the British had no intention of leaving the country defeated for a 
second time. Thus, an understanding of the international context is essential to an 
explanation of the conflict. As Levene highlights, the importance of the humiliating 
defeat suffered by the Italians at the hands of the Abyssinian army in 1896, as well as 
international rivalries in the area were important and he concludes that: 
Kitchener, thus, had to crush the [Mahdia], in the Sudan, not only because 
it was an affront to British rule but also because the alternative was to allow 
the French to extend their control from west Africa and ... block off British 
access to the strategic headwaters of the Nile.274  
Heather Sharkey has also highlighted the context of the Mahdist victory in 1885 as ‘a 
blow at British prestige’ at a time when ‘European powers were beginning to partition 
the African continent in the rush to expand imperial territories’.275 Paradoxically, a 
driving force of the British imperial project was an inferiority complex, which included 
the belief that imperial defeat was representative of a wider failure that threatened the 
entire project. As Levene has argued, European colonialists’ ‘greatest fear’ was ‘that 
they would be shown not to be the all-conquering, invincible masters after all’.276 In this 
instance, the fact that British forces could be defeated had already been ‘proven’ in 
1885 and they were therefore even more determined to defeat the Mahdists.  
It is evident that the reconquest cannot be explained purely by concerns for 
Egyptian security; whilst Egypt may have benefitted, this had been the case for the last 
twelve years. It has even been claimed that ‘Egyptian interests in the Upper Nile played 
no role in the government’s considerations’277 and Daly states that the reconquest ‘was 
(correctly) seen as a campaign undertaken in pursuit of British rather than Egyptian 
interests, and partly to forestall European criticism of British expansionism’.278 In any 
case, Italian requests for ‘moral support’ in the Sudan and Abyssinia in the wake of the 
‘Italian débâcle at Adowa’ on 1 March 1896 and the Mahdist threat to the Italians at 
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Kassala provided Britain with the pretext to re-enter the country.279 The reconquest did 
lead to some isolated criticism in Britain; for example, it was argued that attempts to 
extend the British Empire in Africa were  
not at our own cost, it is not with our own blood, that we are laying the 
foundations of this empire. It is the cost and with the lives of the poor Egypt 
fellaheen—whom we have undertaken to protect—that this addition to 
British power is to be made. In Africa we are extending our borders with 
the blood and money of subject races.280  
The Committee of International Arbitration and Peace Association also voiced their 
concerns to Salisbury that British actions might antagonise other European powers, 
forcing Britain into either ‘national humiliation or the prospect and peril of war’.281  
 As chapter 1 argues, episodes of mass violence can be viewed as one part of a 
wider phenomenon and considerations of genocidal ‘moments’ of potentiality282 are of 
value – particularly in the context of colonialism – with regards to identifying key 
instances in which genocide can become a policy option, even if this is not realised.283 
The case of the reconquest of the Sudan and the policies that were implemented in the 
wake of the British victory can be viewed as part of a process of violence which was 
potentially genocidal, but which was ultimately contained. It is clear that Kitchener’s 
policies led to massacres and other excessive violence and these actions are part of a 
wider European tradition of violence. While it seems unlikely that Kitchener gave 
explicit orders to massacre the wounded and those trying to surrender – although such 
claims were made284 – it is clear that troops were able to freely interpret his orders and 
that there were moments where the Anglo-Egyptian troops had ‘free reign’. As Keown-
Boyd has stated regarding the killing of the wounded, it was not ‘convincingly 
discouraged by British officers of the Egyptian Army’,285 and as Bennett highlighted, 
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‘certainly no protest was made’.286 Fundamentally, the responsibility for the campaign 
was in the hands of Cromer, to whom Kitchener was answerable. Cromer has been 
described as: 
some kind of Napoleonic figure: the embodiment of cold administrative 
rationality – with the important difference that any ambition to ‘liberate’ the 
indigenous population had now disappeared. The ‘civilising’ of Egypt 
served no other interests than those of the occupying power….287 
Yehouda Shenhav has recently discussed Cromer within the context of Hannah Arendt’s 
work regarding imperial bureaucracy and her thesis on the ‘banality of evil’ and 
Shenhav compares the alleged similarities between Cromer and Adolf Eichmann in 
particular.288 Shenhav highlights the foundations of imperial and Nazi bureaucracies 
which were based on race, arbitrary rule with ‘states of exception’, and moral aloofness. 
According to Shenhav, Arendt ‘argued that the dangerous liaisons between race and 
bureaucracy had unleashed extraordinary power and destruction, all the more alarming 
as they were “bathed in an aura of rationality and civilisation”’.289 The flexible and 
arbitrary nature of colonial rule further increased British power throughout its colonies; 
as Arendt argued, ‘The only “law” [these men] obeyed was the “law” of expansion, and 
the only proof of their “lawfulness” was success’.290 
As Holt has highlighted, whilst the majority of the forces present were Egyptian 
and Sudanese, ‘These forces were under British officers and the general direction of the 
campaign was managed throughout by Kitchener. Cromer, a civilian, had a nominal 
supervision of his activities but Kitchener enjoyed his full confidence and that of the 
British government. The khedival government was throughout treated as a sleeping 
partner’.291 Indeed, as Wolseley was at pains to emphasise, Kitchener was to report to 
and correspond with Cromer, not the War Office. 292  As Spiers has highlighted, 
Kitchener was ‘not a model commander’;293 Kitchener was well known for his difficult 
                                                
286 Bennett, ‘After Omdurman’, 20.  
287 Osterhammel, Europe, 16-17.  
288 Yehouda Shenhav, ‘Beyond “Instrumental Rationality”: Lord Cromer and the Imperial Roots of 
Eichmann’s Bureaucracy’, Journal of Genocide Research, 15:4 (2013), 379-99.  
289 Ibid., 387.  
290 Arendt, Origins, 215.  
291 Holt, Mahdist State, 230.  
292 Wolseley Memorandum, FO78/4894; Beckett, ‘Kitchener and the Politics of Command’. 
293 Spiers, ‘Introduction’, 3.  
  189 
manner and was fond of saying that regulations ‘are made for the guidance of fools’.294 
It is clear that this British-led military campaign was directed on the periphery, with 
very little input from the metropole and that Kitchener was responsible for troop 
conduct throughout the campaign. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise the role 
played by Sudanese soldiers in the campaign, as Lamothe does. He criticises the current 
historiography on the campaign, stating, ‘one gets the false impression that the River 
War was largely won by British Army regiments and the Maxim gun rather than 
Sudanese infantry battalions –– that, along with Egyptian troops, made up some two-
thirds of the Anglo-Egyptian army at Omdurman’.295 However, the British were very 
much in charge of the campaign, and Kitchener’s role was key; as Egerton argued: ‘The 
Staff of the Army Head Quarters was practically non-existent. [Kitchener] was himself 
the whole staff rolled into one’.296  
The present study is primarily based on ‘colonial’ sources, as are the majority of 
studies that explore the reconquest campaign. Firsthand accounts from British soldiers 
are essential to this study and reveal the brutal nature of this violent colonial conflict 
under Kitchener, as well as the ways in which it was perceived and justified by British 
troops. Unpublished correspondence and diaries, published eyewitness accounts, as well 
as official British documents, which are held at the National Archives, have all been 
reassessed in consideration of the extent to which extreme violence was an accepted 
part of the reconquest campaign, both in London and on the ground. This study very 
much focuses on British accounts of the war, although it was of course the case that the 
rank-and-file were predominantly Sudanese and Egyptian. Lamothe correctly highlights 
the failure within the historiography to acknowledge the key role played by the 
Sudanese soldiers in the campaign and unfortunately, due to a lack of sources, the 
present study can do little to rectify this anomaly and it has not been possible to discuss 
their perspectives with regards to the nature of the campaign. As Lamothe states, the 
‘historiography is especially striking in that so much of what eyewitnesses documented 
was overlooked or discarded by future historians’. Whilst Lamothe’s study aims to 
provide a ‘historiographical restoration of sorts’, he still concedes that ‘the primary 
sources for such an endeavour remain largely European’.297  
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Kitchener had little to fear from his own conscience.298 
The case of the military campaign in the Sudan is highly relevant to our understanding 
of further British military campaigns, notably the Boer War and World War I and in all 
three cases Kitchener was a crucial figure; as Kiernan stated: ‘As soon as the Sudan had 
been dealt with it was the turn of the Boers’;299 however, these were to be two very 
different campaigns, as Lyttelton observed:  
Few people have seen two battles in succession in such startling contrast as 
Omdurman and Colenso. In the first, 50,000 fanatics streamed across the 
open regardless of cover to certain death, while at Colenso I never saw a 
Boer all day till the battle was over and it was our men who were the 
victims.300 
According to Jörn Leonhard, the Boer War demonstrated the deficiencies of the British 
military and ‘Final victory was only achieved by quantitative superiority and 
radicalising the means of war’.301 Despite the fundamental differences between the two 
military campaigns, there were also important links, particularly within the development 
of European colonial warfare; these links need further investigation and will only be 
suggested here. While this campaign has been emphasised for its targeting of civilians, 
the tactics used to defeat the Boers were often those previously used in other colonial 
campaigns including scorched earthed which, in the case of the Boer War, destroyed a 
total of 100,000 homes. 302  Interference with food supplies meant that a civilian 
population was once again caught in the middle of conflict and left to fend for itself.303 
While it is Kitchener that is typically associated with the brutal tactics against the Boer 
population, it was nevertheless the case that these tactics began under Frederick Sleigh 
Roberts and the majority of farm burning was over by the time Kitchener took over.304 
Roberts was well accustomed to scorched earth tactics, having ordered the destruction 
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of whole villages during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880).305 However, 
Kitchener transformed the British campaign and undertook ‘three extreme tactics’ in his 
‘total’ efforts against the Boers: these methods focused on blockhouses, which were 
linked with barbed wire; concentration camps; the ‘systematic’ sweeping of flying 
columns to destroy food and property.306  
 As in the Sudan, Salisbury once again advocated extreme methods and favoured 
isolating the ‘enemy’, stating: ‘… you ought to be able to destroy food with flying 
columns of considerable strength. You will not conquer these people until you have 
starved them out’.307 The Boer War fuelled Joseph Chamberlain’s idea of ‘racial 
conflicts’, viewing the war as an attempt by ‘an inferior race – the Dutch – to subdue a 
superior one’.308 That the war was viewed in racial terms is also made clear by 
Kitchener’s well-known description of the Boers as ‘uncivilised Africander [sic] 
savages with only a thin white veneer’.309 This attitude challenges Thomas Kühne’s 
belief that the Boer War did not ‘go genocidal’ because ‘there was no basis for “race 
war”’. This statement does not get to grips with the complicated views of British 
contemporaries regarding racial prejudice towards the Boer or African people.310 This 
campaign gained notoriety for Kitchener’s utilisation of ‘concentration camps’, and it 
has been estimated that the camps resulted in the deaths of as many as 46,000 
noncombatants. 311  While these deaths were arguably the result of neglect and 
incompetence rather than intentional policy, it may be noted that the British were aware 
of the devastating consequences that a policy of ‘concentration’ could have as in the 
case of Spanish concentration tactics in Cuba in which between 100,000 and 300,000 
civilians died.312 The importance of Kitchener’s involvement in both the Sudan and 
South Africa is perhaps most significant in his apparent indifference to the suffering of 
                                                
305 See Wessels, ‘Boer Guerrilla’, 12.  
306 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 183.  
307 Salisbury cited in Alexander B. Downes, ‘Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the 
Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy’, Civil Wars, 9:4 (2007), 433: 
emphasis added.  
308 Wolfgang Mock, ‘The Function of “Race” in Imperialist Ideologies: The Example of Joseph 
Chamberlain’, in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (eds), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in 
Britain and Germany Before 1914 (London: Macmillan, 1981), 196.  
309 Kitchener cited in Iain R. Smith and Andreas Stucki, ‘The Colonial Development of Concentration 
Camps (1868–1902)’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:3 (2011), 419.  
310 Thomas Kühne, ‘Honour and Violence’, History Workshop Journal, 62:1 (2006), 308.  
311 This includes 28,000 Boer civilians who died, of whom 79 per cent were under the age of sixteen. See: 
Downes, ‘Draining the Sea’, 428-29; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: Abacus, 2010 [1979]), 
494. 
312 Downes, ‘Draining the Sea’, 436; see also: Jonas Kreienbaum, ‘Deadly Learning? Concentration 
Camps in Colonial Wars Around 1900’, in Volker Barth and Roland Cvetkovski (eds), Imperial Co-
operation and Transfer, 1870-1930 (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
  192 
others – whether in reference to his own men, the dying enemy wounded, or Boer 
women and children. Kitchener emphasised victory above all else: indeed, as Thomas 
Pakenham concludes: ‘Kitchener no more desired the death of women and children in 
the camps than of the wounded Dervishes after Omdurman, or of his own soldiers in the 
typhoid-stricken hospitals of Bloemfontein. He was simply not interested. What 
possessed him was to win the war quickly….’313 This campaign also raised the issue of 
a discrepancy between Kitchener’s explicit orders and ‘accepted practices’ of violence 
in relation to the ‘Breaker Morant’ incident in which 12 Boer POWs were shot dead by 
colonial irregulars. The participants – two of whom were executed on Kitchener’s 
orders – admitted their involvement in the killings and their central defence remained 
that they were only carrying out actions of ‘accepted practice’, as stated by George 
Witton, one of the accused; such practices included ‘No quarter, no prisoners.’314 
Hence, Kitchener repeatedly showed his willingness to engage in extreme methods of 
violence. While Kitchener’s campaigns led to some intense debate in the metropole, as 
this study demonstrates, it is important to note, that rather than being admonished, 
Kitchener continued to be substantially rewarded for his brutal efforts across the 
Empire: after the Sudan campaign he received £30,000 and became Baron Kitchener of 
Khartoum;315 after the Boer War he became Viscount and was awarded £50,000,316 
followed of course by his role as Secretary of State for War in August 1914.317  
 Episodes of colonial violence such as the campaign in the Sudan are essential to 
our understanding of the development of ‘totalising’ violence on European soil. James 
McMillan has argued within the context of the Battle of Omdurman and the ‘extreme 
violence’ of the Boer War that ‘after 1914, it involved no great leap of imagination on 
the part of the military and of civilian policy-makers to adapt their model of colonial 
war to European theatres of war’.318 Whilst the ‘civilising mission’ of Europe’s empires 
had been built upon the assumption that ‘what was good for Europe must be even better 
for the “natives”’, as Kiernan argues regarding the perception of colonialism and its 
alleged benefits, ‘There remained a final stage, to be reached by 1918, of doubt whether 
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European civilisation was much good even for Europe.’319 As one soldier seems to have 
already suspected, the conflict in the Sudan was indicative of events to come in Europe. 
As Franks stated:  
It was indeed a city of the dead, and it was very horrible and sad. War is a 
cruel and terrible thing, and the more one sees of it and its results, the more 
one hopes there may never be anything so terrible in Europe again. One 
talks in a light hearted way of fighting France or Germany, but these things 
are horrible enough in savage lands.320 
Conclusion 
It is evident that the case of the reconquest goes beyond the scale of the violence of the 
two previous case studies. The extent of the killing in the Sudan is much greater for 
several reasons. First, as a result of the strength of the Mahdia army, as well as his 
willingness to fight Kitchener and the Anglo-Egyptian army in open battle. Second, 
conditions on the ground clearly impacted the nature of this violence as soldiers were 
forced to wait out the ‘long summer’ in trying conditions. These troops were eager for 
battle against the forces that had murdered Gordon and were deemed to be ‘savages’ of 
the worst kind. However, this campaign also involved tactics of scorched earth and 
starvation, particularly in the opening years of the campaign when there were few direct 
clashes with the enemy. This campaign remains consistent with contemporary military 
theories including Callwell’s emphasis upon working outside of the remit of the laws of 
regular warfare, an emphasis on the need for ‘a big casualty list in the hostile ranks’, as 
well as calling for ‘not merely the defeat of the hostile forces but their destruction’.321 
Other treatises of colonial warfare supported this extreme vision and the Sudan 
campaign is in line with the arguments put forward by Samuel White Baker, for 
example, who discussed his experiences of ‘savage warfare’ in his lecture to the Royal 
United Service Institution and openly advocated an extreme approach, stating: 
In rebellions I do not like hanging people after the fight is over; but at the 
same time, when the troops are called out to act, I think as well to let them 
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act thoroughly, and not to sound the bugle to ‘cease firing’ until a severe 
lesson has been given.322  
As Henk Wesseling has emphasised, it was often the stronger colonial opponents who 
were easier to defeat as they sought to engage in open battle, concluding that ‘Set 
battles were generally won by the Europeans’.323 The previous chapter also supports this 
view as Bai Bureh initially tried to fight the British in open battle and suffered great 
losses. This led him to undertake guerrilla tactics, which were more difficult for the 
British to deal with, as the Boer War would also show soon after the reconquest 
campaign. It is evident that the violence of Kitchener’s reconquest campaign was on a 
continuum of violence, which could extend to include genocide. While the campaign 
did not ultimately amount to genocide, this case demonstrates the genocidal ‘potential’ 
of the one-sided annihilation of the enemy and, as a result, its marked brutalities mean it 
stands apart from the previous two cases. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion: The Dynamics of British Colonial Violence1 
A habit of treating troublesome natives as ‘vermin’ was bound to brutalise 
white men’s treatment of one another when they fell out.2  
This chapter draws some central conclusions from the three preceding case studies and 
highlights their relevance in relation to other episodes of British violence, as well as 
additional European and colonial conflicts. The findings of this study are then placed 
within the wider debates in the historiography of violence and empire. This is followed 
by a consideration of the connections within and between empires and the relevance of 
colonial warfare for European warfare, and vice versa. Clearly, colonial wars were more 
than a precursor to the world wars of the twentieth century, and should be studied in 
their own right. Nevertheless, colonial violence represents an important historical 
precedent to the violence of the twentieth century and the ways in which violence from 
the colonies ‘came home’. Furthermore, practices of colonial and European warfare 
overlapped throughout the nineteenth century and came together in the two world wars. 
Across the British Empire, examples of colonial violence and ‘small wars’ did not occur 
in isolation and events in one colony clearly affected another. It is hoped that the issues 
raised here will stimulate further research regarding the history of European violence, 
both in the colonies and closer to home.  
 
A British Way of Colonial War?3  
 
Violence was integral to the establishment, continuation and expansion of the British 
Empire; while this may seem an obvious statement, it is clear that this violence has 
often been overlooked or underplayed. By examining lesser-known cases of British 
colonial violence, a pattern emerges regarding the ways in which communication 
between the periphery and the metropole and the actions of the men on the spot affected 
conditions on the ground, antagonising the indigenous peoples and contributing to the 
                                                
1 See also, Michelle Gordon, ‘The Dynamics of British Colonial Violence’, in Philip Dwyer and Amanda 
Nettelbeck (eds), Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern World (Palgrave Macmillan: 
forthcoming 2018).  
2 V. G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man, and White Man in the Age of 
Empire (London: The Cresset Library, 1988 [1969]), 225.  
3 See, Peter Lieb, ‘Suppressing Insurgencies in Comparison: The Germans in the Ukraine, 1918, and the 
British in Mesopotamia, 1920’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 23:4–5 (2012), 627-47.  
  196 
outbreak of violence and its escalation. The British Empire repeatedly found itself 
immersed in cycles of violence on the ‘turbulent frontier’ as ‘Governors continued to try 
and eliminate the disorderly frontier by annexations which in turn produced new 
frontier problems and further expansion’.4 As John Galbraith highlighted, the men on 
the spot often initiated these policies and London rarely reversed their actions.5 As this 
thesis also shows, London made little attempt to limit the governors’ actions and 
conflicts were perceived as all but inevitable, although outbreaks of colonial violence 
invariably led to debates in the metropole on the role of these men. When events led to 
military intervention it is clear that the men leading these campaigns were increasingly 
willing to undertake measures of extreme violence. This pattern continued with little 
action from London. Indeed, the main objective remained the maintenance and 
expansion of the British Empire.  
It is apparent that individuals on the ground were highly important to both the 
expansion of the British Empire and the development of violence within this process, as 
an integral component of the extension of British colonial rule. While colonial methods 
of warfare are a central feature of this thesis, it also analyses the dynamics of 
colonialism and the antagonistic, arrogant manner with which colonial administrators 
dealt with the indigenous populations – and their leaders in particular. How these 
aspects contributed to the outbreak of violence has been explored, as has the willingness 
of the military – in cooperation with the colonial administration – to undertake military 
campaigns that were disproportionate to the actual threat at hand, but which were aimed 
at preventing further resistance. Evidently, the men on the ground – whether civilian or 
military men – held significant power on a local level and British politicians in London 
were reliant on colonial administrators for accurate information on colonial conflicts 
and were subject to the objectives of these men. One source of tension between the 
metropole and the periphery arose between the aims of increased trade productivity – 
with limited political involvement – and of territorial expansion. For the most part, 
London wanted the land and resources without having to pay for them. This thesis set 
out to understand the colonial processes that allowed the men on the spot to push for 
expansion, even when it contradicted the aims of the Colonial Office, and the central 
role of racial prejudices to the actions of these men. The nature of the warfare that 
resulted from this expansion is central to this study. The utilisation of extreme violence 
                                                
4 John S. Galbraith, ‘The “Turbulent Frontier” as a Factor in British Expansion’, Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 2:2 (1960), 168.  
5 Ibid., 168. 
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in the face of indigenous opposition was ultimately accepted on the ground by colonial 
administrators, and the military men who participated, as well as politicians in London.  
This study demonstrates the problematic relationship between the Colonial 
Office and administrators on the periphery, as these men went about their ‘imperial 
careering’.6 In the case of Perak, Jervois’ actions repeatedly contradicted Carnarvon’s 
instructions and his objectives were carried out without the Secretary of State’s 
approval. Such antagonism was accompanied by a precarious relationship between the 
‘coloniser’ and the ‘colonised’ and the cases of Perak and Sierra Leone show the 
inability and refusal of colonial administrators to consider local customs and the 
perspectives of local leaders. Furthermore, in both cases, preconceived notions 
regarding ‘tribal’ rivalries led the administrators to underestimate the chiefs’ abilities to 
unite against the imposition of British rule. This approach is demonstrated by Cardew’s 
central role in the developments that led to the outbreak of violence in the Protectorate 
of Sierra Leone, his determination to enforce the Ordinance and his lack of flexibility in 
the face of opposition played an integral role. Local populations were provoked by the 
antagonistic actions of the British administrators; these actions led to some form of 
indigenous retaliation, which then provided the British with a pretext to engage 
militarily in the region, thus presenting them with the opportunity to use the conflict to 
achieve their central goal of establishing a British colonial presence. The contradictory 
nature of colonialism meant that while the Colonial Office was often in favour of a 
more moderate approach and was keen to avoid prolonged and costly military 
interventions. At the same time, colonial administrators were keen to make a name for 
themselves and cement their power on the periphery. These dual objectives heightened 
the chances that extreme measures of violence would be utilised: one, to establish local 
power in the region and two, to bring the conflict to an end more swiftly and in such a 
way as to deter future unrest. Administrators undertook actions which antagonised 
indigenous leaders in the knowledge that they could rely, if necessary, on the military 
                                                
6 See David Lambert and Alan Lester, ‘Introduction: Imperial Spaces, Imperial Subjects’, in Lambert and 
Lester (eds), Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2; James Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule: 
Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic during the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), ch. 2. Regarding ‘networks’ within an interconnected British Empire, see also: 
Alan Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain 
(London: Routledge, 2001); Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815–45: Patronage, the Information 
Revolution and Colonial Government (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Frederick 
Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, ‘Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda’, in 
Cooper and Stoler (eds), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
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strength of the British Army; furthermore, they continually insisted that it was the local 
population that was behaving in a hostile manner. While the men on the ground may not 
have had the support of their superiors in London, when it came to it, military 
reinforcements were invariably sent and the resistance brutally suppressed. 
In the case of the reconquest of the Sudan, communications between the 
metropole and the periphery were of less importance as Kitchener’s objectives were 
clear and Cromer was ultimately responsible for the campaign. Despite the 
controversies surrounding Kitchener’s methods, he was nevertheless promoted and 
given the opportunity to undertake ever more controversial ‘solutions’ to colonial 
‘problems’, notably in the Boer War. While the specific details of the objectives of 
those in London and those on the periphery may have differed in each case, they were 
united in their goal of the continued existence of the British Empire, at the expense of 
the indigenous populations and in agreement with the basic concepts of the Empire 
regarding the ‘inferiority’ of the ‘natives’ and the racism and prejudices that 
underpinned the entire project. This thesis has shown that while the degree to which the 
British Empire exploited the forces at its disposal varied, regardless of the extremities of 
violence, similar administrative processes and arguments of justification can be 
identified. The methods discussed throughout this work were used against the 
indigenous population in a variety of settings and to counter differing levels of 
opposition. Indigenous populations did not necessarily have to oppose British colonial 
rule outright – a lack of support or enthusiasm for the British imperial project could 
suffice – and rarely did a British military response correspond with the level of 
resistance on show.  
While it may appear at first glance that the three cases of violence explored here 
have little in common due to their differing scales and contexts, on closer inspection and 
in consideration of first-hand accounts, it is the case that all three show commonalities 
including the role of racial prejudices and the use of extreme violence. These conflicts 
all fall under Callwell’s definition of small wars and his work represents the closest we 
have to an official treatise on colonial warfare, in which he openly advocated extreme 
violence to suppress ‘irregular’ opponents. The present study demonstrates that 
regardless of the scale of armed resistance to British colonialism, extreme violence was 
routinely utilised; the extent of the opposition that the British faced differed greatly in 
each case: in Perak around 300 fighters at most; in Sierra Leone 3000; and certainly 
over 50,000 in the case of the Mahdia. All three cases demonstrate a belief in the need 
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swiftly and brutally to suppress indigenous resistance, in line with Callwell’s 
observations. Furthermore, actions such as banishment, summary punishment and 
punitive expeditions served to ensure that British military power would deter future 
potential unrest. All three cases demonstrate an acceptance of the principle of collective 
retribution – and thereby the suffering of noncombatants – and looting was an integral 
component in these small wars. Moreover, in both Perak and Sierra Leone, this logic 
was in evidence in the destruction of deserted villages, a practice that was detrimental to 
the inhabitants who had fled their homes in fear and suffered as a result of having to 
hide in the jungle and bush areas. In this way, many inhabitants were punished for the 
alleged actions of their chiefs. Hence, such actions taught the ‘natives’ a lesson that they 
would not forget. By examining three contrasting cases of colonial violence this thesis 
demonstrates that, regardless of scale, violence was endemic to the British Empire. The 
utilisation of extreme violence was not the result of isolated ‘excesses’, but rather an 
integral component to the expansion and maintenance of Empire.   
While the Sudan reconquest was a fight against ‘savages’, it was also similar to 
more traditional forms of war, as for the most part, both parties were clearly visible and 
fought in open battle. Despite this fact, British tactics throughout the campaign did not 
adhere to contemporary concepts of ‘civilised warfare’. Indeed, of the three case 
studies, the reconquest of the Sudan was the most destructive; the Khalifa fought 
Kitchener and his men in a pitched battle and the superior weaponry that the British had 
at their disposal led to the decimation of the Mahdist troops. The extremities of the 
reconquest are in evidence in the particularly uncompromising nature of the language 
used throughout accounts of the campaign, the violence that ensued and the relentless 
pursuit of the enemy from the very beginning, as shown in Dongola in 1896. Unlike the 
other two cases, the Mahdia was perceived as a significant obstacle to the British 
imperial project in scale and the context of previous British defeat, and Gordon’s 
murder was particularly pertinent in contributing to a radicalisation of violence. The 
dehumanisation of the enemy and preconceptions regarding the ‘nature’ of the enemy 
contributed significantly to extreme violence that included the mass neglect and killing 
of the enemy wounded. While for the most part, a clearly defined enemy was lacking in 
many cases in the colonies, this was not the case in the Sudan and yet, the British 
continued to undertake actions, which breached international law, but were ultimately 
deemed acceptable outside Europe.  
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In all three cases, violence was utilised in extreme forms against those who were 
perceived to be an obstacle to the British imperial project and notions of the ‘civilising 
mission’ and racial assumptions buttressed this extreme violence. In each case, 
participants expressed their disgust and indifference regarding the enemy population. 
These views were further enforced by the utilisation of the issue of slavery, which was 
used to justify ‘liberating’ an area. However, as the case studies show, once colonial 
power was established, British actions were limited in eradicating practices of slavery 
on the ground. Thanks to the ‘nature’ of the ‘natives’, ‘savage’ opposition was to be 
expected and potential resistance brutally suppressed, thereby creating a self-fulfilling 
colonial prophecy. As a result of this racism and the imbalance of relations between the 
‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’, outbreaks of violence became highly likely, as did the 
utilisation of extreme measures against the ‘enemy’; a concept which became 
increasingly flexible. Hence, once opposition was shown, a display of force was 
considered unavoidable – to ‘teach’ the local population the ‘benefits’ of British rule, as 
in Perak and Sierra Leone. The rhetoric of empire provided ready-made justifications 
for a range of actions by the colonists, which could be utilised at various times: blaming 
the ‘savage native’ was key to this way of thinking. British colonial violence was 
viewed as legitimate and necessary and as Nicholas Owen has observed in relation to 
the Amritsar Massacre in 1919, ‘anticolonial violence was interpreted as an illegitimate 
“disturbance,” “unrest,” or “criminality,” but the violence of the state was seen as a 
matter of obligation’.7 Viewing indigenous grievances as ‘illegitimate’ is an overarching 
theme throughout the British Empire; this viewpoint was in evidence in both Perak and 
Sierra Leone and as a result British authorities refused to negotiate or compromise.8 The 
central priority remained the imperial project.  
While a distinction was made regarding the ‘legitimacy’ of the enemy in a 
European context, this was not the case in a colonial setting.9 Those who actively 
opposed the extension of the British Empire were automatically seen as ‘illegitimate’; 
                                                
7 Nicholas Owen, ‘“Facts Are Sacred”: The Manchester Guardian and Colonial Violence, 1930-1932’, 
The Journal of Modern History, 84:3 (2012), 644.  
8 British responses to Kikuyu grievances are a case in point: Caroline Elkins, Britain’s Gulag: The Brutal 
End of Empire in Kenya (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), 126. In comparison to the French ‘oil slick 
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Hohrath (eds), Kriegsgreuel: Die Entgrenzung der Gewalt in kriegerischen Konflikten vom Mittelalter bis 
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this ‘illegitimacy’ included their very opposition to the British Empire, their grievances 
and their tactics. The targeting of potential resistance to colonial rule and the belief that 
violence was necessary to suppress possible future opposition as well as actual, 
immediate violence encouraged violent measures against the indigenous population. 
Individual ‘outrages’, such as Birch’s murder in Perak, were deemed to represent such 
potential resistance and an early show of force was desired in order to stave off violence 
in the future. 10  As this thesis shows, the colonisers’ actions were informed by 
assumptions regarding the indigenous populations and their inability to comprehend the 
lack of gratitude for their ‘civilising’ efforts. Clearly these efforts were unwanted and 
while British colonists were able to rely on the might of the British Army to impose 
their will, the utilisation of this ‘might’ was ultimately a sign of colonial weakness and 
failure.11 Scholars have shown in relation to the use of exemplary violence through 
colonial policing in the interwar period, that rather than a sign of the colonists’ 
unrestrained power, resorting to extreme violence ‘derived from the absence of real 
authority’ and hence the weakness of the state.12 This trend can be identified more 
specifically in the case of decolonisation and the British Empire. As the latter sought to 
hold on to power, ever-more extreme methods were utilised.13 So whilst Jervois, 
Cardew and Kitchener spoke of ‘imposing’ the will of the British Empire on the 
indigenous population, their need to do so marked a failure in policy in which the 
‘savage native’ had to be forced to submit to British colonial rule.   
 Precedents of violence were continuously being set throughout the Empire and 
other episodes of violence, notably the Indian Mutiny in 1857, demonstrated that both 
politicians in London and the men on the spot were able and willing to accept the 
utilisation of more extreme methods if necessary. Hence, just because politicians in 
London may have been reluctant to engage in hostilities on the periphery in the first 
place, does not mean that they were averse to the use of more extreme tactics when it 
                                                
10 On colonial ‘outrages’ see: Elizabeth Kolsky, ‘The Colonial Rule of Law and the Legal Regime of 
Exception: Frontier “Fanaticism” and State Violence in British India’, American Historical Review, 120:4 
(2015), 1229. 
11 A similar argument has been made regarding ‘civilian concentration’ see Iain R. Smith and Andreas 
Stucki, ‘The Colonial Development of Concentration Camps (1868–1902)’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, 39:3 (2011), 418; Dan Stone, Concentration Camps: A Short History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017); on indigenous protests in the interwar period see: Martin Thomas, 
‘“Paying the Butcher’s Bill”: Policing British Colonial Protest after 1918’, Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / 
Crime, History & Societies, 15:2 (2011), 57. With regards to the Amritsar massacre in 1919, see: Kim A. 
Wagner, ‘“Treading upon Fires”: The “Mutiny”-Motif and Colonial Anxieties in British India’, Past and 
Present, 218:1 (2013). 195-96.  
12 See: Thomas, ‘Policing British Colonial Protest’, 66.  
13 For example, Elkins, Britain’s Gulag. 
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came to it. While all three cases included destructive levels of violence in the form of 
scorched earth, collective punishment, and starvation tactics, for example, they did not 
meet the levels of the suppression of the Indian Mutiny. However, the fact that the 
British colonists did not utilise these levels of extreme violence in the cases of Perak 
and Sierra Leone in particular, was because they were not deemed to be required. 
Clearly, more extreme methods were an option against Bai Bureh and his men in Sierra 
Leone, although the scale of the destruction wrought across the country was of course 
damaging enough. Again, to reiterate the point, if more extreme methods were not 
utilised, it was because they were not needed. That the methods undertaken had the 
desired effect was proven by the fact that the house tax continued to be imposed in the 
war’s aftermath and, in the case of Perak that the Resident system also continued. As 
this thesis shows, a range of options was always open to colonial administrators and the 
military.  
 Hence, historical precedents were highly important in terms of colonial violence 
and in the nineteenth century the Indian Mutiny stood out for the ‘lessons’ that Britain 
would learn regarding its treatment of the colonised. The violence enacted across the 
British Empire post-1857 occurred under the Mutiny’s shadow and it clearly 
represented a ‘watershed’ in many ways, dominating the British ‘imperial mindset far 
into the twentieth century’ and laying bare the fallacy of British moral superiority.14 
Indeed, as Andrea Major and Crispin Bates emphasise,  
The sudden, unexpected eruption of violence, the longevity of the 
subsequent unrest and the atrocities committed against combatants and 
civilians on both sides, together with the very real threat posed to British 
rule in India and the perceived challenge to British honour and prestige as 
an imperial power, set the uprising of 1857 apart from previous conflicts 
and left an indelible scar on the national psyche.15 
This punitive violence was particularly significant in its scale, the extent to which 
British civilians were caught up in the unrest, the impact on British public opinion, and 
                                                
14 Mark Levene, Genocide in the Age of the Nation State, Volume II: The Rise of the West and the Coming 
of Genocide (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 250. See: Jill C. Bender, The 1857 Indian Uprising and the 
British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
15 Andrea Major and Crispin Bates, ‘Introduction: Fractured Narratives and Marginal Experiences’, in 
Major and Bates (eds), Mutiny at the Margins: New Perspectives on the Indian Uprising of 1857: Volume 
II: Britain and the Indian Uprising (London: Sage Publications, 2013), xv. Regarding the Mutiny’s 
lasting impact see Wagner, ‘The “Mutiny”-Motif’.  
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the brutal methods utilised, which included tying men to the mouths of cannons before 
blowing them up.16 One lesson that the British colonists learnt from the Mutiny was the 
need to nip rebellions swiftly in the bud, thereby advocating swift and brutal violence.17. 
The centrality of this approach was also in evidence in Perak and Sierra Leone and it 
was informed by the logic that one needed to act swiftly and decisively to prevent the 
encouragement of further potential unrest. In response to the Mutiny, the British utilised 
methods including summary executions and scorched earth tactics to bring the country 
under control – a task that took two years. Typically, the colonists viewed the sepoys’ 
grievances as illegitimate; the outbreak of violence was based upon a ‘refusal to use 
new rifle cartridges for fear that they were greased with pig and cow fat’.18 Although 
Jill Bender states that this issue ‘provided a convenient explanation for the rebellion, 
one that did not openly challenge the legitimacy of British colonial control or validate 
Indian unrest.’19 These cartridges were never issued, but as punishment for their 
involvement in the Mutiny, the ‘mutineers’ suffered culturally specific vengeance at the 
hands of the British. For example, William Forbes-Mitchell recalled the treatment of 
one ‘Nawâb’, who was ‘first smeared over with pig’s fat, flogged by sweepers, and then 
hanged.’20 Denis Judd goes so far as to state that ‘Those mutineers who were blown into 
fragments of flesh and bone from the mouths of cannon, or summarily hanged, were 
among the fortunate ones’.21 The levels of violence enacted can be partly explained by 
the sense of betrayal that the British felt by the ‘mutineers’. As Judd states, those 
involved in the rebellion were ‘denounced as ungrateful and treacherous wretches, 
unmindful of the benefits bestowed by Britain’s civilising mission in the sub-
continent’.22 This was a theme that continued throughout the Empire’s lifetime, until the 
bitter end.23 Kim Wagner has demonstrated that the Mutiny affected British responses 
to future colonial violence in India, highlighting the case of the ‘Kooka outbreak’ in 
1872 in particular. Wagner highlights how post-Mutiny violence in India was 
understood through the ‘lens’ of the events in 1857 and that, when violence erupted 
                                                
16 See: Kim A. Wagner, “‘Calculated to Strike Terror”: The Amritsar Massacre amd the Spectacle of 
Colonial Violence’, Past and Present, 233:1 (2016), 197. 
17 Ibid., 207. 
18 Major and Bates, ‘Introduction’, xvii.  
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22 Ibid., 67.  
23 See for example Elkins, Britain’s Gulag, 114.  
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again in the country, it was ‘read’ as a second Mutiny.24 It is noteworthy that the sixty-
eight Kuka Sikhs executed were tied to canons in a replication and reminder of the 
exemplary violence of 1857.25 As Wagner shows, this event bridges the ‘“cataclysms” 
of 1857 and 1919’ and highlights the connections between colonial violence and 
anxieties; Wagner’s study argues that these events can only be understood in the context 
of the Indian Mutiny. As discussed in chapter 2, it is highly likely that Jervois was 
aware of the events surrounding the Kuka Sikhs, as this violence was widely reported in 
the British press. This instance represents another case of disproportionate British 
suppression of indigenous resistance. The Kuka case also raises issues typical 
throughout the Empire regarding the role of the men on the spot; the British deputy 
commissioner, L. Cowan independently ordered the summary execution of the 
prisoners, demonstrating once again the challenges of containing the actions of these 
men, who so often responded with ‘colonial overreaction’.26  
Elizabeth Kolsky’s study of the Murderous Outrages Act of 1867, which 
established India’s Northwest Frontier as ‘exceptional’ by colonial officials, notes the 
relevance of the timing of the Act in relation to ‘disruptions elsewhere in the empire’,27 
namely the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865, another key event in the catalogue of British 
colonial violence and an ‘important and degrading milestone in imperial history’.28 
Events in Jamaica sparked attention in Britain as Governor Eyre imposed martial law 
and called upon British troops in the face of opposition to colonial rule. Typically, Eyre 
was accused of having ‘[overstated] the danger of a murderous and overwhelming negro 
uprising’.29 Jervois’ actions in Perak also fit this pattern of ‘colonial overreaction’; after 
British troops had already brought the area under control, Jervois extended the 
campaign by several months. Arguments were evoked that the ‘formal cover of law’ 
was required to protect colonial agents who decided to take the law into their own 
hands, as Eyre had done, having abused the use of martial law.30 That administrators 
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were aware of the wider context of violence across the Empire is borne out in the case 
studies. Scholars have examined Britain’s utilisation of martial law and other ‘coercion’ 
laws in relation to the administration of the British Empire. In his consideration of 
‘states of exception’, Tom Lloyd explores the role of martial law in Ireland in 1916 and 
argues that ‘British jurisprudential discourse on martial law had been reshaped’ by the 
controversies of its application in the Morant Bay Rebellion and Boer War.31 The use of 
martial law in Sierra Leone should be viewed within this context; a ‘state of siege’ was 
declared, followed by ‘The Insurgents’ Temporary Detention Ordinance’ in 1898, 
which allowed the colonists to act with impunity.32 Historical precedents were key when 
it came to the application of martial law; for example in the case of the suppression of 
the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 in Palestine, the ‘ghost of Governor Eyre still haunted’ 
discussions of the matter.33 A state of rebellion had to be considered sufficiently serious 
enough for martial law to be declared, although, as Charles Townshend notes, the 
example of India in 1857 was a ‘special case which was not seen as falling under 
martial, or any other, law.’34  
As this thesis demonstrates in the case of Sierra Leone, the use of force to bring 
an area under British control was aided in many instances by a declaration of martial 
law. As David Killingray acknowledges in the context of Jamaica, ‘… Eyre’s brutal 
suppression of the Morant Bay rising in 1865 and subsequent Crown Colony 
government graphically illustrated that there were two classes of British subjects who 
could expect different standards of colonial law and justice.’35 This thesis highlights the 
selectivity with which colonists applied British law throughout the colonies – Jervois 
acknowledged that punishment of the chiefs would be easier if they were not to become 
subject to English law. While populations across the Empire may have been technically 
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‘British subjects’, it is evident that colonial law differed from the rule of law in the 
metropole. While it may seem obvious that law and order would be applied differently 
in the metropole and on the periphery, such claims were made and were central to 
justifications for the Empire and its alleged ‘civilising mission’.36 Lloyd highlights the 
importance of colonial law to the British imperial project thus:  
Upholding the rule of law was seen as an intrinsic justification for British 
dominion abroad: a moral underpinning for the government of foreign 
others, a marker of a distinctively ‘modern’, ‘civilised’ and ‘British’ polity, 
and an uplifting, enlightening, educating force for progress.37 
In fact, clearly the rule of law was not upheld and colonial subjects could not expect the 
same treatment as British subjects at home. Methods such as collective punishment and 
punitive expeditions, amongst others, were utilised to ‘uphold order, not law’.38 Indeed, 
as Taylor Sherman highlights in her study of state violence and punishment in India, 
‘We must move beyond the idea that some colonial penal tactics violated a legal order 
which was otherwise just.’39  
The contradictory premise upon which the Empire was built, that the 
‘benevolent’ British Empire subjugated populations in order to ‘civilise’ them was laid 
bare by examples of British response including, notably, the Indian Mutiny. In times of 
colonial unrest, the British repeatedly flouted the rule of law and the brutalities that 
were enacted by British forces exposed the true nature of the British Empire. The Indian 
Mutiny also served as a reference point for British colonial soldiers throughout the 
remainder of the century and clearly those events loomed large in the minds of British 
colonists, in India and across the Empire; on his arrival into Freetown, Sierra Leone in 
June 1898 Carleton wrote home: ‘Several thousand square miles of territory are now in 
a state of insurrection and I imagine the country very much resembles what India was in 
the mutiny’.40 The Mutiny served as a constant reminder of what could happen if 
‘unruly’ indigenes were not kept under control and set a precedent for the level of 
‘acceptable’ violence in the suppression of opposition – it also demonstrated the violent 
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lengths that colonists were willing to go to in order to maintain power.41 Furthermore, 
individuals who had fought to suppress the rebellion were expected to utilise this 
‘knowledge’ against other colonial resistance.42 The likelihood of extreme violence was 
increased by the expectations of the colonists regarding the behaviour of indigenous 
populations; Wagner argues that the Indian Mutiny was instrumental to the nature of 
British responses to colonial unrest in which they responded to what the violence ‘could 
become’. This approach, Wagner suggests, contributed to the ‘disproportionality of 
colonial state violence’.43 Of course, British colonial suppression did not follow a 
blueprint regarding the Mutiny, and there were specific reasons for the development of 
the violence in that instance; nonetheless, the sheer brutality of this ‘race war’44 is 
striking and was a ‘lesson’ that the Empire would not forget.  
Recent debates regarding ‘minimum force’ illuminate the ways in which 
assumptions continue regarding a British propensity for moderation. The British Army 
clearly went beyond what could be considered ‘necessary’ to defeat the indigenous 
opposition in these cases and, as discussed in chapter 1, minimum force was not part of 
British military doctrine in nineteenth-century colonial warfare. However, assumptions 
of a British approach based on moderation were (and remain) present. While recent 
studies have brought to light the brutalities of decolonisation, such violence was 
consistent with the colonial relationship hitherto. Huw Bennett importantly highlights 
the nature of the violence inflicted in Kenya against the Mau Mau and argues that just 
because minimum force was not adhered to, does not mean that a policy of maximum 
force was followed, but neither does that demonstrate a British propensity for 
moderation;45 rather, British doctrine allowed the men on the spot to determine the 
‘necessary’ levels of force to be applied. 46  Scholars of counterinsurgency have 
demonstrated that a British approach was not ‘exceptional’ in its use of violence.47 
Furthermore, measures of extreme violence were given ‘tacit’ if not official ‘approval’ 
in London and by colonial administrators, as this study demonstrates regarding 
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45 Huw Bennett, ‘Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21:3 
(2010), 466.  
46 Ibid., 466. 
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Salisbury’s uncompromising approach in the reconquest and the Boer War.48 This thesis 
supports the view that Callwell’s analysis of small wars demonstrated the advocacy and 
acceptance of the use of a considerable lack of restraint, rather than moderation.49 Long-
held assumptions regarding Britain’s ‘exceptionalism’ include successes in 
counterinsurgency based on ‘hearts and minds’; this approach is deemed to represent a 
‘British Way’ in warfare.50 However, as a closer investigation of colonial violence 
throughout the Empire shows, ‘in many instances, slaughter was the “British Way”, in 
theory and in practice’.51  
As I have discussed above, Callwell’s approach included a ‘mixed message’ 
with regards to the issue of force and at times his argument is more ambiguous, 
emphasising on the one hand the need to beat the enemy ‘thoroughly’,52 but on the 
other, the suppression of a rebellion without exasperating the enemy.53 The tension 
between these two approaches was in evidence throughout the British Empire and is 
borne out by Jervois’ approach in Perak, for example: while Jervois was at pains to 
emphasise the need to protect innocent civilians, he also advocated swift retribution to 
prevent extended hostilities and measures of scorched earth and blockades. Similarly, in 
relation to German colonial warfare, Susanne Kuss highlights the ways in which 
explicit orders could be implicitly contradicted in a colonial context.54 These tensions 
were often masked in the vague language of colonial documents and first-hand accounts 
of colonial campaigns are essential to uncover the true extent of the force utilised. In the 
case of the Sudan, it was clear that the fundamental aim was to destroy the Mahdia as a 
force for opposition to colonial rule. Nevertheless, Kitchener did at times advocate 
some restraint, but this explicit order was violated throughout the campaign by an 
uncompromising approach that offered ‘no quarter’ and did not view the enemy as 
human.  
In relation to the ‘minimum force’ debates and the question of British military 
doctrine, Bennett makes an important point that, as historians, we need to focus on what 
soldiers actually do, rather than what ‘doctrine or social background posit they ought to 
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do’ – this point is particularly significant considering that the British Army has 
traditionally placed more emphasis upon the practice of colonial warfare rather than 
doctrine.55 Furthermore, doctrinal texts and the ideas discussed by important military 
figures such as B. H. Liddell Hart generally ignored ‘small wars’,56 in favour of 
focusing on traditional European warfare – this was an emphasis that continued beyond 
World War I, although the Field Service Regulations did add a section on ‘Warfare 
Against an Uncivilised Enemy’ in the 1912 edition. In any case, this official doctrine 
only served as a guide and was too general for those who had no experience of colonial 
warfare; Callwell therefore remained essential reading.57 Wolseley’s The Soldier’s 
Pocket-Book for Field Service confirms an approach, which recognised the need to 
‘strike hard and strike quickly.’58 This book was distributed to all British officers and 
much like Callwell’s work, it was continually updated in light of the ‘lessons’ that were 
learnt in colonial campaigns.59 Troops were often ill prepared for the realities of 
colonial warfare and as they arrived on the periphery, their official training at military 
academies was of little use and they had to learn ‘uncivilised’ tactics on the job.60 This 
study has shown that colonial troops were given much leeway in terms of their actions 
and, at times, they were given ‘free reign’, leading to an approach in which no quarter 
was offered and the enemy wounded were not spared. While such tactics may have been 
implicitly understood, the ultimate objective of these campaigns was clear: to suppress 
resistance and sufficiently punish any opposition– the form this violence would take 
was open to interpretation. In each campaign the tactics of the enemy differed, as did 
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the terrain and the conditions, therefore improvisation and adaptation were essential in a 
colonial context.61  
The case studies demonstrate the ad hoc nature of colonial conflicts, 
highlighting the typical struggles of small wars: disease, challenging weather conditions 
and poor living/sleeping conditions, lack of food and clean water, all of which – along 
with an ‘irregular’ opponent who refused to engage in battle – led to frustration and 
fuelled a desire to experience military action. As each case study shows, colonial 
warfare entailed adapting one’s own tactics in response to the actions of their 
opponents. Or as Wolseley put it: ‘you must to a great extent adopt the enemy’s mode 
of fighting, which is invariably well suited to the country they occupy’.62 The British 
had a range of extreme methods at their disposal. However, it is important to emphasise, 
as Kuss does, that the nature of colonial campaigns was directly related to conditions 
and contexts on the ground (‘theatres of war’/Kriegsschauplätze) and hence, as in the 
case of German colonial campaigns, the military interacted with local conditions 
producing a ‘unique dynamic’ rather than ‘the imposition of a preestablished mindset’.63 
This approach was certainly apparent regarding British colonial troops who received 
little training in the conduct of colonial warfare, with an emphasis on learning on the 
job. British campaigns varied greatly and their outcome was subject to the size of the 
opposition and the tactics their opponents undertook. It is evident from the case studies 
and Callwell’s treatise, for example, that if a colonial enemy would not fight in open 
battle, scorched earth tactics were standard. Kuss’ study of German colonial wars 
emphasises the differing nature of each German campaign and concludes that each 
context and conflict is distinct. In contrast to Isabel Hull’s work, which has argued a 
distinct German ‘military culture’ which ultimately led to genocide, Kuss argues that we 
need to examine the unique local conditions.64 Kuss considers three cases, one of which 
is the German war against the Herero and Nama, which became ‘the first genocide of 
the twentieth century’.65 Kuss’ study shows that this campaign occurred within a similar 
context to Germany’s other colonial wars and that genocide was one of many options on 
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a continuum of violence; indeed, the events in German Southwest Africa remained the 
exception.66 Hence, by considering a range of campaigns, methods of extreme violence 
and motivations, Kuss shows that the Herero genocide was not the result of a 
‘specifically German will to exterminate’,67 but rather that genocide could and did 
become an option in the colonies in certain conditions. The relationship between 
colonialism and genocide will be discussed below, but clearly the two are connected. 
The case studies under examination demonstrate that, as Kuss shows, the difficult 
conditions in the colonies, as well as a long and uncertain wait for military action 
contributed to an eagerness to engage in battle with the enemy and a willingness to 
utilise extreme methods, as the case of Gatacre’s men in the Sudan demonstrates.  
Both Kuss and Tanja Bührer highlight the importance of indigenous tactics in 
colonial warfare and the ways in which these affected the overall nature of the colonial 
campaigns. Both scholars have considered the German campaigns in German East 
Africa. Bührer in particular argues that German tactics were affected by local traditions 
of warfare. Bührer discusses an ‘africanisation’ (Afrikanisierung) of European tactics, 
arguing that the German Schutztruppe (‘protection force’) modified aspects of African 
war tactics, in particular, holding women hostage and removing cattle in order to bribe 
the rebels into negotiation.68  Bührer argues that owing to the nature of colonial 
conflicts, it was not possible for the Schutztruppe to fight their African counterparts 
with European tactics. Instead, Bührer argues, the Schutztruppe had to follow ‘an 
African logic of violence’, which led to the targeting of the local population.69 Clearly 
one has to tread carefully in arguing that colonial troops undertook extreme methods of 
violence such as scorched earth in terms of an ‘africanisation’ of European tactics; 
Bührer is quite clear that this argument should not be understood as trying to exculpate 
brutal German tactics70 – however, this line of thinking certainly can sound similar to 
contemporary arguments regarding the ‘nature’ of the ‘natives’ and justifications for 
undertaking ‘savage’ methods. It is of course highly important to emphasise the agency 
of indigenous actors who fought against the colonisation process, an issue which is 
often neglected and which ‘colonial archives’ rarely allow.71 It was argued throughout 
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the British Empire, as Callwell put it, that in certain circumstances, ‘the regular forces 
are compelled, whether they like it or not, to conform to the savage method of battle’.72 
Kuss also highlights that the ‘failure’ of the enemy to conform to European standards of 
warfare was viewed as a ‘testament to their lack of humanity’.73 Hence, as I have argued 
throughout this thesis, when European troops diverged from these standards they had a 
ready-made excuse for doing so: they could blame the ‘savage native’.  
It is apparent throughout this thesis that British military tactics were adapted in 
the face of ‘irregular’ opposition: one example is the case of Sierra Leone in which Lt.-
Col. Marshall took over the British campaign in April 1898 and implemented flying 
columns and scorched earth tactics; British troops had repeatedly failed to bring the 
opposition into open battle as a result of Bai Bureh’s tactics of ‘bush warfare’, based on 
stockades and snipers. As stated above, the frustrations of the troops were further 
heightened by issues of supply and the trying conditions on the ground, notably the 
discomfort of sleeping in an area that had been decimated by scorched earth tactics. 
British actions were radicalised by the conditions on the ground and colonial forces 
needed to adapt in order to remove indigenous opposition. The British Army had a 
range of methods available to it, there was no uniform response and, similar to Kuss’ 
study, the context of the campaigns clearly affected the methods that would be utilised. 
It is evident that in the Sudan, the neglect and killing of the enemy wounded was fairly 
routine practice. In contrast, only Carleton’s description of the campaign in Sierra 
Leone described tactics of no quarter and massacring captured troops, and this violence 
was directly related to a more extreme campaign in the South of the Protectorate. 
Clearly the tactics of the enemy did influence the brutal methods of the British; but 
again, it is important to emphasise that extreme methods such as taking no prisoners 
were available to the colonial troops, when it was felt necessary in the face of staunch 
opposition. If extreme tactics were not utilised, it was not on the basis of any moral 
objection. 
What both Kuss and Bührer make clear is that an approach which discusses 
‘German colonial warfare’ as uniform and prescriptive does not grasp the ways in which 
there was a range of methods at their disposal and that the tactics and terrain of the 
indigenous opposition affected how the German colonial troops fought their colonial 
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wars.74 Hence, such studies demonstrate the specific challenges for European colonial 
armies, who were faced with similar issues throughout their empires. While one may 
argue that German colonial troops were under additional pressure to succeed as ‘late 
comers’ to empire, clearly all of the European imperial powers were under pressure to 
maintain their powers at the fin de siècle 75 – as this thesis shows, concerns of 
international prestige were at the forefront of the colonists’ minds when faced with 
indigenous opposition. These more in-depth studies demonstrate the need for further 
European comparisons, demonstrating the use of similar methods, subject to 
circumstance. Contrary to Hull’s supposition, German colonial violence was not 
‘unique’.76 While the violence inflicted against the Herero and the Nama may have been 
‘unusual even by contemporary standards’, this fact was not the result of a German 
propensity for ‘final solutions’.77 In the case of the British Empire, as this study shows, 
if there was a ‘British way in colonial warfare’ it was based on a catalogue of extreme 
violence, which was drawn upon subject to the conditions on the ground; these methods 
were readily utilised when deemed ‘necessary’.   
 
The British Empire and ‘Exceptions’ of Violence 
 
Both British and German violence have been regarded as ‘exceptional’ – Britain based 
on its moderation and Germany based on its brutality. Hull’s work is central to these 
debates. In Absolute Destruction Hull presents the case of British violence in the Boer 
War in contrast to Germany’s propensity for ‘final solutions’. While the war was fought 
in a ‘colonial’ setting, clearly, this was not a conventional ‘colonial war’ – although 
neither was it a ‘gentlemen’s war’.78 Hull’s use of this war as her point of comparison is 
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problematic. Fundamental to Hull’s argument in relation to the nature of the German 
imperial military are assumptions regarding Britain’s contrasting political culture which 
include: the role of parliamentary intervention, strong civilian control of the military, 
and effective public criticism.79 Regarding the last point, in reference to public outrage, 
which was voiced in response to reports of the conditions in the concentration camps, it 
is essential to note that the outcry against this huge loss of civilian life was motivated by 
the skin colour of the victims. No moral outrage was directed against the ‘native’ 
camps, the conditions of which were far worse; Emily Hobhouse did not even visit 
them.80 The failure to make this distinction allows Hull to reach a false conclusion in 
reference to the role of public opinion in Britain regarding colonial violence. 81 
Criticisms were also voiced in the press in response to both the Sierra Leone ‘Hut Tax’ 
War and most notably in the case of the reconquest of the Sudan. However, that this 
criticism was ineffectual can be gleaned from the fact that Britain’s most controversial 
‘colonial’ war took place shortly after. In the case of the Sudan, clearly the death of 
Gordon captured the British public’s imagination and there was widespread support for 
the reconquest campaign and the systematic defeat of the Mahdia. In any case, criticism 
came too late for a change in tactics and it seems that the running of future campaigns 
was not affected. Indeed, considering Kitchener’s role in the controversial reconquest 
campaign it may be noted that he was nevertheless chosen as Roberts’ successor in the 
Boer War. Hence his career was not hampered as a result and he was given the role 
despite (or perhaps because of?) his propensity for extreme measures in the face of 
strong opposition. Kitchener’s successful career brings into question Rod Thornton’s 
contention regarding minimum force and the promotion of ‘gatekeepers’ of dominant 
norms. If Kitchener was a ‘gatekeeper’ of ‘Victorian values’ then those values 
supported extreme violence based on racial prejudices, destructive tactics of 
concentration and ‘taking no prisoners’, rather than ‘pluck’ and Christian 
                                                
79 Hull, Absolute Destruction, 184-85. See: Thomas Kühne, ‘Honour and Violence’, History Workshop 
Journal, 62:1 (2006), 304-10.  
80 Smith and Stucki, ‘Concentration Camps’, 429. Alexander B. Downes, ‘Desperate Times, Desperate 
Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimisation in War’, International Security, 30:4 (2006), 430; see 
also: Elizabeth van Heyningen, ‘Costly Mythologies: The Concentration Camps of the South African War 
in Afrikaner Historiography’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 34:3 (2008), 495-513; idem, ‘A Tool 
for Modernisation? The Boer Concentration Camps of the South African War, 1900–1902’, South African 
Journal of Science, 106:5–6 (2010), 1-10: 
http://www.sajs.co.za/index.php/SAJS/article/view/242/290. Accessed 30 June 2016.  
81 Kuss also makes this point: German Colonial Wars, 350, n21. 
  215 
gentlemanliness.82 As Hull shows, Kitchener pushed for ever-more extreme methods 
against the Boer population – including the banishment of oppositionist Boer civilians 
and POWs83 – however, rather contradictorily in light of her argument regarding the 
moderating effects of civilian authorities, Hull states that ‘It is possible that British 
civilian leaders would have permitted continued severity had it been effective’.84 
Furthermore, one may question Hull’s contention that Kitchener’s tactics were not 
effective.85  
Thomas Kühne also disputes Hull’s approach in relation to the Boer War 
arguing that ‘it was civil politicians in Britain, like Joseph Chamberlain and Alfred 
Milner, who advocated war against the Boer at all costs and who were largely 
responsible for the radicalisation of warfare when the military was confronted with 
more obstacles than expected’.86 Indeed, Roberts offered an amnesty for combatants 
who surrendered in the first months of 1900; however, Lord Lansdowne criticised this 
leniency.87 Although there were civilian objections to the extreme violence in South 
Africa – as demonstrated by Liberal politician Henry Campbell-Bannerman’s ‘methods 
of barbarism’ speech – the tactics used were not new (with the exception of the 
concentration camps) and scorched earth policies were clearly utilised across the 
Empire.88 It was not always the case that more moderate actions were encouraged by 
politicians in London;89 as Bruce Vandervort argues additional pressure could result 
from politicians at home for a ‘decisive victory’,90 which in turn influenced the British 
military’s decision to undertake ‘strategies of attrition’, resulting in a radicalisation of 
the methods of violence.91 Even when politicians were reticent regarding the use of 
extreme violence, rarely did they intervene to restrain the actions of the men on the spot. 
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While the respective Secretaries of State for the Colonies may have bemoaned the 
heavy-handed approach of the men on the ground, they took little action to rein them in. 
Regarding the alleged moderating influence of the British parliament and civilians, 
politicians in London could also advocate more extreme solutions to colonial unrest, 
one example of note being Lord Salisbury. Studies of decolonisation also demonstrate 
the role of politicians in the imperial metropole regarding British colonial violence. For 
example, Caroline Elkins and Huw Bennett both emphasise the ways in which the 
extreme brutalities inflicted against suspected Mau Mau were officially sanctioned.92  
 Distant colonial wars were brought home in a variety of ways, including via 
newspaper reports provided by war correspondents, parliamentary debates, first-hand 
published accounts and letters home from colonial troops which, as we have seen, were 
highly revealing regarding the nature of these campaigns. Significantly, the work of 
writers such as G. A. Henty whose historical adventure stories described colonial 
skirmishes and ‘derring-do’, espoused the values of the British imperial project and its 
ideals to the British public.93 Anyone who was interested could read about the extreme 
violence of the British Army across the Empire; newspapers quite openly reported and 
supported the use of extreme violence, accepting the commonly held belief in the 
‘civilised’ versus ‘barbaric’ dichotomy, as demonstrated throughout this study. 
However, critics of British colonial policies and its accompanying violence also 
accepted this dichotomy. In the cases that I have discussed, there is a lack of evidence to 
suggest that the criticism, which was evident in contemporary parliamentary debates 
and certain newspapers, had any effect in curtailing these military campaigns, or that the 
aims of these campaigns were revised.  
Historians have documented the changing nature of modern European warfare 
towards the ‘total wars’ of the twentieth century and typically they acknowledge the 
French Revolution as the watershed moment regarding levée en masse, ‘the nation in 
arms’.94 Importantly, Hull has challenged the assumption that colonial and European 
warfare were markedly different and argues that ‘contemporaries insisted that “small 
wars” were of an entirely different character from “real”, European conflicts; one could 
learn nothing about one from looking at the other’. Hull emphasises that historians have 
been too quick to accept this point of view.95 As historians explore the relevance of 
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European colonial violence for the genocidal violence that occurred in Europe in the 
twentieth century, it seems there is also a need to extend investigations to include the 
relationship between nineteenth-century European and colonial violence. That European 
warfare was becoming increasingly ‘national’ and hence, ‘total’ in nature was indicated 
by Napoleon Bonaparte’s reliance upon the need for his massive armies to sustain 
themselves by ‘living off the land’; such practices made the suffering of the 
noncombatant population inevitable. 96  Outside of Europe, the relevance of the 
American Civil War has been emphasised within the narrative of ‘total war’ and the 
targeting of civilians.97 Henry Dunant’s account of the Battle of Solferino illuminated 
the brutalities of warfare in nineteenth-century Europe and his work was key to the 
establishment of the International Red Cross and the beginnings of a codification of 
international humanitarian law in the form of the Geneva Convention of 1864. 
However, no such provisions were made for ‘uncivilised’ foes,98 including ‘illegitimate’ 
opponents, and these laws were only intended for Europe; of course it was in the 
colonies that the worst excesses of violence would take place in this period. As 
Christine Krüger highlights, contradictory developments were underway during this 
time regarding European warfare: on the one hand there were efforts to make warfare 
more humane and on the other, modern weaponry was allowing European armies to 
wreak mounting levels of devastation, and civilians were increasingly targeted.99 For 
example the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 has been described as ‘a new kind of 
mass warfare’100 and German and French troops clearly acted outside of the doctrine of 
‘civilised warfare’. Examples include the starvation tactics and bombing undertaken by 
the Germans, including the Siege of Paris.101 Hull emphasises the Franco-Prussian War 
for the important precedents of violence that it set and argues that by World War I these 
‘exceptions’ had become the rule.102 Hull identifies that both Britain and Germany were 
turning toward more ‘total’ forms of war firstly in an imperial context and then through 
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the violent practices of World War I;103 this development was to reach its height in 
World War II.104 Clearly the nature of World War II and Adolf Hitler’s objectives for 
his New Order demonstrate the relevance of European colonial warfare for our 
understanding of practices of violence across the Nazi Empire.105 European and colonial 
warfare were taken to the extreme and combined on European soil in an ideological and 
racial battle that differed in scale to all that had preceded it.106 While there was a 
‘totalising’ effect on European warfare in the nineteenth-century, we must consider 
European colonialism in order to identify methods of violence closer in nature and scale 
to the genocidal violence of 1939-45. As Glenn Anthony May has suggested, ‘What 
came to be called “total war” was colonial warfare writ large’.107  
As discussed in chapter 1, scholars are exploring the role of colonial violence 
and assumptions regarding the ‘exceptionalism’ of German colonial violence in 
particular. Peter Lieb’s consideration of counterinsurgency tactics is one example of a 
comparative approach and his work contradicts arguments regarding minimum force, 
demonstrating that Britain was willing to take extreme measures in certain 
circumstances. Lieb’s study regarding the British suppression of unrest in Mesopotamia 
in 1920 highlights the lengths to which the military was willing to go in the face of 
substantial opposition and also demonstrates that assumptions of ‘exceptionalism’ on 
either side are too simplistic.108 The present study supports this view and highlights that 
the British Army was willing to undertake tactics of extreme violence in a colonial 
context, even in the absence of ‘substantial opposition’. An interesting point of 
comparison regarding the tactics used by European colonists is the Boxer Rebellion in 
China in 1900-1901. An international alliance of eight states was created, including 
Britain, France and Germany. As Kuss has explored, a range of ‘interactions’ was key 
to the conflict which ‘unfolded on a multilateral plane.’109 The allies fought a brutal 
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campaign against the Boxers in which tactics included, inter alia, rape and plunder, as 
well as the destruction of villagers’ provisions and property, and mass executions.110 In 
the case of Baoding, as Kuss describes, the punitive expedition ended with the 
execution of suspected ‘Boxers’ who were forced to dig their own graves; temples were 
destroyed and the local population was subject to a levy to pay for the executions and 
the administration of the city.111 Indeed, as Hull emphasises, ‘the uprising brought out 
the worst in all armies present’,112 although the methods they used were of course 
nothing new in a colonial context. That European troops fought together in this way 
demonstrates a consensus regarding the conduct of colonial warfare; this case also 
clearly highlights the ability of European powers to come together in ‘extra-European 
war’, in spite of rivalries and animosities across the continent.113  
Scholars are increasingly considering the ways in which colonial and European 
warfare were interconnected; we need to consider how events in one empire affected 
those in another and the interaction of a dialogue across empires with regards to 
colonial violence and methods of ‘dealing’ with recalcitrant native populations. 
Scholars are addressing the ways in which European colonisers ‘learnt’ from one 
another and how this ‘knowledge’ informed European tactics of violence, thereby 
considering whether we may identify a ‘common approach’ between European powers 
in their modus operandi in the colonies,114 and how this approach informed tactics 
within and across empires. Had European colonialism created ‘a common European tool 
kit’, which was widely available across the continent against perceived enemies from 
within and without, and which ultimately came to be used on European soil?115 If 
knowledge was transferred between the metropole and the colony then this ‘traffic’ 
went in both directions. The treatment of the colonised and the European poor provides 
one example of learning between the metropole and the periphery. The ‘conviction that 
work must be the basis for any kind of help’ was a colonial policy, which we may 
recognise in the actions taken in the famine in Ireland in the 1840s or the famine camps 
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in India in the 1870s and 1880s, as well as the aftermath of the reconquest campaign in 
the Sudan, as discussed above. In Britain, this approach was the basis for the Poor Law 
and the workhouses.116 Although context was important, as Syed Hussein Alatas has 
noted: ‘[w]hen the British capitalist denigrated the British working class he was not 
denigrating the entire British nation. In the case of the colonial ideology, whole 
communities and ethnic groups were affected.’117 Clearly the development of colonial 
policies on the periphery was informed by national, colonial and local knowledge and 
contexts, and there was no uniform approach. Nevertheless, it was the case that the use 
of brutal methods on the periphery had in common the imperial ideology of European 
‘superiority’ over the ‘inferior’ ‘natives’, which informed ‘deadly learning’ across 
empires.118  
The knowledge that accumulated throughout Europe’s empires included 
practices which had already been undertaken within Europe, but which were utilised on 
a different scale in the colonies and that were radicalised by the racial ideology of 
empire. Attempts to codify humanitarian laws in European warfare aimed to remove 
these practices from European soil, however, such methods including starvation tactics, 
summary executions and punitive expeditions continued to be deemed acceptable in a 
colonial context. The accumulation of experiences throughout the colonies led to an 
‘archive’ of methods that were used to quell opposition to European powers – the 
phenomenon of the concentration camp is just one example.119 Arguments regarding 
knowledge transfer clearly represent a challenge to the historian in terms of empirical 
evidence and it is clear that one needs to tread carefully in making assumptions 
regarding wider connections.120 It is nevertheless important to emphasise the fact that 
many of these modes of violence had taken place in Europe and when extreme practices 
of violence became increasingly common in Europe in the twentieth century, this was 
not merely the result of a transfer of knowledge from the colonies back to the metropole 
but rather represented an interaction between the two; these experiences filtered back to 
Europe in the twentieth century as European warfare became increasingly violent and 
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destructive. Kuss also highlights such ‘interaction’ in relation to the Boxer War and the 
‘forms of exchange’ which took place.121 Aside from setting precedents, acts of colonial 
violence were relevant in terms of how individual ‘outbreaks’ of violence were dealt 
with by colonial authorities. As Hull also argues, European armies learnt from one 
another and ‘Their similarities far outweighed their differences’.122 Jonas Kreienbaum 
notes how in the face of guerrilla warfare the Colonial Office looked to the Franco-
Prussian War and American Civil War ‘in order to evaluate which measures were 
feasible in counter-guerrilla warfare’.123 With regards to the practice of massacres, 
Philip Dwyer and Lyndall Ryan also note the importance of personnel exchanges and 
the ways in which experiences were transferred, citing the example of British officers in 
Ireland in 1798 that later served in Spain, India and Australia.124  
The taking of hostages represents one example of the interaction between the 
methods utilised by European powers in continental warfare as well as on the periphery. 
In South Africa, Roberts had already proclaimed the intention to take hostages in an 
attempt to halt the destruction of railways by the Boers; as L. S. Amery summarised, 
‘residents in the various districts might be carried on trains, as hostages for their 
compatriots’ good behaviour’. However, as Amery states, these measures were not 
effective (and were revoked a few weeks later) as ‘the persons who were ordained to 
suffer were not the mobile commandos who did the damage, but peaceful Boers who 
had surrendered’. Importantly, Amery claims that this policy was founded on 
‘precedents set by the Germans in 1871’.125 While Britain’s practices of violence had 
been predominantly utilised in the colonies, during World War I it became clear that 
Britain – as well as her allies and rivals – was willing to undertake tactics that would not 
be considered ‘civilised’.126 Britain has a history of naval bombardment and blockades 
(which invariably led to civilian suffering), as well as aerial bombardment.127 Blockades 
were used to devastating effect against the Central Powers in World War I via the so-
called ‘starvation blockade’ which was enforced by the British and which ultimately led 
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to the excess deaths of 763,000 civilians in Germany and Austria-Hungary, in a bid to 
‘starve Germany out’;128 British methods also included the use of poisonous gas and 
jellite shells, which contained cyanide.129 Other colonial ‘learning’ includes tactics that 
emerged during and after World War I regarding the internment of POWs, ‘aliens’, as 
well as civilian refugee camps in Europe.130 It is also interesting to note, in the context 
of British policies, that German POWs retained a higher status than colonial workers in 
Britain’s labour companies in World War I.131 As James McMillan argued, ‘The 
violence that would be generated by the First World War was unprecedented in Europe 
itself, but it had nineteenth-century roots and antecedents’; these antecedents occurred 
both within and outside of Europe.132   
European military theorists drew on the experiences of other countries, as is 
evident from Callwell’s work, which explored a range of campaigns to bring together 
his treatise on the challenges of ‘irregular’ warfare for ‘regular’ troops. Although, in 
marked contrast to Britain, Kuss argues that Germany did not try to determine ‘lessons’ 
from her own imperial warfare.133 With regards to the three case studies, direct 
personnel connections were unlikely due to their timing: the Perak War took place over 
twenty years earlier and the Sudan and Sierra Leone campaigns were occurring 
simultaneously. However, Carleton provides one example, as prior to fighting in Sierra 
Leone, he had been present in Dongola at the beginning of the Sudan reconquest 
campaign, in which ‘no quarter [was] given or asked’.134 In relation to both campaigns, 
Carleton expressed his indifference to the suffering of those that he and his fellow 
troops killed. While his letters do not provide direct reflections in relation to comparing 
the two campaigns and the ‘lessons’ he may have learnt, it is perhaps significant, as 
discussed above, that it was the Indian Mutiny that first came to mind on his arrival in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone. By considering the wider context of colonial violence, we can 
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see that military men such as Kitchener, Wolseley and Gatacre took their experiences 
with them and adapted tactics of extreme violence across the Empire and beyond; these 
connections warrant further research.  
 Clearly discussions regarding Germany’s relationship with extreme violence in 
her colonies are linked to discussions of colonialism and genocide, as scholars have 
been considering the connections between German colonial violence and Nazi 
genocidal violence, as well as exploring Hitler’s expansionist aims in ‘the East’ as 
colonialism.135 Scholars have discussed whether German colonial violence can be 
understood as ‘exceptional’ and the extent to which we can identify ‘continuities’ from 
‘Africa to Auschwitz’.136 This thesis argues that studies of British colonial violence are 
relevant to these debates in terms of the apparent emergence of a new colonial 
Sonderweg.137 While it does not suffice to argue that there was a ‘direct line’ of 
continuity from the colonies to the genocidal violence of World War II, it is clear that 
there was an historical context of European traditions of violence which was relevant to 
twentieth-century developments of extreme violence. Levels of German colonial 
violence were not ‘exceptional’ and need to be considered within the context of 
European colonial practices.138 Kuss argues that rather than a direct line of continuity, a 
‘German colonial Sonderweg was conspicuous by its absence’.139 While contemporary 
British commentators may have criticised ‘German methods’ in the colonies prior to 
1914, these arguments once again recall ‘the peculiar imperial squint’, when 
considering another empire’s atrocious behaviour.140 The present study demonstrates 
that it was not only the German colonists who celebrated introducing ‘civilisation’ to 
‘semi-barbarous people … by the thunder of artillery, the demolition of towns, and 
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human bloodshed.’141 With regards to the similar approaches of Britain and Germany in 
the colonies, Vinay Lal references the fact that the British ‘pioneered’ the use of dum-
dum bullets in India, and argues that ‘though Britain, the island civilisation, prided itself 
on its unquestionable moral superiority to the militaristic Germans, it undoubtedly had a 
thing or two to teach’ them.142 Indeed, as Ulrike Lindner’s work highlights, the British 
Empire served as a ‘role model’ for European imperialism, and for Germany in 
particularly. 143  As the introduction discusses, scholars have explored European 
colonialism as an important historical precedent to fascism on European soil. In 
criticising the ‘continuity thesis’, Birthe Kundrus emphasises a need ‘to relativise the 
significance of German colonialism and stress the European dimension of imperialism. 
From this vantage point, the imperial world of the 1930s, especially the British Empire, 
was a kind of “sounding board” for National Socialism.’144 Hence the British Empire 
was also an important precedent regarding extreme racial violence. It is evident that 
colonial violence is relevant to understandings of the intra-European violence of the 
twentieth century and there is a need for more empirically based, synchronic 
comparisons of colonial violence and for further in-depth enquiry into individual cases 
of colonial brutality. We need further studies of European colonial violence based on 
archival research so that comparative research can be undertaken, which will enhance 
our understanding of the development of European traditions of violence both within 
and outside of the colonies.145  
A Colonial Logic of Genocide?146 
 
At the outset of this study I argued the relevance of considering the phenomenon of 
colonial violence through the lens of genocide. An exploration of the relationship 
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between colonialism and genocide demonstrates the connections between the two; in 
light of the size and significance of the British Empire it is logical that the latter also be 
at the centre of discussions regarding this relationship. Discussions of Britain’s 
Holocaust Memorial Day highlight the need for greater investigation into Britain’s role 
in mass violence, to challenge assumptions that genocide has little to do with Britain 
and its history; Britain’s role in genocidal violence and practices is much more complex 
than is often assumed and this role needs to be explored. In a discussion of the 
relationship between Ireland and Britain within a context of genocide – an issue which 
has received only a limited amount of attention – Robbie McVeigh rightly emphasises 
the difference between settler and ‘administrative colonialism’, the latter being most 
relevant to the present study and within which ‘the logic is less directly genocidal’.147 
Nevertheless, as McVeigh argues in the context of British policies in Ireland, the 
potential for genocidal policies was present, not least due to the ability of colonists to 
use starvation tactics as ‘a deliberate administrative policy of genocide’.148 Indeed, 
starvation tactics could serve to radicalise campaigns of colonial warfare into ‘wars of 
extermination’ (Vernichtungskrieg). 149  The one-sided nature of colonial violence, 
technological advances and increasingly ‘total’ aspects, as well as the racism that 
informed colonial violence are issues that connect the Empire to potential practices of 
genocide. The ‘potential’ for genocide is clear in the reconquest of the Sudan in 
reference to starvation tactics, the massacring of the enemy wounded and surrendering 
troops, as well as the targeting of Emirs for violence in the conflict’s aftermath. 
However, in considering the relationship between colonialism and genocide, Michael 
Mann rightly points out that ‘colonial governments almost never wanted to kill the 
natives beyond what was necessary for conquest. They wanted the natives to tax and 
conscript.’150 Roberta Pergher and Mark Roseman also emphasise this point: ‘On the 
face of it, genocide is inimical with empire, indeed in some sense its negation’ as ‘[i]f 
the “others” are all eliminated … imperial rule ends’.151 Hence, it is perhaps more 
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useful to consider ‘moments’ of genocidal potential in relation to administrative 
colonialism, owing to the fact that, fundamentally, the European coloniser needed a 
population to colonise.152 In contrast to these arguments, when it comes to settler 
colonialism in nineteenth-century America and Australia, Norbert Finzsch, among 
others, has argued that settler imperialism is itself inherently genocidal.153 The close 
relationship between colonialism and genocide is made clear by Raphael Lemkin’s oft-
quoted statement that: 
Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the 
oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the 
oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed 
population which is allowed to remain or upon the territory alone, after 
removal of the population and the colonisation of the area by the 
oppressor’s own nationals.154 
For Jürgen Zimmerer, the relevance of colonialism for genocide is clear; as he 
states, ‘genocide is colonial’, though it does not necessarily follow that the reverse is 
true.155 The initial disregard of the subject ‘colonial genocide’ can be accounted for, in 
part, by the overemphasis of political scientists in the 1980s on the role of the state in 
genocide.156 Lemkin, whose work on the subject, as well as the related 1948 United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has 
been rediscovered in recent years, did not share this assumption.157 When Patrick Wolfe 
discusses settler colonialism in genocidal terms he refers specifically to the ‘logic of 
elimination’, arguing that this logic is present in cases of settler colonialism and states 
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that: ‘Settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory but not invariably genocidal.’158 
Wolfe argues that this logic is a result of the settlers’ need for the land, but not 
necessarily the labour of the people, thus making their presence undesirable to the 
colonists.159 Colonial genocide challenges the perception of genocide as state-led as 
often in a colonial context it is the colonial settlers rather than the state that are leading 
the violence.160 Caroline Elkins’ Britain’s Gulag also shows how the presence of 
settlers in a colonial context could radicalise the nature of the conflict in the face of 
indigenous resistance. Even though genocide did not occur in this case, Elkins 
highlights the potential for genocide as settlers grew increasingly frustrated with the 
actions of the imperial metropole and they sought to take the law into their own 
hands.161 The point regarding Elkins’ study as well as the present work is not to ‘prove’ 
that genocide took place,162 but rather to examine the dynamics of violence within a 
consideration of the wider debates around genocide. 
While studies of colonialism and genocide have highlighted similar issues to 
those identified in the present study with regards to communication and policies 
between the metropole and the periphery, these issues were made even more complex 
by the actions of the settlers and highlight the problematic issue of colonial genocide 
and intent. 163  The question of ‘unintended’ consequences of colonial policy is 
particularly challenging for genocide scholars.164 Levels of responsibility are difficult to 
ascertain, for example, as governments were often more than aware that their policies 
would lead to what they perceived to be the ‘inevitable’ demise of the indigenous 
population as a result of factors such as disease, malnutrition, birth-rate decreases to 
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name a few, even if these were not the effects of an active policy of killing.165 Hence, 
the issue of communications is no less problematic with regards to settler colonialism 
and policies in the metropole could differ enormously to the intentions of settlers and 
the two were often highly contradictory; just because official policy was theoretically 
designed to protect the indigenous population, did not insure its implementation and 
real conditions on the periphery could easily overtake the ideals of those in the 
metropole. Thus, a lack of agency from government could be enough to seal the fate of 
a native community, with a persistent failure of the metropole to hinder settler 
behaviour in the colonies.166 We may recognise the fact that the government in London 
often failed to protect the population and continued its imperial project regardless of the 
devastating consequences at the hands of the settlers, consequences of which they were 
well aware.167 This study demonstrates that in cases of administrative colonialism, 
politicians in the metropole were also aware that extreme tactics of violence were being 
utilised against indigenous resistance and that politicians in London rarely had a 
moderating effect upon these campaigns. 
Establishing clear lines of intent in the colonies can be highly problematic, 
especially since colonial systems of government could be confusing and complex. One 
example, which has been discussed among genocide scholars, is the case of the 
destruction of the indigenous Tasmanian population; Tom Lawson certainly considers 
this to be a case of ‘British genocide’. While highlighting the key role of social 
Darwinist thinking and the extermination of the Tasmanians, Lawson also emphasises 
key features of the approach taken in Australia, which we may identify as being part of 
a wider approach throughout the British Empire, even though the outcome in the case of 
Tasmania was the almost total destruction of the indigenous population of the island, 
and clearly this genocidal violence went far beyond anything discussed in the cases 
above. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that similar approaches to violence 
against the indigenous populations were utilised across the British Empire. For 
example, Lawson describes the desire of the British government to demonstrate 
‘absolute force’ against the Aborigines and thus to ‘demonstrate to the indigenous 
population the full might of the British Empire’.168 Clearly force was used to ‘teach the 
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natives a lesson’ and exemplary violence was used repeatedly to suppress both actual 
and potential resistance across the Empire, as this study shows.169  
Racial prejudices informed London’s indifference to the suffering of the 
indigenous population at the hands of the settlers, believing that their extinction was 
ultimately ‘inevitable’.170 While the cases within the present study do not deal directly 
with genocide, they demonstrate that British politicians were willing to allow extreme 
methods in the colonies in the event that these were deemed to be necessary. In a 
consideration of the genocidal potential of colonial warfare, Dominik Schaller and 
Jürgen Zimmerer emphasise that ‘even in cases in which colonial military commanders 
did not aim at exterminating their indigenous enemies they usually willingly and 
cynically accepted the death of thousands of Africans or Asians as a collateral damage 
of their method of warfare’.171 This thesis has repeatedly highlighted the unequal and 
often one-sided nature of colonial warfare in terms of strength and weaponry and shows 
that the potential for mass violence against indigenous resistance was great; here again 
we may recognise the ‘potential’ for genocidal violence in the extreme violence that 
was routinely utilised. Kuss and Bührer demonstrate the ways in which a consideration 
of genocide is relevant to studies of European colonialism; Kuss’ study also shows that 
there could be a fine line between extreme violence and genocide, subject to the 
circumstances on the ground, which could quickly radicalise. And in emphasising 
extreme tactics of brutality – including hunger tactics and scorched earth – Bührer 
highlights that such tactics were often a sign of weakness on the part of the ‘colonial 
powers’, rather than the result of a clear policy of genocide, although the end result 
could still be highly destructive.172 While the cases discussed here did not constitute 
genocide, this thesis shows that even small-scale colonial conflicts led to one-sided 
brutalities that ravaged the regions the British sought to ‘civilise’ and ‘protect’. Colonial 
conflicts could easily become wars of attrition due to the imbalance of power and 
resources between the colonial force and the indigenous forces/local populations. 
Genocidal ‘potential’ was further heightened by the perceived ‘illegitimacy’ of the 
colonial enemy. Schaller and Zimmerer also consider the binary encoding regarding the 
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‘colonised’ and the ‘colonisers’ to be a ‘precondition for genocide’, stating that 
‘Colonial wars are thus potentially genocidal’. In considering the relationship between 
settler colonialism and genocide, they state that ‘three factors seem to be especially 
important: a sense of crises, a radicalisation on the ground, and the absence of any 
restraining political or moral authority’.173 Clearly the issues they raise are relevant to 
the present study; a sense of crisis and perceived threat to the colonial project was 
present in each case and was essential to the execution of extreme violence, but this 
sense of crisis was often limited and stemmed predominantly from the results of the 
colonisers’ own actions against the indigenous populations. There was no real threat on 
the ground and this meant that the violence was contained and did not extend beyond 
the objective of ‘pacifying’ the area and bringing it under British control.  
As Dirk Moses highlights, there are many ways to study empire and genocide; 
the point of such endeavours is not to ‘prove’ that genocide took place, but neither 
should we downplay the levels of destruction that were present.174 While for many 
imperial historians, the issue of genocide in the colonies is an ‘anachronistic 
question’,175 it is the case that colonialism and genocide are intimately connected and if 
we view colonial warfare on a continuum of violence, we can recognise the potential for 
genocide within. Colonial violence was often one-sided: first, from a technological 
point of view. Second, in relation to the disparity between the losses of the indigenous 
population in comparison to the British forces. However, indigenous opponents also had 
advantages in the form of local knowledge and resources, although British tactics of 
scorched earth and blockades soon cut off access to these resources. British colonial 
violence may be viewed within a wider context of European colonial violence and 
clearly further comparative studies are necessary. It is apparent that we need to be more 
open and honest about Britain’s relationship with extreme violence and the true nature 
and legacy of the British Empire.    
As the introduction discusses, debates regarding European colonial violence and 
their relevance to European violence raise the question of why it was Germany, and not 
Britain, that unleashed the greatest levels of racial violence across Europe in the 
twentieth century. Hull presents the issue thus: while ‘all imperial powers behaved 
despicably in the colonies … only Germany went on during World War II to pursue 
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complete extermination as national policy’.176 Britain shared many of the same concerns 
and challenges that its continental neighbours were grappling with at the fin de siècle, 
including the implications of industrialisation and urbanisation, and the demands of the 
new working-class, including increased political participation. Britain should not be 
viewed as immune to more extreme elements that were seeking new solutions to 
contemporary problems, but political extremism was contained by the political system 
and importantly, in Britain, unlike in other European countries in the interwar period, 
‘mainstream conservatism did not need to co-opt [British fascism’s] ideas in order to 
remain in power’.177 Nevertheless, these ideas were present in Britain and as Dan Stone 
explores, the fact that British fascism fundamentally did not go beyond a set of ideas 
was not ‘inevitable’ and although we may look back as this period as one of ‘political 
continuity’, it was not so keenly felt at the time.178  
If one considers the factors presented as typical in the interwar period in 
encouraging political and racial violence, these clearly had limited relevance for Britain. 
Ian Kershaw for example emphasises that low levels of political violence corresponded 
with, inter alia, the fulfilment of imperial ambitions, having fought on the winning side, 
a lack of revolutionary or counter-revolutionary circumstances and a national identity 
based on statehood over ethnicity and culture.179 There is no doubt that victory in World 
War I was essential in providing stability within Britain. However, the extreme violence 
that Britain utilised in World War I to become a victor is often overlooked.180 In Britain, 
a parliamentary system had long been established, even if universal suffrage had not, 
and ‘the principal traditions of liberal democracy were both longstanding and highly 
regarded’.181 But there were periods of instability in Britain in the interwar period, 
including the General Strike in 1926, which ‘left a simmering legacy of bitterness’. 
However, incidents of violence in the Strike were relatively low and institutional 
                                                
176 Isabel V. Hull, ‘Military Culture and the Production of “Final Solutions” in the Colonies: The 
Example of Wilhelminian Germany’, in Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan (eds), The Specter of 
Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 142.  
177 Dan Stone, Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002), 4.  
178 Ibid., 4.  
179 Ian Kershaw, ‘War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe’, Contemporary European 
History, 14:1 (2005), 115.  
180 Methods included the ‘starvation blockade’ as discussed above.  
181 John Stevenson, ‘Conservatism and the Failure of Fascism in Interwar Britain’, in Martin Blinkhorn 
(ed.), Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe 
(Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003), 264.  
  232 
representation of the unions meant that a revolutionary approach was not favoured.182 
Hence, there was a lack of revolutionary zeal in the country, as demonstrated by the fact 
that, as Carl Levy highlights, Tory support for Oswald Mosley and his British Union of 
Fascists was abandoned ‘when he resorted to violence’.183 Despite the relative political 
stability that Britain experienced, in some respects we may recognise similar trends to 
events on the continent and demobilised soldiers after World War I took part in race 
riots and street violence in the aftermath of the war, joined the paramilitary auxiliaries 
in Ireland (the ‘black and tans’), as well as the expanding trade unions.184 However, as 
Paul Preston asserts, Britain was one of the countries with a more flexible system, 
which was better able to deal with the challenges it faced, and also, importantly, had the 
‘safety valve’ of a colonial empire.185 Of course, we cannot know what would have 
taken place had Britain been on the losing side of the war and had lost its colonies, as 
Germany had,186 but clearly the strength of the British Empire and Britain’s victory in 
the war were key in terms of maintaining relative peace at home, as was the long-
established parliamentary system. 
This relative peace in Britain in contrast to the continent allowed the British 
Army to fulfil its role in policing at home within the practice of ‘military discretion’ 
when dealing with civil unrest; this approach was clearly not in evidence in the Empire, 
as the example of Ireland and the prospect of Home Rule shows.187 As in the nineteenth 
century, throughout the interwar period, the violence undertaken on behalf of the British 
government took place predominantly throughout the British Empire, as indigenous 
resistance to the British Empire created ‘a crisis of empire’.188 As the present study 
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demonstrates, Britain’s willingness to rule by force in the colonies was not new. As 
resistance grew in strength, as Martin Thomas argues, there was a ‘repressive 
consensus’ regarding how to deal with colonial resistance in this period, which ‘rarely 
broke down’;189 this consensus was based upon the need to ‘terrorise’ participants of 
unrest, rather than ‘antagonise’.190 This study addresses the brutalities of suppressing 
colonial resistance and the expressed need to act swiftly and decisively against 
indigenous resistance, demonstrating that such ‘repression’ occurred within a wider 
historical framework of British violence in the colonies. It would take another world 
war before resistance to the British Empire would achieve its aims, but Britain’s ‘dirty 
wars’ of decolonisation were fought until the bitter end and were consistent with 
Britain’s violent colonial past, rather than a doctrine of ‘minimum force’, as discussed 
in chapter 1.191  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis emphasises the importance of archival research for furthering our 
understanding of colonial violence and the ways in which British soldiers viewed the 
events in which they participated, demonstrating that they perceived the destructive and 
brutal tactics as justified, based on the ‘uncivilised’ nature of the ‘savage natives’. This 
study highlights the extent of the destruction that occurred as a result of ‘small wars’ 
across the Empire – a term which reveals little as to the scale of the resultant 
destruction. There are many examples of these wars and we know very little about most 
of them, which clearly warrant further research. While sometimes small in scale, these 
wars nevertheless devastated whole communities, often with the use of ‘total’ methods, 
and need to be studied in their own right. By focusing on these little-known conflicts, 
this study illuminates how first-hand accounts are essential to our understanding of 
British colonial violence and the ways that British military men justified their 
participation in extreme violence. This thesis set out to demonstrate the nature of this 
violence and the levels of destruction it entailed throughout the British Empire, in 
contrast to claims that the British Empire was fundamentally a ‘good thing’. It shows 
the inherent nature of the violence within the colonial relationship and the importance of 
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racial prejudices to the outbreak of violence and the forms taken by this violence once 
conflicts broke out. By its nature, colonial violence was disproportionate; extreme 
violence was accepted as necessary in the endeavour of preventing further potential 
unrest.  
Further archival research is needed to enhance our understanding of the extent of 
the violence and destruction across the Empire, as well as the unfolding of events, 
which led to ever-expanding British rule. Future research will also need to bring the 
violence of the British Empire within a comparative framework. 192  This study 
contributes to the historiographies of the individual wars, which for too long, have been 
consigned to the studies of often ‘parochial’ military history, meaning that their 
relevance within a wider context of extreme violence has been overlooked.193 Such 
studies are necessary to further challenge the long-held perception that the British 
Empire was ‘not as bad’ as its European counterparts. This thesis also contributes to the 
body of work on colonial warfare, within wider considerations of studies of violence. 
The existence of the British Empire was only possible because its politicians and 
military men were willing to utilise extreme methods of violence in the face of 
opposition. While maximum (genocidal) violence was not always used, neither was the 
minimum and as scholars are increasingly finding, the history of the British Empire is 
not one of restraint. Violence was fundamental to the British imperial project from the 
very beginning, both in establishing and maintaining British rule. Throughout its 
lifetime the British Empire consistently utilised extreme violence to extend its reach and 
as such, the brutalities of decolonisation were consistent with the logic and traditions of 
British colonial violence in establishing and maintaining the Empire. As well as 
considering the violence of conquest and occupation we need to incorporate studies of 
the everyday violence that permeated the lives of those who found themselves under the 
imposition of British colonial rule. British rule generally began and ended with 
measures of highly destructive violence, and in between these instances, violence was 
ever-present in the day-to-day running of the Empire. Furthermore, the ways in which 
European empires interacted with each other are important and the means by which 
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techniques of violence were transmitted between empires and back to Europe need 
further investigation.  
 This thesis argues that a reassessment of Britain’s relationship with violence is 
required, an issue that is clearly much more complicated than standard studies of British 
history acknowledge. There is a British history of colonial violence, as well as a legacy 
of willingness to utilise extreme tactics against both combatants and noncombatants 
both in and outside of the colonies. Such a reassessment not only has implications for 
the country’s past, but also for its role in the world in the present and future. Studies of 
British colonial violence also, of course, have implications for the history of those 
nations against whom this violence was unleashed. A rethink is also necessary regarding 
the relationship between European and colonial warfare; clearly European tactics did 
not correspond to contemporary notions of ‘civilised warfare’ and extreme violence 
occurred throughout nineteenth-century Europe, albeit sporadically. Comparative 
studies will be essential to this endeavour, as will the work of scholars of violence, 
genocide, and colonialism, as well as those of European and British history. 
Considerations of European colonialism, of which the British Empire was central, are 
essential to furthering our understanding of the dynamics of colonialism and violence in 
the colonies as well as on European soil; in the twentieth century, the ‘violence outside 
Europe was about to come home to roost’.194  
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